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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent escalation of health care costs in the United States has in-
spired a rapid expansion of regulatory controls over the health services
industry. But governmental efforts to grapple with costs directly
through regulation have reflected a concern for a symptom of the
health care system's underlying problems rather than a desire to find
and address root causes.1 The thesis of this Article is that one impor-
1. This Article continues an exploration of the relative value of regulation and market forces
in finding the appropriate level of health care spending. On regulatory issues, see Havighurst,
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taut, and probably remediable, cause of the cost crisis has been the
medical profession's long-standing resistance to economizing innova-
tions in the organization and administration of private plans for financ-
ing health care. It is argued that vigorous enforcement of the antitrust
laws against certain concerted actions taken by physicians with respect
to health care financing could significantly improve the climate for pri-
vate cost-containment initiatives. New interest by the antitrust enforce-
ment agencies in the activities of the organized professions and in the
health services industry generally 2 suggests the existence of real pros-
pects for expanding opportunities for privately initiated change.
Organized medicine has always attached great importance to
health care financing mechanisms and the behavior of private third-
party payers for medical care. Despite the obstacles that the profession
has placed in the way of financing plans employing cost-containment
strategies, health maintenance organizations (HMOs) have become es-
tablished in some communities as an alternative to traditional financ-
ing mechanisms. However, professional opposition to HMOs has
remained strong in many places, and HMOs have not developed rap-
idly or widely? Less well recognized than the medical profession's suc-
cess in curbing HMO development has been its effectiveness in
discouraging structural and administrative innovations in traditional
insurance and service-benefit plans. The result of the profession's ef-
forts in this area has been to deny consumers access to third-party pay-
ment plans. These plans would serve consumers' interest in
economizing, either by strengthening their bargaining position vis-a-vis
Health Care Cost-Containment Regulatioit Prospects and an Alternative, 3 AM. J. L. & MED. 309
(1977); Havighurst, Federal Regulation of the Health Care Delivery Systen" A Foreword in the
Nature of a "Package Insert," 6 U. TOL. L. REv. 577 (1975); Havighurst, Regulation of Health
Facilities and Services by "CertFfcate of Need," 59 VA. L. REV. 1143 (1973); Havighurst & Blum-
stein; Havighurst & Bovbjerg, Professional Standards Review Organizations and Health Mainte-
nance Organizations.":Are They Compatible?, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 381. On the market alternative,
see Controlling Health Care Costs, Havighurst, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Market
for Health Services, 35 LAW & CoNTEMp. PROB. 716 (1970); Havighurst, Speculations on the Mar-
ket'r Future in Health Care, in REGULATING HEALTH FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION 249 (C. Havig-
hurst ed. 1974); Havighurst, Blumstein & Bovbjerg, Strategies in Underwriting the Costs of
Catastrophic Disease, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 122 (1976). The thesis developed in these writ-
ings is that the prospects for effective regulation are overestimated and that the market's potential
value is underestimated. The skepticism toward regulatory prescriptions is comparable to that
appearing in C. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST (1977) (a recent and widely
noted book by the current chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisors).
2. See, e.g., Antitrust: New Pressures on Medicine, PATIENT CARE, Jan. 15, 1978, at 38. The
Federal Trade Commission has been somewhat more active in this area than the Department of
Justice.
3. See generally Kissam, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Role of Antitrust La"
1978 DUKE L.J. 487.
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providers' monopoly power or by preventing 'doctors and patients from
spending inappropriately the funds contributed to the insurance pool.
Although the medical profession's professed reason for inhibiting
the development of HMOs and other health care plans with effective
cost-containment features has been the preservation of the "quality of
care," "free choice of physician," the "doctor-patient relationship," and
"professional independence," the physicians' concerted efforts have
had a darker side as well. The financing programs that have been ac-
ceptable to the medical profession have systematically fostered the de-
mand-stimulating effects of third-party payment and foreclosed
experimentation with ways of offsetting those effects. The profession
has particularly resisted attempts to alter the fee-for-service mode of
payment, to create closed panels of physicians as competitive alterna-
tives to traditional "free choice" insurance plans, and to impose direct
or indirect administrative checks on decision making by physicians and
patients affecting the expenditure of insurance funds. In addition to
HMOs founded on the prepaid group practice model,4 there is a largely
unexplored spectrum of possible administrative arrangements lying be-
tween such HMOs at one extreme and traditional forms of health in-
surance at the other. One purpose of this Article is to highlight some of
the points on this spectrum that deserve more attention than they have
received.
In addition to examining professional restraints on the growth of
such recognized innovations as HMOs, this Article seeks to establish
the true importance of the de facto disciplinary power exercised by
organized medicine over third-party payers for medical care, not only
in the past but at the present time. While other factors also contribute
to the underdevelopment of cost-containment capabilities in the private
sector, it is argued that the slow pace of meaningful change in this area
would increase significantly if third-party payers were less deferential
toward the medical profession. The second half of the Article is con-
cerned specifically with the potential utility of the antitrust laws to re-
duce the threat posed by organized medicine to innovation in health
care financing.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE MEDICAL PROFESSION'S METHODS
OF RESISTING CHANGE
As a result of their long enjoyment of substantial professional au-
4. See, e.g., Phelan, Erickson & Fleming, Group Practice PrepaymentAn Approach to Deliv-
ering Organized Health Services, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 796 (1970).
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tonomy5 physicians now respond almost reflexively to outside interfer-
ence in their affairs by taking collective action through their local, state
and national professional associations, through hospital staff organiza-
tions, and through less formal mechanisms. But as "combinations" of
competitors, professional groups must be prepared to defend them-
selves against the charge under federal or state antitrust laws6 that their
various activities unreasonably restrict competition and deny consum-
ers the benefits of a functioning market. Although courts may allow
professional groups some leeway not allowed industrial trade associa-
tionsI there are certain practices, not all of them uncommon, that can
be called into question. Before addressing the social significance of
these restraints or the antitrust issues they present, it is useful to de-
scribe the means that have been employed by doctors to resist un-
wanted measures.
A. The Strong Arm and the Heavy Hand. Boycotts and Related
Restraints.
Early professional efforts at repressing unwanted innovations pri-
marily involved the use of ethical rules to deny professional opportuni-
ties to physicians who cooperated with new plans. As revealed in the
1943 antitrust case of American Medical Association v. United States,8
expulsion from membership in the county medical society for ethical
violations was an effective tactic against Group Health Association, an
HMO, because hospital staff privileges were not generally available to
HMO physicians without such membership. 9 This precondition for
staff membership resulted in part from the AMA's "Mundt Resolu-
5. Sociologists have shown considerable interest in the autonomy that society has seemingly
granted the so-called learned professions. See, eg., J. BERLANT, PROFESSION AND MONOPOLY: A
STUDY OF MEDICINE IN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN (1975); E. FREIDSON, PROFES-
SIONAL DOMINANCE: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL CARE (1970).
6. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), provides that "[e]very contract, com-
bination. . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,. . . is
declared to be illegal." The other principal federal antitrust statutes are the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12-27 (1976), and the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976). Many of the
state antitrust laws are patterned after the federal statutes. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1
(1975).
7. See notes 197, 199 infra and text accompanying notes 197-99 infra.
8. 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aft'd, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
9. Offending physicians were expelled or threatened with expulsion for violation of the ethic
against "contract practice" of medicine. 130 F.2d at 238-39 n.23. A strikingly similar case is Group
Health Coop. v. King County Medical Soe'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951).
Other doctors involved in HMOs have also encountered problems in obtaining or keeping
membership in local medical societies. For example, in Elk City, Oklahoma, after harassing but
not finding any reason to expel the director of a prepaid medical plan, the local medical society
dissolved for six months and reorganized without him. See E. RAYACK, PROFESSIONAL POWER
AND AMERICAN MEDICINE: THE ECONOMICS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 181
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tion," which stated that internship programs would not be authorized
by the AMA in hospitals where all staff members were not members of
the local medical society.' 0 Power over accreditation of educational
programs was thus parlayed into control of hospital policies and ulti-
mately into control over all physicians requiring access to a high-quali-
ty hospital." I
Today hospital privileges are no longer as likely to be directly tied
to medical society membership.' 2 But other professional and social
benefits that flow from society membership 3 may still be such that the
possibility of nonadmission or expulsion can keep unorthodoxy from
spreading in a medical community. Although increasing judicial will-
ingness to review arbitrary membership policies under common law
principles governing voluntary associations 4 may have reduced the
(1967). Ethical grounds were cited for excluding doctors participating in the Health Insurance
Plan of Greater New York from the local medical society. Id 189.
10. 130 F.2d at 250 n.87.
11. The low pay of interns at that time gave hospitals a strong incentive to meet the AMA's
requirements. The AMA actively enforced the Mundt Resolution, sending letters to the hospitals
inquiring as to their compliance. Id at n.89.
12. For a case striking down a requirement of medical society membership as a condition of
staffprivileges, see Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963). A case indicat-
ing that ties between society membership and staff privileges still exist is Maricopa County Medi-
cal Soe'y v. Blende, 104 Ariz. 12, 448 P. 2d 68 (1968). For other examples, see Rayack, The
Physicians' Service Industry, in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 419 (W. Adams ed.
1971).
13. Cf. Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626, 628-29 (9th Cir.),cert. denied,
434 U.S. 825 (1977) (reviewing benefits of dental society membership). Membership in or certifica-
tion by a specialty society or board has particular value as a professional distinction. Cf. Pinsker
v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, I Cal. 3d 160, 460 P.2d 495, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1969)
(membership in orthodontic association not an "economic necessity" but denial of membership
held harmful nevertheless). See also United States Dental Inst. v. American Ass'n of Orthodon-
tists, 1977-2 Trade Cases 61,557; United States Dental Inst. v. American Ass'n of Orthodontists,
396 F. Supp. 565 (N.D. Ill. 1975). For a case in which pathologists used their power to certify
medical technologists to disadvantage competing clinical laboratories, see Higgins v. American
Soe'y of Clinical Pathologists, 51 N.J. 191, 238 A.2d 665 (1968), appeal after remand, 53 N.J. 547,
251 A.2d 760 (1969).
14. See Maricopa County Medical Soc'y v. Blende, 104 Ariz. 12, 448 P.2d 68 (1968); Pinsker
v. Pacific Coast Soe'y of Orthodontists, 12 Cal. 3d 541, 526 P.2d 253, 116 Cal. Rptr. 245 (1974);
Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 460 P.2d 495, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623
(1969); Bernstein v. Alameda-Contra Costa Medical Ass'n, 139 Cal. App. 2d 241, 293 P.2d 862
(1956). For earlier cases taking a narrower view, see Elizabeth Hosp., Inc. v. Richardson, 167 F.
Supp. 155, 164 (W.D. Ark.), aj'd, 269 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959);
Smith v. Kern County Medical Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 263, 120 P.2d 874 (1942); Porter v. King County
Medical Soc'y, 186 Wash. 410, 58 P.2d 367 (1936). As stated in the Pinsker cases, where the court
finds that the professional society occupies such a unique position in the profession that exclusion
from membership deprives the plaintiff of substantial economic advantages, a public interest is
shown and the court will review the society's membership policies both for their substantive ra-
tionality and for their accordance with basic due process. 12 Cal. 3d at 543-45, 526 P.2d at 255-56,
116 Cal. Rptr. at 247-48; 1 Cal. 3d at 165-67, 460 P.2d at 498-99, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 626-27.
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medical societies' powers of intimidation, the societies still possess a
range of discretion in formulating and enforcing ethical and quality-
related standards 5 that threaten individual practitioners experimenting
with lower-cost approaches to medical care. As long as a medical soci-
ety proceeds under the banner of the quality of care, professionalism,
ethics, or patients' rights, it may be able to isolate many types of inno-
vators, raise their costs, diminish their prospects and perhaps discredit
them to the point where they will fail. 6
Access to a hospital is essential to most physicians,1 7 and for that
reason control over admitting privileges is probably the most powerful
weapon in enforcing the preferences of the professional majority. Be-
cause of the technical questions necessarily involved, hospital boards
must delegate the administration of staff privileges to professionals.
The universal practice is for the staff physicians, who are competitors in
the market for medical services, to organize formally to perform this
and other peer-review functions.18 Thus, the hospital, by bringing phy-
sicians together on a regular basis and according them the power to
control the availability of an important resource, is an ideal vehicle for
controlling medical practice in a community. 9 Even in areas where
several hospitals exist, the medical staffs of each are likely to reflect the
15. See, e.g., Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soe'y of Orthodontists, 12 Cal. 3d 541, 558-60, 526 P.2d
253, 266-67, 116 Cal. Rptr. 245, 258-59 (1974) (specialty dental society allowed to maintain rule
against delegation of tasks to uncertified dentists); Cal-Medicon v. Los Angeles County Medical
Ass'n, 20 Cal. App. 3d 148, 152-53, 97 Cal. Rptr. 530, 533 (1971) (protection of interests of its
members and the public held to justify association's interference with its members' participation in
plaintiffs referral business).
16. For examples of alleged professional society harassment of innovative plans in the name
of professional values, see Health Corp. of America, Inc. v. New Jersey Dental Ass'n, 424 F. Supp.
931 (D.C.N.J. 1977) (threats, harassment, coercion and the dissemination of misinformation alleg-
edly used by dental societies to induce dentists not to contract with prepaid dental plan); Cal-
Medicon v. Los Angeles County Medical Ass'n, 20 Cal. App. 3d 148, 97 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1971).
17. Guerrero v. Burlington County Memorial Hosp., 70 N.J. 344, 355, 360 A.2d 334, 339
(1976).
18. See text accompanying note 23 infra.
19. Cases revealing use of the privilege system to discourage competitive innovation include
American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943); Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp.
Ass'n, 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969) (place-of-business requirement held unreasonable; plaintiffs
were HMO practitioners); Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp.
1258 (N.D. Fla. 1976); Group Health Coop. v. King County Medical Soe'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237
P.2d 737 (1951). See also Ascherman v. San Francisco Medical Soe'y, 39 Cal. App. 3d 623, 114
Cal. Rptr. 681 (1974) (political activities of plaintiff-physician resulted in loss of privileges at three
hospitals). On the exclusion of osteopaths, see Wolf v. Jane Phillips Episcopal-Memorial Medical
Center, 513 F.2d 684 (10th Cir. 1975); Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817
(1963); E. RAYACK, supra note 9, at 244-45; Blackstone, The A.MA. and the Osteopaths: A Study
of the Power of Organized Medicine, 22 ANTITRUST BULL. 405, 411-14 (1977). On podiatrists'
access to hospital privileges, see Levin v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 223 F. Supp. 953 (D.D.C. 1964),
rep'd sub nonm Levin v. Joint Comm'n on Accreditation of Hosps., 354 F.2d 515 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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dominant professional interests and ideology. Moreover, hospital
boards which might be tempted to compete for patients by catering to
an innovative provider, such as an HMO, face a risk that, if offended,
their staff doctors will send their patients elsewhere.20
Because of the influence of medical staffs over hospital decisions
on staff privileges and on other matters potentially affecting innovation,
neither public nor private hospitals should be seen as independent deci-
sionmakers whose discretion is unreviewable.2 t In recent years there
has been an increase in judicial scrutiny of staff membership deci-
sions.22 Further, procedures for granting, withholding, or curtailing
privileges have been regularized as a result of pressure from the Joint
Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals,23 thus reducing the po-
tential for anticompetitive abuse. Once again, however, the myriad op-
portunities for questioning the ethics and competence of providers
engaged in activities threatening to dominant professional interests re-
main such that the power to withhold staff privileges may be used effec-
tively to curb change.24 One would suppose that only a minority of
professionals would feel completely secure in subjecting themselves to
the special scrutiny that deviation from accepted patterns could be ex-
pected to occasion.25
20. See, eg., Comfpetition in the Health Services Market: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust andMonopoly of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1567-68 (1974)
(statement of John W. Riley).
21. Public hospitals must meet constitutional due process requirements which are inappli-
cable to private hospitals without a finding of "state action." See, e.g., Foster v. Mobile County
Hosp. Bd., 398 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1968); Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp.
Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967); Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hosp. Dist., 174 Cal. App. 2d 709, 345
P.2d 93 (1959). Private hospitals, however, are increasingly subject to comparable requirements as
a matter of common law. See cases cited in note 22 infra. Factual situations involving decisions by
the institution itself and not presenting the conflict of interests implicit in decisions by the medical
staff may be treated differently, with greater discretion allowed. See Guerrero v. Burlington
County Memorial Hosp., 70 NJ. 344, 360 A.2d 334 (1976); Davis v. Morristown Memorial Hosp.,
106 N.J. Super. 33, 254 A.2d 125 (1969); Fried v. Straussman, 41 N.Y. 2d 376, 393 N.Y.S.2d 334,
361 N.E.2d 984 (1977).
22. See, eg., Ascherman v. San Francisco Medical Soc'y, 39 Cal. App. 3d 623, 114 Cal. Rptr.
681 (1974); Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp. 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963); Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d
645 (1971). But see, e.g., Sosa v. Board of Managers of Val Verde Memorial Hosp., 437 F.2d 173
(5th Cir. 1971); Lloyd v. Jefferson Davis Memorial Hosp., 345 So. 2d 1046 (Miss. 1977); Grodjesk
v. Jersey City Medical Center, 135 NJ. Super. 393, 343 A.2d 489 (1975).
23. See JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HosPITALs, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR
JCAH HosPrrALs 46-48 (1973).
24. Cases recognizing broad medical staff discretion in setting and enforcing standards in-
elude Klinge v. Lutheran Charities Ass'n, 523 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1975); Woodbury v. McKinnan,
447 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1971); Sosa v. Board of Managers of Val Verde Memorial Hosp., 437 F.2d
173 (5th Cir. 1971); Moore v. Board of Carson-Tahoe Hosp., 88 Nev. 207, 495 P.2d 605, cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 879 (1972).
25. Selective enforcement of standards against unorthodox physicians is a particular risk. Cf
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The increase in specialization in medicine,26 by increasing interde-
pendence among physicians, has also provided a powerful weapon for
controlling unorthodox forms of health care delivery.27 Thus, a special-
ist cooperating with an HMO or other innovative program may jeop-
ardize the referrals from other physicians on which his practice
depends, and specialists opposed to the HMO may refuse to consult
with HMO physicians referring patients to them.28 Moreover, orga-
nized medicine's efforts to encourage such responses could significantly
increase the magnitude of the problem. In the AM4 case, for example,
the circulation of a "white list" of approved providers served not only
as a "seal of approval" but also as an invitation to boycott those pro-
viders who were omitted from the list.29 Indeed, mere association with
such providers raised ethical questions, and one specialist was chal-
lenged for accepting a Group Health check after treating a referred
patient.3 Even without an identifiable call for a boycott, however, a
fall-off in a specialist's referrals or an increase in noncooperation with
referring physicians could easily occur. Not only does the apparent le-
gitimacy of the profession's concerns over ethics or quality make legal
control difficult, but the profession's communications network is diffi-
cult to monitor for clues as to the doctors' true purposes. 1
Exclusion of a physician from a profession-dominated financing
plan, such as Blue Shield32 or a county medical service bureau,33 has
also been used to good effect in combatting innovation and competi-
Woodbury v. McKinnan, 447 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1971) (physician denied right to challenge the
competence of staff members).
26. See generally R STEVENS, AMERICAN MEDICINE AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1971).
27. In Feminist Women's Health Center v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Fla. 1976),
a physician who had worked in an abortion clinic objectionable to competing physicians was
alleged to have experienced a delay in obtaining specialty board certification. See Brief for Plain-
tiff-Appellant on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit at 23.
28. Cases revealing abuses of the referral process include Ascherman v. San Francisco Medi-
cal Soe'y, 39 Cal. App. 3d 623, 114 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1974) (plaintiff ceased receiving referrals from
society's answering service); Hubbard v. Medical Serv. Corp., 59 Wash. 2d 449, 367 P.2d 1003
(1962) (enjoining practice of preventing referral of nonsubscriber to nonmedical society bureau
doctor); Group Health Coop. v. King County Medical Soe'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737
(1951). Refusals by medical doctors to consult with osteopaths are discussed in Blackstone, supra
note 19, at 416-17.
29. See United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703, 706-07 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 310 U.S. 644 (1940). See also text accompanying notes 234-39 infra.
30. American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233, 238 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
31. Letters and statements in the record in the AMA, case, however, made the doctors' pur-
poses clear. Similarly, in Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. 1258
(N.D. Fla. 1976), statements by one of the defendants made it obvious that a boycott of a local
abortion clinic was economically motivated. Id at 1266. Such evidence will not often be available.
32. On Blue Shield, see notes 46, 50, 56-59, 61, 280, 282, 285, 287-290, 292, 295, 296, 298-301,
304 infra and text accompanying notes 46-61, 279-307 infra.
33. See Hearings, supra note 20, at 1564.
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tion.34 Some service bureaus have had exclusive dealing clauses in their
contracts with participating physicians which prevented them from be-
coming involved with HIMOs.35 This tactic effectively prevents the phy-
sician accepting HMOs' referrals from serving the financing plan's
subscribers; in the absence of alternative financing plans or a full-time
HMO practice, the effect on the physician is catastrophic.
36
Another way to frustrate an innovative health plan is to make it
inconvenient for the patient who enrolls with the plan. In the AMA
case, the doctors refused to accept Group Health's checks in payment
for services rendered to Group Health subscribers on referral. 37 In-
stead, patients were required to pay personally and obtain reimburse-
ment from Group Health. Similarly, in United States v. Oregon State
Medical Society,38 physicians refused to deal with the objectionable
"hospital associations," refusing to submit to the plans' attempted cost
controls and insisting that they confine themselves to indemnifying pa-
tients for incurred costs. Although physicians and hospitals will usually
deal directly with indemnity insurers as an accommodation to their pa-
tients, their ability to cease doing so is a powerful disciplinary weapon.
Likewise, medical service plans, such as Blue Shield, and other plans
dependent on contractual relationships with providers are susceptible
to refusals to sign participation agreements. In either case, concerted
refusals to deal are a significant danger because of professional solidar-
ity, which flows in part from the interrelationships detailed above and
individual practitioners' vulnerability to pressure.
The foregoing powers of organized medicine over physicians and
third parties are formidable enough that they need not be exercised
frequently or fully to achieve the desired results. To control a physi-
cian's behavior, for example, it would usually be sufficient just to raise
a question concerning its propriety.39 Even where the formal power to
discipline a physician is lacking or there is no credible threat to invoke
34. See Ballard v. Blue Shield of S. West Virginia, Inc., 543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977) (exclusion of chiropractors); Medical Serv. Corp., [1977] TRADE REo.
REP. (CCH) 21,195 (FTC Dkt. No. C-2853, Dec. 3, 1976) (exclusion of HMO doctors); Group
Health Coop. v. King County Medical Sc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951); Hearings,
supra note 20, at 1562-96.
35. See Hearings, supra note 20, at 1615-20 (exhibit: Treatise by L.S. Helland).
36. For a discussion of the very different issues presented by the exclusion of providers from
financing plans not dominated by professional interests, see text accompanying notes 105-33 infra.
37. Record 611-12, American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
38. 343 U.S. 326 (1952). See Goldberg & Greenberg 51-53.
39. A recent illustration is provided by Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad,
415 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Fla. 1976), in which the obstetrics-gynecology staff of a community hos-
pital induced staff physicians to sever their connections with a local competing abortion clinic
simply by questioning the clinic's ethics and quality of care.
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such power, a fear of jeopardizing professional and social relations may
inhibit the behavior of many doctors.4° Then, when innovative pro-
grams are forced to rely primarily on the medical profession's outsid-
ers-foreign medical graduates, osteopaths, and others not full-fledged
members of the club-the profession's prophecies about the ethical
standards prevailing in unorthodox practice are seemingly confirmed.
The self-fulfilling character of these ethical prophecies is a powerful
force in holding the line against innovation.
Similarly, the medical profession's power over third parties need
not be exercised frequently to be effective. Fear of boycotts can serve
well enough to prevent many initiatives that would otherwise be taken.
Proposed initiatives are frequently submitted for the profession's ap-
proval out of respect for its power, and are modified either in advance
or afterward to meet the profession's concerns.41
B. The Strategy of Preemption and Cooptation." Professionally
Sponsored Reforms.
When many of the more repressive tactics reviewed above were
held to be criminal conduct in the AMA case, it suddenly behooved the
medical profession to pursue its goals by less obviously offensive meas-
ures. Interestingly, the Supreme Court in Oregon State Medical Society
observed that what had been a "tooth-and-claw struggle" between the
medical society and private "hospital associations" came to an end in
1941, when "there was an abrupt about-face on the part of the orga-
nized medical profession in Oregon."4 Failing to note that this change
of behavior coincided closely with the first court of appeals decision in
the AMA case,43 the Court attributed it to a change of heart on the part
of the defendant doctor associations and to a new recognition "that the
public demanded and was entitled to purchase protection against unex-
pected costs of disease and accident."' Impressed with the profession's
farsightedness in adopting its own prepayment plan, the Court failed to
attach importance to the Society-sponsored plan's effect of stifling the
cost-containment efforts of the hospital associations. It seems that the
40. The Feminist Women's Health Center case, id, also demonstrates the close knit character
of the profession in that the staff was able to "persuade" physicians from another community not
to do abortions for the clinic by writing letters to the head of the residency program in which they
were employed. 415 F. Supp. at 1266.
41. See text accompanying notes 71-72 infra.
42. 343 U.S. at 329. The "about-face" resulted in the formation of the doctors' own nonprofit
corporation to provide prepaid medical, surgical and hospital care on a contract basis. Id at 330.
43. United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir.), cer. denied, 310 U.S.
644 (1940).
44. 343 U.S. at 329.
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Oregon doctors were more farsighted than the Court knew, because
having their own prepayment plan immeasurably strengthened the
doctors' ability to resist privately stimulated innovations that might
have served consumers better without resorting to egregiously anti-
competitive tactics.45
Although there is some recognition that professionally sponsored
prepayment plans have curbed development of other forms, 46 it is not
widely recognized that this may have occurred not through simple
competition so much as through the facilitation of professional re-
straints of trade. After its long resistance to all forms of prepayment for
health care,47 the medical profession's decision to offer Blue Shield
service plans and to accept indemnity-type insurance had the effect of
making its continued resistance to other forms of financing seem plau-
sibly enough related to ethics and patient interests to escape full public
scrutiny. The AMA, having successfully assumed the power to regulate
prepayment plans, announced certain principles on which it insisted,
particularly in plans under private sponsorship. The profession's eco-
nomic interests played a critical role in the development of the princi-
ples adopted.48
Lawrence Goldberg and Warren Greenberg have recently reexam-
ined the record in the Oregon State Medical Society case and revealed
the degree to which having their own "ethical" insurer in the field per-
mitted doctors to resist the hospital associations effectively.49 Although
some of the associations remained in business, they entirely abandoned
their efforts at cost containment and adopted the passive-insurer role
that has now become traditional.5 0 Doctors' refusal to deal directly with
the hospital associations was the decisive stroke, but the courts were
unwilling, for reasons to be explored later,51 to attribute these refusals
to deal to a conspiracy. The government did not challenge the legality
45. See notes 50, 56, 57 infra and text accompanying notes 49-57 infra.
46. See, eg., A. DONABEDiAN, BENEFITS IN MEDICAL CARE PROoRAMS 270-75 (1976). Like
many other discussions, Donabedian's assumes a certain inevitability in the practical differences
between provider-controlled service-benefit plans and traditional insurance. It is submitted that
this inevitability flows from the threat of professional retaliation against commercial insurers that
seek to change their role.
47. See generally, Comment, The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose and Poltics
in Organized Medicine, 63 YALE LJ. 937, 976-96 (1954).
48. See id. 985-88.
49. See Goldberg & Greenberg 58-62.
50. Although there is evidence that the hospital associations' change of behavior resulted
from professional preferences, the timing was such that an alternative explanation might be the
reduced interest of consumers in cost containment as a result of the exception made for health
benefits in wartime wage controls and the later introduction of favorable tax treatment of health
insurance premiums. See text accompanying notes 164-67 infra.
51. See text accompanying notes 186-92 infra.
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of the profession-dominated prepayment plan itself,52 despite the com-
petitive advantage that it demonstrably enjoyed and despite its substan-
tial success in facilitating the profession's efforts to discipline the
insurance industry.53 Goldberg and Greenberg were unable to docu-
ment 4 what still seems a likely possibility-namely that the success of
the Oregon Physicians Service (OPS) was in large measure attributable
to below-cost "disciplinary" pricing." It seems more than likely that,
during the period in which OPS was competing for subscribers and
seeking to become the model of insurer conduct, the doctors under-
wrote the plan's losses by taking less than their full fees allowable
under OPS schedules 6.5  The hospital associations, unable to compete
against the temporarily low price, submitted to the doctors' rule, there-
after regaining some of the market share they had lost.
5 7
A more recent example of concerted professional action to domi-
nate, and thereby limit, innovation in health care financing and deliv-
ery is provided by the appearance of so-called "foundations for
medical care" (FMCs).5 8 These medical society-sponsored plans follow
in the Blue Shield tradition but install a stronger "peer-review" process
in an attempt to control costs. Although FMCs are a step in the right
direction where they are effective,59 they may be seen, like the Blue
Shield plans before them, as mild half-measures compared to the
independent initiatives they preempt-both independently operated
HMOs and insurance plans having their own cost-containment ma-
52. See United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 330 (1952) (summarizing
the government's basic allegation); Goldberg & Greenberg 65-66.
53. See Goldberg & Greenberg 60-61.
54. Id 77 n.77.
55. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 277
(1970).
56. There was evidence that OPS did indeed pay less than 100 cents on the dollar. See
Goldberg & Greenberg 61. It appears that OPS fees were paid at the rate of 85% of the schedule in
1947. Record at 4786, United States v. Oregon State Medical Soe'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952). For a
possibly comparable situation, see note 298 infra.
57. The doctors' plans had a smaller market share in 1948 than in 1943, suggesting that physi-
cians had become more tolerant of the non-captive plans. See Record at 3519, 5202-03, United
States v. Oregon State Medical Soe'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
58. FMCs are medical society-sponsored plans designed to control utilization and costs more
effectively than have Blue Shield plans, which they otherwise resemble. See C. STEINWALD, AN
INTRODUCTION TO FOUNDATIONS FOR MEDICAL CARE (1971); Edgahl, Foundations for Medical
Care, 288 NEw ENG. J. MED. 491 (1973).
59. The effectiveness of FMCs in controlling costs has not been established. See INSTITUTE
OF MEDICINE, ASSESSING QUALITY IN HEALTH CARE: AN EVALUATION (1976); Edgahl, Taft,
Friedland & Linde, The Potential of Organization of Fee-for-Service Physicians for Achieving
Signpfcant Decreases in Hosfpitalization, 186 ANNALS OF SURGERY 388 (1977); Gaus, Cooper &




chinery. Indeed, it can be argued that FMCs, although offered by well-
intentioned physicians as real reforms, have appeal in the profession
primarily because they hold out the hope of forestalling competitive
developments such as HMOs and of short-circuiting threatened gov-
ernmental intrusion.60 This suggests the hazard that the FMC, as a to-
ken of the profession's good faith and commitment to containing costs
without sacrifice of quality, will serve to legitimize the profession's con-
tinued antagonism toward more aggressive measures that others might
take.61
It seems clear that significantly improving the climate for private
innovation in cost containment will require closer attention to the ben-
efits and costs of the organized medical profession's involvement in
prepayment plans, utilization review and other reforms.
C. Recent Exertions of Professional Power.
Although some of the evidence recited above is dated, other evi-
dence suggests that medical organizations are still using their power to
shape the economic environment in which physicians operate. Thus
HMOs continue to encounter professional opposition in a variety of
forms. A Youngstown, Ohio HMO was the subject of a doctor group's
formal resolution critical of HMOs generally and calling on its mem-
bers to deny the HMO an opportunity to work out favorable arrange-
ments with their hospitals. 62 The Harvard Community Health Plan for
a long time found community hospitals closed to it and its physicians,
forcing the Plan to use expensive university hospitals.63 Exclusion of
HMO doctors from a medical service bureau in the State of Washing-
ton was halted under a Federal Trade Commission consent order.'
While it does not appear that all the less sophisticated forms of profes-
sional resistance to HMOs have been dropped, the medical organiza-
60. See text accompanying notes 286-98 infra.
61. A parallel to professionally sponsored reforms appears in current efforts to mount an
industry-wide voluntary cost-containment plan. Under prodding from Rep. Rostenkowski, pro-
vider groups have organized a cooperative plan for supervising and publicizing hospitals' cost
performance, using public opinion and other subtle pressures to bring down the rate of cost in-
creases. See Letter from Richard J. Wertheimer, Esq. and G. Philip Nowak, Esq., to John H.
Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General, United States Department of Justice (Antitrust Division)
(Feb. 2 1978) (request for antitrust "clearance" of proposed program). In addition to providing a
forum for agreements to avoid competition, the proposed program would seem to present the
hazard noted in the text. See note 296 infra.
62. Resolution of the Eastern Ohio Council of Hospital Medical Staffs (discovery evidence),
Ohio ex rel Brown v. Mahoning Medical Soe'y, No. C76-168y (N.D. Ohio 1976).
63. Based on conversations with Plan officials and Massachusetts health planners.
64. Medical Serv. Corp., [19771 TRADE REG. REP.(CCH) 21,195 (FTC Dkt. No. C-2853,
Dec. 3, 1976) (consent order).
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tions recently have emphasized political efforts to restrict or delay
HMO growth, particularly through use of health planning and certifi-
cate-of-need mechanisms,65 and organizing competing doctor-spon-
sored FMCs or similar plans.
Cost-containment efforts by third parties have continued to meet
professional resistance. Recent studies by the Council on Wage and
Price Stability of private sector cost-control efforts reveal a number of
instances of professional association resistance to health care cost-con-
trol measures that employers and unions have sought to introduce.
66
Not long ago, when the Aetna Life and Casualty Company instituted
the practice of helping its insureds defend themselves in court against
claims by physicians for fees which the insurer had determined were
excessive, medical society response was vigorous, and Aetna was forced
to conform to professional demands.67A cost-containment initiative un-
dertaken in Michigan at the instance of the United Auto Workers has
prompted an explicit boycott call by the state medical society, which
claims that 1900 physicians have refused to deal with Blue Cross-Blue
Shield of Michigan as a result.68 Other third parties' efforts similar to
this one, which involved an attempt to differentiate between coopera-
tive and uncooperative providers, have earned critical resolutions from
medical societies elsewhere, including the AMA itself.
69
The innovation by third-party payers that has seemed most threat-
ening to doctors in recent years is the encouragement, or even require-
ment, of second opinions prior to elective surgery. Designed to
discourage "unnecessary" surgery, these initiatives seem mild com-
pared to what might be tried,70 but they have nevertheless occasioned a
number of strong reactions from medical groups. For example, recently
in the Detroit area three medical societies negotiated the precise nature
65. See Hearings Before Subcoma on Health and Scientifc Research of the Senate Comm. on
Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 3, 1978) (statement of Kaiser Foundation Health
Plan, Inc.); id (testimony by AFL-CIO), reported in HEALTHI SEicES INFoRMATION, Feb. 13,
1978, at 3; Kirchner, Where Fee-for-Service is Under the Gun, MED. ECON., Aug. 8, 1977, at 230;
Havighurst, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Health Planners, 1978 UTAH L. REv. 123.
66. See CouNc. oN WAGE & PRICE STABILFTY 109, 116-17.
67. See Goldberg & Greenberg 62-65.
68. Michigan Prepaid Plan Challenged, Am. Med. News, Jan. 2, 1978, at 1, col 1. See also
MDs to Quit Blue Shield in Michigan, Am. Med. News, Nov. 7, 1977, at 1, col. 1. The flavor of the
medical society action can be gathered from the following statement by one doctor. "We've got to
march in unison until we have the input that the medical system needs. We must recapture the
health care system to assure our patients of quality care." Id The issue involved in these disputes
is discussed in the text accompanying notes 105-33 infra.
69. IndIana MDs Hit Blue ShieldBeneft Plans, Am. Med. News, Nov. 14, 1977, at 19, col. 4;
Blues' Polcies Opposed, Am. Med. News, Dec. 12, 1977, at 7, col. I (reporting an AMA resolu-
tion).
70. See text accompanying notes 88-94 infra.
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of these plans with the insurer.7 ' Some of the doctors' demands were
apparently nonnegotiable, however, and a threat of a boycott undoubt-
edly hung over the discussions. It has been customary for health insur-
ers introducing such an innovation in a community to touch base with
the local medical society first.72 It is important to question why a
change in an insurer's benefit package is a matter on which organized
medicine should be consulted.
Whether or not the specter of antitrust attack has visibly affected
state and local medical societies' efforts to control insurer practices,
there is some evidence that the AMA is attempting to moderate its
members' anticompetitive impulses. In December 1976, an AMA com-
mittee, on the advice of antitrust counsel, withheld from the AMA's
membership a report critical of health insurers' second-opinion plans
and substituted a milder report.73 Although the AMA's lawyers have
recognized that antitrust principles require professional associations to
take more neutral positions on developments in private health care
financing, the lesson has been hard to get across to the doctors them-
selves. At the AMA's 1977 annual convention, for example, a resolu-
tion opposed to insurer-imposed consultation requirements was
"overwhelmingly" adopted, to the delegates' cheers, despite the legal
department's plea for caution.74
Despite the foregoing evidence of ongoing professional efforts to
limit private cost-containment initiatives, it may still be difficult, look-
71. MDs Winning "Second Opinion" Fight, Am. Med. News, Apr. 18, 1977, at 1, col.l.
72. Statement by Henry Di Prete, Conference on the Antitrust Laws and the Health Services
Industry, sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research and Duke
Law Journal (Dec. 20, 1977) (transcript on file at Duke Law Journal).
73. "Second Opinion" Statement Weakened, Am. Med. News, Dec. 13, 1976, at 12, col. 1.
74. Resolution 77 requested the AMA to adopt a policy statement regarding
mandatory consultation which reaffirmed the right of a patient or physician to seek con-
sultation; opposed the concept of mandatory consultation required by a third party
payor and the concept of closed panels of consultants, and supported the concept that
consultations required by a third party payor be at no cost to the patient, and that if
consultation is required by a third party payor, the patient should be allowed to choose
the physician.
Minutes, AMA House of Delegates Meeting, 126th Annual Convention of the AMA, June 1977,
Resolution 77 (Policy Statement re Mandatory Consultation, item 38). A news report of the adop-
tion of this resolution is of particular interest:
At the behest of [antitrust] counsel, the delegates reluctantly gagged themselves on sev-
eral... issues, but rebellion finally broke out on a matter of mandatory second opin-
ions, which some third parties are opting for as a means of cutting costs. The House was
clearly eager to accept a resolution opposing mandatory consultation, but the cautious
legal department wanted time to study the implications first.
"This resolution is a clear statement of our views and we ought not to be afraid to
adopt it," thundered Georgia's Frederick W. Dowda. "If we ran our offices the way the
legal department wants us to run this House, we'd see one patient a week." The delegates
cheered and adopted the resolution overwhelmingly.
Permanent President for the AMA?, MED. WORLD NEws, July 25, 1977, at 14, 17.
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ing at current events, to perceive the medical profession as the crucial
obstacle in the way of privately initiated major change in health care
financing and delivery. The argument, however, is not simply that the
medical profession is continually defeating promising initiatives. In-
stead, it is contended that the profession's power, resulting not only
from a surprising degree of consensus within the profession but also
from a complex network of frequently subtle but always substantial
controls and influences, has conditioned all actors in the health care
system and effectively deterred all but the most modest attempts at
change.75 The foregoing review of the profession's strategic advantages
and opportunities for controlling change, along with a record of
skirmishes demonstrating the profession's willingness to use its power,
should establish, at least, that a potentially serious problem exists.76
III. ASSESSING THE PUBLIC SIGNIFICANCE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESTRAINTS ON THIRD-PARTY PAYERS
Despite the foregoing demonstration, there are several reasons
why the medical profession's resistance to private cost-containment ini-
tiatives might still be thought an insignificant factor in today's crisis in
health care costs; thus, it may be asked whether significant changes
would in fact occur even if physicians did not collectively oppose them.
There is no doubt, for example, that HMOs face many obstacles be-
75. More sweeping innovations supported by groups as powerful as the United Auto Workers
have been instituted, but whether they will survive massive resistance by the profession remains to
be seen. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
76. The foregoing discussion of the mechanics of professional domination over the instru-
ments of change in the health care system suggests why certain mechanisms have been more sus-
ceptible to professional control than others. It is significant that the most successful innovative
plans-for example, such HMOs as the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan and Group Health Coop-
erative of Puget Sound--are also the most self-contained, possessing their own hospitals and full-
time specialists and being dependent hardly at all on community resources. Although such tight
integration is frequently assumed to be essential to achieve administrative efficiency in an HMO,
see, ag., HMO Act of 1973,42 U.S.C. § 300e-(b)(l)(3) (Supp. V 1975), as amended by Pub. L. No.
94-460, § 102, 90 Stat. 1945 (1976), this technical explanation for the relative success of more
integrated plans may be inacccurate. See Bailey, Economies of Scale in Medical Practice, in EM-
PiRiCAL STUDIES IN HEALTH ECONOMics 255 (H. Klarman ed. 1972). Instead, HMOs which are
dependent (or whose physicians are dependent) on interactions with the local medical establish-
ment may fail to prosper precisely because they are more exposed to obstacles raised by the tradi-
tional medical community through its ability to sever essential links with independent providers.
Under this hypothesis, traditional insurance and service-benefit plans would be the most vulnera-
ble of all would-be innovators in the health care system. Because their subscribers, enrolled as
members of employment groups rather than through individual choice, expect a wide range of
choice among available providers, these plans are peculiarly susceptible to boycotts, even highly
disorganized ones, and to other retaliatory actions. Despite the difficulty of removing these obsta-
des, this Article argues that it is possible to employ legal means to improve significantly the pros-
pects for effective cost-containment innovation on the part of these critical actors.
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sides those maintained by the medical communities that they wish to
enter. 7 Moreover, additional private cost containment may be simply
unworkable. Perhaps nearly everything worthwhile is already being
done, and it is market equilibrium rather than professional opposition
that accounts for the slow pace of innovation. It is possible that cost
containment has only limited appeal to purchasers of insurance and
thus is not saleable in a competitive market.
Examination of these questions is necessary before it can be con-
cluded that reducing professional power over private innovation should
be a high-priority objective in the campaign to improve the health care
system's performance. The discussion here focuses on the potential
ability of third-party payers to impose discipline on the fee-for-service
providers whose charges they underwrite. The problems and prospects
of HMOs have been extensively treated elsewhere in the literature,78
and their omission here reflects not only that fact but also the belief
that, as HMOs have received great and deserved attention in recent
years, other alternatives for reshaping health care financing and deliv-
ery have been neglected. Thus, health insurers, who have been willing
to pursue various HMO initiatives, have, for reasons to be explored,79
not been especially inventive in other respects, with the result that
health care spending by fee-for-service providers remains largely un-
controlled. Although the commercial health insurance industry cur-
rently takes the position that innovations in cost containment such as
its members might competitively undertake are not in themselves a
promising avenue for reform, 0 this conclusion is vigorously disputed
here. Indeed, the argument is that competing third-party payers are the
most natural candidates for the cost-containment job, potentially pro-
viding a more complete answer to the health care system's cost
problems than either HMOs or government regulation.
77. See, ag., INSTrrUTE OF MEDICINE, NAT'L ACAD. SCI., HMOs: TOWARD A FAIR MARKET
TEST 19-29, 32-49 (1974).
78. See id; Kissam, supra note 3. Nothing said or left unsaid here is meant to draw support
or enthusiasm away from the HMO concept or from attempts to expand HMOs' opportunities.
See Iglehart, HMOs-.An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 10 NAT'L J. 311 (1978).
79. See text accompanying notes 139-63 infra.
80. Their position is that they have done a great deal already, but cannot reasonably be ex-
pected to do more. See, e.g., Bailey, Controlling Health Care Costs: The Needfor a Cooperative
Effort, 9 NAT'L J. 968, 968-69 (1977); Beach, The National Health Care Issue: It's More Than
Financing Treatment, 9 NAT'L J. 1014, 1014-15 (1977); Kilpatrick, Prescroitions for Health Care
Control Joint Effort by the Public andPrivate Sectors, 9 NAT'L J. 1016, 1016-17 (1977). These are
all statements by executives of leading health insurers.
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A. Neglected Private Cost-Containment Strategies.
In order to assess what the public may be losing as a result of the
medical profession's influence over private financing schemes, it may
be helpful to speculate about what private health insurers might have
done, or might now do, to contain health care costs. The following ex-
position of possibilities is not sheer speculation, however, since closely
analogous practices have been adopted in other lines of insurance or
have appeared from time to time in medical care only to be suppressed
by professional action. The thrust of this discussion is to suggest that a
competitive health insurance industry, if it faced undistorted demand
for its product' and did not have to defer to organized medicine,
would indeed generate effective solutions along the lines to be indi-
cated.
1. Some Possible Insurer Strategies. All the possible steps that
might be taken by private health insurers, major purchasers of health
insurance, or independent provider groups to contain health insurance
premiums and the overall cost of health care cannot be fully elabo-
rated, evaluated or defended here. Nevertheless, the following list of
strategies, some of them conceptually challenging to conventional wis-
dom concerning the nature and purpose of health insurance, suggests
the truly vast range of private approaches to medical care cost contain-
ment that have not been adequately explored.
(a) High deductibles. This form of cost sharing would put more
emphasis on catastrophic risks and less on "shallow" coverage."2
(b) Selective coverage. Benefit packages could be designed
which expressly exclude specific treatments or procedures from cover-
age for any of the following reasons: because the treatment's efficacy or
its value in benefit/cost terms is in doubt;83 because a less costly mode
81. As is noted in the text accompanying notes 164-65 infra, the tax law currently prevents
this fundamentally important condition from being fulfilled. Although the issue is not argued at
length here, change in the tax treatment of health insurance premiums would probably be the
single most important step that could be taken toward improving the private sector's ability to
deal with health care costs. See Controlling Health Care Costs 475-78.
82. See Feldstein, The High Cost ofHospitals-And What To Do About It, 48 PUn. INTEREST
40, 52-54 (1977). Primarily because of the tax subsidies that distort demand for health insurance,
see text accompanying notes 164-65 infra, current insurance coverage is often excessive in the area
of routine, predictable expenses and inadequate in the area of major risks. See also Feldstein,
How Tax Laws Fuel Hospital Costs, PRISM, Jan. 1976, at 15, 18-19. See generally Havighurst,
Blumstein & Bovbjerg, supra note I.
83. For examples of treatments whose coverage might be inappropriate, see A. COCHRANE,
EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY RANDOM REFLECTIONS ON HEALTH SERVICES 26-27,29-32,45-
66 (1972). Insurance policies with selective coverage could serve as an effective bulwark against
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of treatment is available and adequate;84 or because physician-patient
consumption decisions are particularly in need of cost discipline to as-
sure that nonessential care is discouraged.85
(c) High copayment requirements. Copayments of up to fifty
percent would be appropriate for treatments or procedures that are fre-
quently of doubtful value yet not appropriately excludable from cover-
age altogether under the principles just stated.
86
(d) Diagnosis-specyfc or treatment-specf c limits on the duration of
hospitalization coverage. For example, a limit on the number of cov-
ered days of postoperative hospital care, varying with the procedure or
diagnosis and subject to exceptions for complications, would stimulate
private benefit/cost assessments of continued stays and many earlier
discharges.8 7
(e) Second-opinion requirements prior to elective surgery. These
could range in stringency from simply covering the cost of a voluntary
second opinion-which the medical profession accepts-to condition-
ing coverage on obtaining a confirming opinion.88 In the latter case,
the introduction of new technologies whose benefits are not known to exceed their costs. Although
such technologies are widely perceived as inflationary and as requiring governmental controls,
private-sector action could do much to solve the problem.
84. In such a case, it might be preferable to provide a cash indemnity equal to the cost of the
less expensive treatment, allowing the patient to supplement those funds if he believed the more
expensive treatment was desirable. A less flexible approach is taken in the federal "maximum
allowable cost" rules for reimbursing the cost of prescription drugs under the Medicare and Medi-
caid programs which force the patient to accept a generic rather than a brand-name drug unless he
can obtain a special physician's certification. 45 C.F.R. § 19 (1976).
85. For the argument that the "moral hazard," as reflected in the elasticity of demand for a
particular medical service, is a relevant factor in the consumer's decision to insure or self-insure
against the need for that service, see Havighurst, The Role of Competition in Containing Health
Care Costs in FTC 359.
86. Such coverage might be appropriate for a procedure such as costly coronary by-pass sur-
gery, which apparently can be effective in relieving symptoms but not in prolonging life. See, e.g.,
Braunwald, Coronary-Artery Surgery at the Crossroads, 297 NEw ENG. J. MED. 661, 662 (1977).
The conventional practice is to employ copayments, if at all, across the board and at levels un-
likely to have much impact. Economists have largely confined their research to the effect of cost-
sharing on consumption of medical care in general and have not looked at demand for discrete
services. See, e.g., Newhouse, Phelps & Schwartz, Policy Options and the Impact of National
Health Insurance, 290 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1345 (1974); Newhouse & Phelps, New Estimates of
Price and Income Elasticities of Medical Care Services, in THE ROLE OF HEALTH INSURANCE IN
THE HEALTH SERVICES SECTOR 261 (R. Rosett ed. 1976).
87. A physician friend recently described to me an uninsured patient, capable of paying her
own bills, whom he was able to discharge two days after surgery even though the normal stay
would have been five days. This suggests that, instead of front-end deductibles, limitations at the
other end, where marginal benefits of additional care rapidly decline, would be more rational. For
a powerful demonstration of the principle's importance, see note 104 infra.
88. See COUNCIL ON WAGE & PRICE STABILITY 105-18. For the medical view, implying an
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note that, as with other coverage limitations, the patient and the physi-
cian may still proceed with surgery, though not at the insurer's expense.
(f) Prior insurer authorization requirements. This could be used
as a condition of coverage of nonemergency hospitalization or sur-
gery. 8
9
(g) PSRO-type utilization review.9" Such review would limit
coverage to essential care as determined on a case-by-case basis and
would be needed in administering exceptions to express exclusions.
Unlike the PSRO program, however, it should be clear that it is the
plan's coverage, not good medical practice, that is being defined.91 The
PSRO program is disappointing expectations primarily because it em-
bodies the view that anything not bad medicine should be paid for.92 In
private insurance schemes exclusions from coverage could rationally be
based on other grounds.93
(h) Predetermination of benefts. This would enable the patient
and, at least equally important, the physician to know in advance of
nonemergency treatment what costs the insurer will or will not bear.
With complex coverage rules of the varieties suggested here, predeter-
mination of benefits, which is widely employed in dental insurance,
94
would seem essential.
obligation on the part of third-party payers to pay for anything that is not fraudulent, see Paul-
shock, "Unnecessary" Surgery: Who'll Have the Final Say?, MED. ECON., Mar. 7, 1977, at 75. See
also text accompanying notes 73-74 supra.
89. For an historical example, see Goldberg & Greenberg 51-53. See also Amago v. Cuban
Clinic Ass'n of Hialeah, 345 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. App. 1977) (refusal to pay subscriber's medical
expenses because subscriber failed to provide letter of admission to participating hospital; sum-
mary judgment for defendant insurance company reversed).
90. On PSROs, see Grad, Professional Self Discipiine, 1978 DUKE L. J. 443; Havighurst &
Blumstein.
91. This point is both legally and ethically important. See Controlling Health Care Costs 496
n.62.
92. By treating the PSRO program as regulatory, the profession has assured that it will have
little impact, eliminating fraud and sheer waste but not forcing attention to trade-offs at the mar-
gin. See generally Havighurst & Blumstein. Recent studies sponsored by the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare indicate that the PSRO program has had little effect. See OFFICE
OF PLANNING, EVALUATION AND LEGISLATION, HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, PSRO: AN
EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS REVIEW ORGANIZATIONS (Executive Summary
1977).
93. See note 85 supra.
94. See K. NASH, S. GARFINKEL & F. BRYAN, IDENTIFY AND DESCPIBE QUALITY ASSUR-
ANCE METHODOLOGIES AS EMPLOYED BY SELECTED THIRD-PARTY CARRIERS OF PREPAID DEN-
TAL PLANS (Center for Health Studies, Research Triangle Institute; prepared for Div. of Dentistry,
Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare) (1975); COUNCIL ON WAGE & PRICE STABILITY 115-18.
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(i) Insurer loans.95  These loans would permit insureds to
finance the cost of excluded treatments or large copayments. Exclusion
from coverage under the foregoing strategies implies neither that the
treatment is never medically appropriate nor that consumers would be
wrong to purchase the treatment. On the contrary, some care that is
customary and often advisable but not clearly essential in all cases
should be paid for out of pocket, at least in part, in order to retain cost
as a discipline for patients and physicians.
(j) Contractual alteration ofpatients' malpractice rights. This is a
means of reducing the perceived necessity for practicing costly "defen-
sive" medicine.96 Many approaches are possible, ranging from a simple
arbitration requirement97 to the substitution of a limited "no-fault"
compensation system for the insureds' right to sue in tort for specified
adverse outcomes. 98
(k) Cash benefits. Predetermined cash benefits which are based
on the diagnosis or the treatment selected and which are payable with-
out regard to actual cost give the patient both the funds to obtain
needed care and the incentive to spend them wisely.99 Although such a
departure from reimbursement for incurred costs may be unattractive
for some purposes, 1°° cash benefits could be used selectively. For exam-
95. See Seidman, Medical Loans and Maor-risk National Health Insurance, 12 HEALTH
SERVICES RESEARCH 123 (1977).
96. Defensive medicine has been defined as either
(a) the use of diagnostic and other resources primarily for the purpose of protecting the
physician against a successful malpractice claim rather than the patient against an ad-
verse medical result or (b) the refusal to provide needed care or to adopt desirable new
methods out of a concern that exposure to liability would be increased...
Havighurst, "MedicalAdversity Insurance'-Has Its Time Come?, 1975 DUKE L.J., 1233, 1235.
See generally Project, The Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of Defensive Medicine, 1971 DUKE
L.. 939.
97. See Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 17 Cal. 3d 699, 552 P.2d 1178, 131 Cal. Rptr.
882 (1977) (upholding an arbitration clause negotiated by the state for its employees); Doyle v.
Giuliucci, 62 Cal. 2d 606, 401 P.2d 1, 43 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1965).
98. See O'Connell, No-Fault Liabilit by Contract/or Doctors, Manufacturers, Retailers and
Others, 632 INs. L.J. 531, 532-37 (1975). O'Connell has not considered alteration of the liability
relation through the health insurance contract, as opposed to direct doctor-patient agreements, but
the proposal has the substantial advantage of allowing the cost-saving benefits of the changed
liability rule to accrue to the insureds themselves. In addition, this proposal would considerably
reduce the problem of unconscionability. See id. 540-42; Havighurst, supra note 96, at 1276-77.
See also Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION RE-
SEARCH J. 87.
99. See note 84 supra.
100. Frequently the diagnosis will be unclear, or complications will exist so that the pre-
scribed cash benefit is insufficient to avoid hardship.
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pie, ancillary services during certain hospital stays could be covered by
a fixed-sum payment so as to discourage unnecessary tests and x-rays.
() Fee schedules for professional services.10 1 Again, a range of
approaches is available, from simply limiting the indemnity payable to
the patient, leaving him to negotiate the actual fee, to establishment of
a closed panel of physicians who have agreed to accept the schedule. In
lieu of uniform fees, an insurer could negotiate fees with individual
physicians.
(m) Prior negotiation of hospital charges between theplan and the
hospitals.
10 2
(n) Adjustment of premiums according to the insured's choice of
hospital at the time of enrollment.
10 3
(o) Payment of hospitals on the basis of diagnosis. This would
provide an inducement for early discharge where health services re-
search indicates an opportunity to shorten customary lengths of stay. 04
Most of the foregoing strategies would present formidable admin-
istrative problems and would not work unless the cooperation of a
sufficient number of individual providers could be obtained. Indeed,
the success of any cost-containment effort probably depends more on
the plan's ability to select cooperative and cost-conscious physicians
101. See Kallstrom. See also text accompanying notes 105-33 infra.
102. See, e.g., Webster County Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. United Mine Workers Welfare &
Retirement Fund, 536 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (upholding a union's bargaining with a hospital
for a fixed per diem charge). HMOs have sometimes been able to negotiate a favorable rate for
their subscribers.
103. See Newhouse & Taylor, How Shall We Payfor Hospital Care?, 23 Pun. INTEREST 78
(1971).
104. A recent study indicates that many heart attack victims can be safely discharged after a
one-week hospital stay with potential savings estimated at $360 million per year. McNeer, Wag-
ner, Ginsburg, Wallace, McCants, Conley & Rosati, Hospital Discharge One Week After Acute
MyocardialInfarction, 298 NEW ENrG. J. MED. 229 (1978). This finding has prompted a proposal
to change incentives by giving the hospital "a certain fixed payment for each patient with a certain
diagnosis irrespective of the duration of stay." Ross, Early Discharge After Heart Attacks and the
Efficient Use ofHospitals, 298 NEw ENG. J. MED. 275, 276 (1978). Dr. Ross does not examine how
this revolutionary approach could be implemented, though he implies that government regulation
would be appropriate. But a private arrangement negotiated with a hospital by an insurer on
behalf of its insureds, who reap the benefit in lower premiums, would be one possibility. Another
simple way of meeting the cost issue would be simply to limit insurance coverage to one week in
accordance with the principle stated in the text accompanying note 87 supra. Dr. Ross' proposal
departs from the traditional approach of appealing simply to providers' professionalism to induce
a desirable change in medical practice, but, in looking instead to provider incentives, he neglects




than on the precise coverage limits or administrative mechanisms em-
ployed. Insurers have an obligation to explore aggressively the oppor-
tunities for offering their insureds a range of lower-cost options
featuring selective coverage, administrative controls and restricted
choice of physician, in addition to traditional comprehensive coverage
with free choice of physician.
2. Enlisting Physician Cooperation: Provider Panels. The real
key to effective private cost-containment efforts-whether using the
foregoing strategies or some other approach-is the formal enlistment
of individual providers as willing participants in the plan. By the same
token, care rendered by noncooperating providers must be either ex-
cluded from insurance coverage altogether'05 or paid for on a different
basis so that patients bear personally at least the excess cost entailed by
their decision to patronize such providers. The enlistment of "partici-
pating" providers is necessary not only to effectuate the use of negoti-
ated fee schedules and to exclude uncooperative providers but also to
obtain compliance with such administrative controls as might be neces-
sary to implement complex coverage limitations introduced to restore
provider and patient cost consciousness at appropriate decision points.
The idea of panels of voluntarily participating providers is not un-
familiar to the insurance industry nor is it an alien concept in the
health policy debate. Such panels have been used successfully in pre-
payment plans for dental,"°6 pharmacy, 10 7 optometric, 10 8 auto repair, 0 9
burial, 10 and legal 1 services. With respect to medical care, Blue Cross
and Blue Shield plans have routinely employed participation agree-
ments for physicians and hospitals. Although such agreements usually
have been neither particularly burdensome to participating providers
105. Note the parallel to HMOs, which pay for care provided by non-HMO doctors only
where it is provided on an emergency basis outside of the area which the HMO serves. Just as the
consumer might buy into such a plan, he might choose an insurance plan that limits the providers
to whom he has access at the insurer's expense.
106. See Manasen v. California Dental Serv., 424 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Cal. 1976). See also K.
NASH, S. GARFINKEL & F. BRYAN, supra note 94.
107. See Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life and Health Ins. Co., 556 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1448 (1978); COUNCIL ON WAGE & PRICE STABILITY 119-24. For a legal
discussion of prepaid drug plans, see Kallstrom 669-74.
108. See COUNCIL ON WAGE & PRICE STABILITY 155-56.
109. See Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir.), petitionfor cert.
filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3375 (Oct. 19, 1977) (No. 77-580); Hill v. National Auto Glass, 293 F. Supp. 295
(N.D. Cal. 1968).
110. See Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1110 (1975).
111. See N. PFENNIGSTORF & S. KIMBALL, LEGAL SERVICE PLANS: APPROACHES TO REGU-
LATION (forthcoming); Kallstrom 674-78; Pfenningstorf & Kimball, Regulation of Legal Serpice
Plans, 1977 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 359.
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nor significantly disadvantageous to nonparticipants, 112 current contro-
versies in Michigan and Massachusetts reveal their potential for
achieving effective control. 13 Panels of fee-for-service providers, called
"individual practice associations," are contemplated in the federal
Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973."14 Another indication
of the viability of the panel concept is Dr. Paul Ellwood's recent propo-
sal for creating "health care alliances"---clusters of doctors and hospi-
tals separately rated for insurance purposes and competing against
similar alliances and HMOs.' 1 5 A new approach to national health in-
surance, embodied in a proposal for a "Consumer-Choice Health
Plan," leaves room for competing panels of fee-for-service practitioners
as one option for consumers.1 6 A California insurer offers insureds the
option of signing up with one of its participating primary-care physi-
cians, who then supervises all referrals and hospitalizations to assure
the appropriateness of care." 7
Historically, too, the panel-medicine approach has been a contin-
ual contender for a role in health care delivery, not only in the United
States but elsewhere."' But patterns violating the principle of "free
choice of physician" have survived professional counterattacks in only
a few places. The most notable success, of course, was the survival of
prepaid group practice HMOs in the United States as a direct result of
the invocation of the antitrust laws in the AMA case. Unfortunately, a
similar attempt to use the antitrust laws to vindicate health insurance
plans with cost-containment and panel-medicine features failed in the
112. See Anderson v. Medical Serv., 1976-1 Trade Cases 1 60,884 (E.D. Va. 1976), aft'd
mem., 551 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1977).
113. See New Blue Shield Policies Stir Protestsfrom Michigan M.D.s, Am. Med. News, Sept.
19, 1977, at 1, col 2; Medical Society To Sue Blue Shield, Am. Med. News, Oct. 31, 1977, at 1, col.
1. On further developments in Michigan, see note 68 supra and accompanying text.
114. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to 300e-15 (Supp. V 1975), as amendedby Pub. L. No. 94-460, §§ 101-
116, 90 Stat. 1945-55 (1976). Although HMOs authorized by the Act might serve as vehicles for
some cost-containment strategies, the Act contains restrictions that would preclude the use of
many of the approaches suggested in the the text. In particular, the Act requires that benefits be
comprehensive, id. § 300e(b)(1), making the strategy of selective coverage unavailable. Neverthe-
less, standards of practice in an HMO might be, and usually are, less resource-consuming than in
the fee-for-service sector. Kissam, supra note 3, at 488 n.3. The consumer's choice of an HMO
may therefore be interpreted as a choice of more selective coverage.
115. See Reynolds, A New Scheme to Force You to Competefor Patients, MED. ECON., Mar.
21, 1977, at 23.
116. See Enthoven. See text accompanying notes 308-10 ifra. For a brief discussion of En-
thoven's plan, which fundamentally (and unnecessarily) departs from the approach endorsed here,
see note 309 infra.
117. See Enthoven, Shattuck Lecture--Cutting Cost Without Cutting the Quality ofCare, 298
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1229, 1232-33 (1978).
118. See B. ABEL-SMrrH, VALUE FOR MONEY IN HEALTH SERvics 8-11 (1976).
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Oregon State Medical Society case.1 19 Current professional efforts to
combat aggressive use of the panel-medicine concept to control insur-
ance costs include an explicit boycott in Michigan and litigation chal-
lenging the legitimacy of compulsory-participation plans.
120
Provider participation agreements can present some difficult legal
issues, since not all of organized medicine's antipathy to such plans is
unjustified. To the extent that an insurance plan wields monopsony
power- market power as the dominant purchaser in the market-there
may be a socially objectionable opportunity for it to exploit providers,
driving their fees below a fair, competitive level.121 Although the anti-
119. See text accompanying notes 42-45 supra.
120. See note 68 supra and text accompanying notes 68-69, 112-13 supra.
121. A monopsonist can exploit producers only where the latter have unrecoverable fixed
costs, making it rational for them to stay in business even though their total costs are not covered
by the price they obtain. By setting a price at least equal to out-of-pocket costs plus a fair return
on recoverable capital, a monopsonist can keep his suppliers in business while denying them a
return on their original investment. But, because little new capital will be invested in an industry
facing a monopsonistic purchaser, the monopsonist will ultimately have to relax his grip in order
to maintain a source of supply. Health professionals, particularly physicians, are potentially sub-
ject to monopsonistic exploitation because their considerable investments in education, including
wages forgone, cannot be recovered and because their alternative employments are not likely to be
as lucrative or personally satisfying. This means that most health professionals would stay in their
professions even if their incomes were drastically reduced, and it might therefore be tempting to
would-be monopsonists-including large purchasing groups, such as labor unions and perhaps the
federal government as well--to take advantage of their vulnerable situation.
Of course, this scenario is upset by the presence of substantial monopoly power on the
professionals' side of the market. See note 174 infra and text accompanying notes 174-75 infra.
Monopoly provides a possible warrant for introducing monopsony, thereby substituting prices
arrived at by collective bargaining between parties of equal power for the present monopolistic
price structure. Viewing the matter in this way, some consumer advocates have favored monop-
sonistic policies toward health care providers, see, e.g, S. LAW, BLUE CROSS, WHAT WENT
WRONG? (1974), and government regulation is apt to have monopsonistic features, see note 131
infra. For a thoughtful discussion, see Starr, Controlling Medical Costs Through Countervailing
Power, WORKING PAPERS FOR A Naw SociETY 10 (Summer 1977), which nevertheless underesti-
mates the variety of responses available to competing insurers. See also Somers & Somers, A
Proposed Frameworkfor Health and Health Care Policies, 14 INQUIRY 115, 156-61 (1977); A.
Somers, Negotiated Rates: One Road to Strengthening the Private Sector and Cost Containment
in Health Care (Sept. 20, 1977) (unpublished paper prepared for a conference on The Future of
the Private Sector in Medical Care and Education, Duke Medical Center).
This Article argues that private monopsony, like regulation and public takeover of health
care financing, is an inappropriate response to the monopoly problem if it is also possible to
eliminate the monopoly and restore workable competition. Nevertheless, the case against using
private monopsony to correct the current imbalance of power in favor of the medical profession
should not be overstated. Local monopsonies would not be able to exploit doctors significantly as
long as doctors can relocate their practices and can individually refuse to deal with plans that
underpay, thereby inviting market entry by other plans. The argument that physicians might be
unfairly exploited, while valid, is not overpowering because most physicians have probably al-
ready recovered their educational investments through monopoly profits and because the profes-
sion's past abuses are not entirely irrelevant in forming future policy. Finally, although it would
certainly be undesirable to squeeze physicians to the point of drying up the pool of applicants to
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trust laws should be as concerned with providers victimized by a
monopsonistic combination of buyers122 as with consumers exploited
by a provider cartel, recent case law interpreting the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act's exemption of the "business of insurance" from the antitrust
laws 23 threatens to expose providers of insured services to exploitation
by dominant insurance plans. In one case, for example, an alleged hori-
zontal combination of automobile insurers was seemingly given the
benefit of the McCarran exemption, despite allegations that they ex-
ploited auto repair shops.24 The law in this area is unsettled, however,
medical school, the length of the queue of qualified applicants today suggests that medical fees
could be reduced substantially without unduly affecting the supply of doctors.
In general, the strongest objection to monopsony is probably not that it is unfair or ex-
ploitative but that it legitimizes the perpetuation of the very monopoly it confronts and embraces
the collective-bargaining model. Such a system yields unpredictable results and leads to such
things as doctor strikes and the standardization and depersonalization of care. Moreover, it would
do little about the troublesome ideological dimension of the physician monopoly. See note 214
infra. Although some think that confrontations with physicians, using monopsonistic vehicles, can
break down physicians' ideological dominance, this Article looks to a more competitive, pluralistic
system for solutions to that problem.
122. Monopsony has received little attention from antitrust courts and has more frequently
been dealt with as a public policy problem through legislation setting aside antitrust prohibitions
against producer combinations so that producers can wield monopoly power against a monop-
sonistic purchaser. See, eg., Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1976) (agricultural coopera-
tives); Fisheries Cooperative Marketing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 521 (1976); and the labor exemption from
the antitrust laws in sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976), 29 U.S.C. § 52
(1970). Although the medical profession's claim to the benefit of the labor exemption was rejected
in the AMA, case, the court of appeals, in discussing the issue, stated:
[f the laity were so dominantly organized into consumer cooperatives that it might
properly be said of the physician, as of the individual unorganized worker, that he is
"commonly helpless . . . to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment,
or protection "from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor,
." then possibly the two Acts would be applicable.
130 F.2d at 242-43 (footnote omitted); G( United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339
U.S. 485 (1950) (real estate brokers are not entitled to the labor exemption). Obviously, no one is
currently prepared to suggest that physicians are so helpless. But V. note 304 infra and text ac-
companying notes 304-05 infra. On the contrary, monopsony is offered as a response to en-
trenched provider monopolies. See note 121 supra.
123. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976). See generally Weller, Yhe McCarran-FergusonAct'sAnti-
trust Exemption for Insuranc" Language, History and Policy, 1978 DuKE L.J. 587; Kallstrom 684-
.89.
124. Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir.), petitionfor cert.
filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3375 (Oct 19, 1977) (No. 77-580). See note 130 infra. In another case, a prepaid
dental services plan was held exempt without significant attention to either its possible possession
of monopsony power or the possibility that its discriminatory treatment of nonparticipating den-
tists went too far. Manasen v. California Dental Serv., 424 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Cal. 1976). How-
ever, neither possibility seems substantial from the published opinion. Indeed, the plan appeared
to have professional sponsorship and may have presented hazards of an order very different from
those raised by the plaintiff. See text accompanying notes 279-85 infra. A similar case involving a
Blue Shield plan with a 37% market share was resolved against the protesting physician in the
same way. Anderson v. Medical Serv., 1976-1 Trade Cases 1 60,884 (E.D. Va. 1976), aft'dmem.,
551 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1977). However, as compared with the plans in Proctor and Manasen, the
4nderson plan was less discriminatory toward nonparticipating providers.
DUKE LAW JOUVATAL
and the most recent case refused to extend the McCarran exemption to
a prepaid drug plan which allegedly treated small pharmacists un-
fairly.125 This case, Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life and Health Insurance
Co., is currently pending in the Supreme Court, and it is to be hoped
that it will be resolved in such a way as to guarantee insurers wide
latitude in using provider participation agreements for cost-contain-
ment purposes while also giving providers protection in true monop-
sony situations.
1 26
Practical solutions to the monopsony problem seem available and
could be readily implemented without jeopardizing the legitimate cost-
containment measures that insurers might take to limit the cost-escalat-
ing tendencies that insurance itself introduces and to counter the mo-
nopoly power of providers. A guarantee that monopsony power was
not being exercised could be achieved by insisting in cases presenting
the hazard that care rendered by nonparticipating providers not be al-
together excluded from coverage. Instead, such care might be paid for
125. Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 556 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
granted, 98 S. Ct. 1448 (1978). The small pharmacists claimed that they could not afford to accept
the plan's low dispensing fee but insisted they were competitive on the basis of service. Insofar as
the allegations of the complaint seemed to suggest monoponistic abuse, they were untenable in
view of the willing participation of three large drug chains. The allegations of a horizontal con-
spiracy by these chains, however, should take the case out from under the McCarran exemption.
See note 126 infra.
126. The case might be resolved by holding that the McCarran Act does not shelter provider
participation agreements at all. In that event, Sherman Act principles would apply, and, even
though they would not prohibit insurer-provider agreements tailored to business needs, see note
128 infra and accompanying text, some uncertainty concerning the precise rules governing such
agreements would prevail among insurers at least until the decision on remand. Confusion would
also result from overturning the ground of the reassuring decisions cited in notes 124 supra and
130 infir leaving insurers to speculate on how these cases would have come out under a Sherman
Act analysis. See note 130 infra. Despite these concerns, a ruling against the McCarran exemption
would have some merit in permitting antitrust scrutiny of monopsonistic insurance plans, of possi-
bly exclusionary terms in insurer-provider agreements and of any implicit or explicit horizontal
agreements among providers. State insurance regulators are not equipped to deal with competitive
effects in businesses other than "the business of insurance," see note 131 infra, and there is no
basis in legislative history for sheltering such effects from antitrust attention. See Weller, supra
note 123, at 598-602.
Despite these arguments for not recognizing any McCarran exemption, provider participation
agreements designed to combat the impairment of consumer cost-consciousness caused by insur-
ance itself can be viewed, contrary to the RoyalDrugcourt's perception, 556 F.2d at 1383, 1386, as
"peculiar to the insurance industry," suggesting that such agreements should qualify as part of the
"business of insurance," as discussed in the text accompanying notes 128-33 infra. This reading
would square with the decided cases, would allow the Supreme Court to settle most of the uncer-
tainties in its RoyalDrug opinion instead of remanding for a full antitrust evaluation, and would
leave the antitrust courts with jurisdiction to prevent all of the possible abuses which insurer-
provider agreements might be used to perpetrate. Such a reading would apparently leave the
RoyalDrug plaintifis a chance to prevail if they could prove their somewhat far-fetched claim that
there was a conspiracy of participating pharmacies to drive them out of business and to achieve a
shared monopoly.
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on a different basis, perhaps with a copayment roughly reflecting the
higher costs (in fees, utilization and administration) necessitated by
such providers' nonparticipation.127 Such an agreement would allow an
insurance plan to offer "free choice of physician," which many insureds
enrolled as members of employment groups might desire or even re-
quire in order to avoid having to change doctors. But choice of a non-
participating provider would carry a price tag, supplying a desirable
incentive to opt for the panel with its lower costs.
Legally, it would seem possible to employ antitrust principles to
ensure the fair treatment of nonparticipating providers wherever the
insured group represents an undue concentration of buying power.
This result could be reached simply by treating as within the "business
of insurance" for McCarran Act purposes, and thus exempt from anti-
trust attack, only those practices that are reasonably necessary to pro-
tect an insurer and its insureds against overcharges or overutilization.
So construed, the McCarran exemption would extend no further in
these cases than the Sherman Act's usual tolerance for "ancillary" re-
straints imposed as an incident to achieving a legitimate business pur-
pose.128 Language in the leading Supreme Court precedent on the
127. The cases reveal a variety of ways of treating nonparticipating providers. One variable is
the plan's willingness to pay such providers directly, relieving the insured of the necessity for filing
a claim. Compare Anderson v. Medical Serv., 1976-1 Trade Cases 60,884, at 68,856 (E.D. Va.
1976), a.f'd mem., 551 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1977) (payment to subscriber) with Traveler's Ins. Co. v.
Blue Cross, 481 F.2d 80, 84 n.12 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973) (payment to provid-
ers). Another variable is the amount of the discount, if any, from the fee regularly payable. Com-
pareAnderson (no discount) with Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 556 F.2d 1375
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S.Ct. 1448 (1978) (subscriber patronizing non-participating drug-
gist reimbursed 75% of amount paid participant). There is as yet no case where a payment differ-
ential was based explicitly on risk differences resulting from the absence of utilization controls. A
plan attempting to control costs in good faith should not have to justify its differentials by minute
cost calculations. Given the clear business purpose, the burden of proof should be on the providers
challenging the plan's reasonableness.
128. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), a f'd, 175 U.S.
211 (1899); United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); United
States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). A practice that falls outside the McCarran
exemption is not, of course, necessarily a substantive antitrust offense. Requiring insureds to pa-
tronize only "participating" providers is a restraint of trade, however, and deciding whether it
would constitute an antitrust violation requires analysis under the rule of reason with help from
any analogies that can be drawn from established antitrust doctrine. It should be clear that the use
of a fee schedule by an insurer would not, without more, amount to unlawful price fixing. See
Anderson v. Medical Serv., 1976-1 Trade Cases 60,884 (E.D. Va. 1976), aff'dmena, 551 F.2d 304
(4th Cir. 1977); Kallstrom 679; cf 91 HARV. L. REv. 488 (1977) (critique of the application of the
price-fixing label to a joint selling agent performing a commercial function analogous to the in-
surer's buying function here). Neither is there a boycott since any refusal to deal is wholly inciden-
tal to the consumers' individual decisions to join the plan and patronize its participating providers
instead of their competitors.
In the absence of a horizontal agreement among insurers, insureds or providers, provider
participation agreements may be analyzed as a kind of vertical restraint. Since complaints origi-
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McCarran exemption suggests that just such a functional analysis is
intended,'29 and the courts have in fact examined insurer-imposed re-
straints in just this way, tolerating restraints that are tailored to a busi-
ness need.
130
nate with providers rather than consumers, an analogy to cases condemning maximum-price
fixing as a restriction on the "freedom of traders" is suggested. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S.
145 (1968); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951). Those cases
invalidated sellers' attempts to curb monopoly power being wielded by their distributors, and
might be read to deny an insurer of the defense that its "price fixing" was to offset providers'
market power or some other market defect. In the absence of demonstrable monopsony, however,
this defense should be permitted, and the Aibrecht and Kiefer-Stewart cases distinguished on the
ground that other remedies (termination of exclusive territories and litigation against the distribu-
tor cartel) were realistically available in those cases but not here.
Though having some of the characteristics of bilateral exclusive dealing and tying agree-
ments, the contemplated arrangement is tripartite, suggesting a possible analogy to the "TBA"
(tires, batteries and accessories) cases, in each of which an oil company favored a particular TBA
manufacturer over others as supplier to its independent service stations. FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393
U.S. 223 (1968); Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965); Shell Oil Co. v. FTC, 360 F.2d
470 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967). However, those arrangements served no
apparent economic purpose, foreclosed competitors willing to compete on price, reflected the oil
companies' coercive power over ostensibly independent retailers, and were condemned only under
§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, not the Sherman Act.
The arrangements examined here are more defensible than those in the maximum-price
fixing and TBA cases. Nevertheless, standard antitrust analysis applicable to ancillary price fixing,
the Columbia Pictures and Morgan cases, and CBS, Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors
& Publishers, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977), discussed in 91 HARV. L. Rav. 488 (1977), and joint
ventures suggests that a legitimate business purpose, such as appears here, is not a sufficient de-
fense when there is also present both an actual effect on prices (or enough market power to have
such an effect) and an available less restrictive alternative. See generally P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST
ANAL.YSIS 348, 380, 409-10 (1974). The argument here is thus that the same facts that should
render the "business of insurance" exemption unavailable-market power and a less restrictive
alternative-also establish the substantive Sherman Act violation. See Kallstrom 688 (adopting
the analysis suggested here with somewhat less attention to the monopsony issue); cf St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 98 S.Ct. 2923 (1978) (the "boycott" exception to the McCarran exemp-
tion construed with reference to the terms Sherman Act meaning, making the exemption's bound-
ary for those purposes congruent with the boundary of the substantive violation). Admittedly,
some difficulty would be presented by the need to measure monopsony power (a structural issue
calling attention to market share and entry conditions) and to distinguish monopsonistic effects
from the price-lowering effects of introducing competition where a provider monopoly previously
prevailed.
129. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969):
The relationship between insurer and insured, the type of policy which could be issued,
its reliability, interpretation, and enforcement-these were the core of the "business of
insurance." Undoubtedly, other activities of insurance companies relate so closely to
their status as reliable insurers that they too must be placed in the same class.
Whatever contributes to running a sound and competitive insurance plan and to offsetting the
distorting effects of insurance in the market for insured services could easily fit within this defini-
tion of the "business of insurance."
130. Under the recommended analysis, the court in Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir.), peiftionfor cert.filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3375 (Oct. 19, 1977) (No. 77-580);
(see text accompanying note 124 supra), should have examined the alleged horizontal arrange-
ments among insurers to see if any ancillarity defense-data exchange or joint claims adjustment,
for example, (see note 158 infra)--could be made out. Although the court appeared to tolerate the
danger that body shops would be exploited, the court of appeals did apply the recommended
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Under such a rule-of-reason approach, a discriminatory restriction
adopted by an insurer when an equally effective but less restrictive al-
ternative was available would be subject to antitrust attack f the in-
surer was a dominant purchaser and if state law did not specifically
authorize the monopsonistic restraint.13' Room would thus be left both
analysis in determining that the specific treatment of nonparticipating shops was reasonable and
not a "boycott, coercion, or intimidation" subject to the Sherman Act. 561 F.2d at 274-75. Also, it
found no evidence to support the charge of conspiracy. Id at 276. For these reasons, the error in
allowing alleged concerted action unsanctioned by an affirmative state regulatory policy, see text
accompanying note 131 infra, to qualify for the McCarran exemption was probably harmless since
there was no antitrust violation. On their facts at least, the decisions in Proctor, Royal Drug Co. v.
Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 556 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S.Ct. 1448 (1978);
Anderson v. Medical Serv., 1976-I Trade Cases 60,884, ajdme., 551 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1977);
Manasen v. California Dental Serv., 424 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Cal. 1976), discussed in note 124
supra and accompanying text, all seem consistent with the concerns expressed in the text. Accord,
Battle v. Liberty National Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1110
(1975) (funeral insurance plan held not exempt where 50-70% of the funeral services industry was
controlled and "unauthorized" funeral homes were treated unfairly). The only case that seems
clearly wrong in not according insurers appropriate freedom to control costs is Hill v. National
Auto Glass Co., 293 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Cal. 1968), where the court said, without analysis, that the
"business of insurance" did not include "securing for particular glass dealers the sales and instal-
lation jobs required by Allstate claimants." Id at 296. The court held, however, only that the
McCarran exemption did not apply, not that there was a substantive violation.
131. As discussed in note 121 supra, legalization of monopsony has been suggested as a legiti-
mate public policy response to a monopoly problem. For cases using the McCarran Act to uphold
such a response to the problem of hospital costs by the Commissioner of Insurance in Penn-
sylvania, see Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 557 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1976); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue
Cross, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1973); Frankford Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 417 F. Supp. 1104 (E.D. Pa.
1976), aI'dper cur/am, 554 F.2d 1253 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 860 (1977). In the Travelers
case, Blue Cross had a 62% market share.
For a case holding exempt an alleged conspiracy of insurers to lower agents' commissions on
the ground that state law contemplated "cooperation" on such matters and provided for regula-
tion of rates, of which commissions were an element, see California League of Independent Ins.
Producers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 175 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Cal. 1959). This case and others
reflecting the operation of insurer rate bureaus on aspects of the insurance business, see, e.g.,
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966); Schwartz v.
Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 374 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Pa. 1974), would seem distinguishable
from cases in which combinations of insurers attempt to exert their market power over the provid-
ers of insured services, whom state insurance regulators are normally not charged with protecting
or controlling. In cases involving such spillover effects on noninsurance businesses, any exemption
for an insurer cartel would have to arise not under the McCarran Act, but under the "state action"
doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), which exempts anticompetitive actions of pri-
vate persons done by command of the state acting as a sovereign. The doctrine requires a strong
and explicit state policy respecting the market in which the effect is felt. See Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (antitrust laws held to apply, in the absence of a clear state policy
to the contrary, to electric utility's anticompetitive actions affecting the market for light bulbs,
even though those actions were authorized by the state utility commission); Blumstein & Calvani,
State Action as a Shield and a Sword in a Medical Services Antitrust Context: Parker v. Brown in
Constitutional Perspective, 1978 DUKE L.J. 389. The Pennsylvania Blue Cross cases cited at the
beginning of this footnote, though decided under the McCarran Act, should be viewed as applica-
tions of the Parker doctrine. The state's use of Blue Cross as a monopsonistic vehicle for control-
ling hospitals, though not truly within the scope of the private "business of insurance," was
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for insurers to take steps to offset the market-distorting effects of insur-
ance and also for state regulators to authorize insurers to exert their
monopsony power to offset the monopoly power of providers. 32 Prov-
iders would have significant protection against unfair exploitation by
private interests, and, by accepting the development of a more competi-
tive and innovative insurance industry, could reduce the threat to
themselves of state-sponsored monopsony, whether in the form of Blue
Cross-Blue Shield plans133 or a federally dominated national health in-
surance program.
3. The Attractions of -Private Measures to Control Costs. The
cost-containment strategies suggested above, including the approach of
organizing a panel of participating doctors, are fundamentally distin-
guishable from most of the innovative plans, particularly HMOs, which
have incurred professional opposition in the past. Indeed, the suggested
strategies specifically contemplate continuation of the fee-for-service
mode of payment and the use of third-party insurance for the patient's
financial protection. While anticipating a substantial departure from
the passive insurer model, they nevertheless leave the doctor-patient
relationship largely intact. The strategic use of coverage limitations to
reintroduce the constraint of the patient's personal resources in appro-
priate circumstances would increase the necessity for the physician to
act in a fiduciary capacity and to be professionally responsible for the
patient's personal funds as well as his health. Under such a strategy, the
insurer would in no sense be engaged in the "corporate practice of
medicine,"' 34 because the patient would still look to his physician alone
for medical advice and treatment. Any ethical objections that the medi-
cal profession might raise to such an approach would seem to reflect
doctors' interest in preserving monopoly power more than legitimate
defensible as an exercise of state power. See Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life and Health Ins. Co.,
556 F.2d 1375, 1382-83 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S.Ct. 1448 (1978).
132. It seems unlikely that a state could be required under federal antitrust policy and the
Parker doctrine, see note 131 supra, to adopt a less restrictive, procompetitive alternative ap-
proach to the control of a provider monopoly. But see note 133 infra. Nevertheless, the state's
election to employ a monopsonistic regulatory strategy would have to be clear. See note 159 infra
for a discussion of the possibility that insurers might combine under an insurance commissioner's
auspices to negotiate doctors' fees.
133. Consistent with the analysis suggested in note 131 supra, an exploitative policy of a state
government adopted without a colorable justification of a countervailing monopoly might con-
ceivably be challengeable under the supremacy clause despite the Parker doctrine as inconsistent
with the antitrust laws' procompetitive premise.
134. See Note, Controlling Health Care Costs Through Commercial Insurance Companies,
1978 DUKE L.J. 728.
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ethical concerns. 135 As long as individual providers could elect volun-
tarily whether to participate in one or more competing plans, they
could not complain that their independence was inappropriately
eroded.
Because the suggested strategies could evolve naturally from ex-
isting insurance and practice patterns, a change in market conditions
permitting the adoption of such strategies could have an immediate im-
pact. If fear of professional retaliation could be obviated, health insur-
ers should find cost controls less difficult to implement than the HMO
concept, which requires a new organization, new capital, large start-up
costs and numerous regulatory approvals. The prospect of lower insur-
ance premiums would stimulate consumer interest in cost containment,
aiding the process of educating consumers to the benefits of the pro-
posed approach. Once competitive innovation and the education proc-
ess have begun, the transition to a significantly restructured financing
and delivery system should not take long.
36
It is tempting but dangerous to try to evaluate the suggested cost-
containment strategies in the abstract. Despite one's natural inclination
to appraise their administrative feasibility and to estimate intuitively
their acceptability both to individual providers and to consumers, such
speculation is unreliable. Instead, the obvious complexity of the cost-
containment task and the endless possibilities for combining strategies,
for shaping the necessary administrative tools, and for enlisting provid-
ers' cooperation should suggest that testing and evaluation would best
be undertaken in a competitive market. Not only are checks and bal-
ances always present in a competitive environment, but there are also
constantly changing circumstances and a wide variety of individual at-
titudes and preferences which compel adaptation. Moreover, to in-
crease receptiveness to cost-saving ideas, government could alter the
operative incentives, particularly those flowing from the current tax
treatment of health insurance premiums.
137
135. Of course, physicians might raise the egalitarian notion that cost should never be a factor
in consumers' decisions regarding medical services. But, not only is that proposition hard to de-
fend, see Havighurst & Blumstein 6-30, it is also hard to take seriously when it comes from a
profession that is well paid for providing those services.
136. There are already signs that the private sector is responding to the cost crisis in interest-
ing and innovative ways. See COUNCIL ON WAGE & PRICE STABILITY 99-177; text accompanying
notes 66-69 supra.
137. See text accompanying notes 164-67 infra. For a proposal to change the method of subsi-
dizing the purchasing power of persons requiring assistance, see Enthoven 710-713; Controlling
Health Care Costs 476-77, 494 nn.20-21.
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B. Other Unfavorable Factors in the Climatefor Private Cost
Containment
The medical profession has had many allies in its campaign to
prevent fiscal concerns from intruding very far into decisionmaking on
medical treatment. Indeed, some observers believe that a virtual con-
sensus exists against most forms of cost containment that might be
adopted in private third-party prepayment programs. 38 It would seem,
however, that no such judgment can be made until the issue has been
submitted to a definitive test of nonprofessional sentiment-a fair mar-
ket test in which people face definitive choices, including the opportu-
nity to benefit themselves directly by an economizing choice. The
success of a number of HMOs (in the face of substantial obstacles) indi-
cates that some forms of cost containment are acceptable and indeed
are highly prized. Careful analysis will suggest that if such a consensus
exists, it is artificial and subject to rapid breakdown if certain obstacles
to competition in cost containment could be eliminated.
1. The Third-Party Payers. Among the medical profession's
sometime allies on the cost issue are the third-party payers themselves.
Although they are less passive today than in the past, neither the Blue
Shield plans nor the commercial health insurers have pressed the doc-
tors very hard or very often. Although recent innovations have been
promising, performance still falls short of what is both administratively
possible and required by the magnitude of the cost problem.
Due to their origin as creations of state medical societies and their
continued domination by professional interests in many states, 139 it is
not surprising that Blue Shield plans have seldom been aggressive in-
138. On the general desirability of relying primarily on incentives rather than comprehensive
regulation to solve policy problems, see C. SCHULTZE, supra note 1. See also Altman & Weiner,
Regulating as a Second Best, in FTC 421. Considering the growth of comprehensive insurance, the
practice of delegating decisionmaking to physicians without resource constraints or supervision,
passiveness of insurers, and the limited value of cost-sharing and HMOs, Altmana and Weiner
conclude that the market has no real future. Their analysis is based on a series of assumptions
about consumer behavior, insurer behavior, the physician's role, political prospects for changes in
the tax law and in the prevailing commitment to comprehensiveness in financing plans. Though
the obstacles identified clearly exist, the assessment of insurmountability is questionable. More-
over, insofar as Altman and Weiner are assessing political prospects, their prophecies are apt to be
self-fulfilling because policy advice that has already been discounted for political factors narrows
rather than broadens the policy makers' perspective and range of options.
139. See Ohio v. Ohio Medical Indem., Inc., 1976-2 Trade Cases % 61,128 (S.D. Ohio 1976);
State Medical Soe'y v. Commissioner of Ins., 70 Wis.2d 144, 233 N.W.2d 470 (1975); Testimony of
FTC Chairman Michael Pertschuk Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce (Mar. 21, 1978) (with appendix showing con-
trol of individual plans) (copy on file at Duke Law Journal).
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novators in cost control.1 40 Originating more to assure payment for care
rendered to lower-income patients than to serve consumer interests,
14 1
Blue Shield plans may also have served-as the Oregon Physicians
Service seemed to serve in the Oregon State Medical Society case-as
role models for commercial health insurers, subtly teaching them their
"place" and influencing their behavior toward doctors. 142 Not surpris-
ingly, Blue Shield plans have usually offered free choice among an
open panel of physicians, whose participation agreements have not
been onerous enough to discourage broad participation. 143 The plans
appear to have challenged physicians' spending decisions only rarely,
and such review procedures as are used are dominated by practitioners
lacking a reliable incentive to contain costs. 144 Thus, when maximum
charges are determined by the "usual, customary, and reasonable" fee
formula, 14s peer committees review all controversies that arise under
the standard." 6 In most places, Blue Shield has divided the health in-
surance market with the local Blue Cross plan, which provides more
expensive hospital insurance without significant control over the physi-
cians who prescribe the care for which Blue Cross pays. Despite occa-
sional signs of independent behavior and innovation in the direction of
cost containment," 7 Blue Shield and Blue Cross plans are unlikely to
deliver adequate cost containment to consumers."
48
140. One should not be misled by cases brought by disgruntled physicians, such as Anderson
v. Medical Serv., 1976-1 Trade Cases 60,884 (E.D. Va. 1976), aft'dmem., 551 F.2d 304 (4th Cir.
1977), into thinking that Blue Shield does not serve professional interests.
141. See H. SoMERs & A. SOMERS, DocTORs, PATIENTS & HEALTH INSURANCE 317-22
(1961); Kessel, Price Discrimination in Medicine, I J. L. & ECON. 20, 32-33 (1958). For an illustra-
tion of organized medicine's original conception of Blue Shield, see Master, Impact of Medical
Care Plans on the Medical Profession, 150 J.A.M.A. 766 (1952).
142. See Goldberg & Greenberg 58; see notes 42, 46, 50, 56-59, 61 supra and notes 280, 282,
285, 287-92, 295-96, 298 infra and text accompanying notes 42-61 supra and notes 279-98 infra.
143. See text accompanying notes 112-13 supra; Comment, supra note 47, at 985-86 n.387.
See also Anderson v. Medical Serv., 1976-1 Trade Cases 60,884 (E.D. Va. 1976), aft'dmem., 551
F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1977).
144. See Pertschuk testimony, supra note 139 (showing physician representation on commit-
tees); SC Havighurst & Blumstein (discussing PSROs and their domination by physicians).
145. This type of formula is widely regarded as being inherently inflationary. See Kallstrom
650.
146. See Pertschuk testimony, supra note 139.
147. See text accompanying notes 68, 112-13 supra.
148. In many markets, especially where their competitive advantages and thus their market
shares are large, the "Blues" act as kind of quasi-public agency, responding more to political than
to market forces. Generalizations are thus dangerous because political climates vary, see note 131
supra, but it may be helpful to think of dominant Blue plans as analogous to independent regula-
tory agencies, with all the unreliability and risk of producer influence which that analogy implies.
See generally S. LAW, supra note 121; R. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION (Brookings Inst.
1971). Cf. text accompanying notes 276-305 (implying a political role for the Blues in accommo-
dating public and professional interests).
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There are several explanations for the failure of commercial health
insurers to challenge physicians aggressively in pursuit of cost contain-
ment. The commercial companies often operate at distinct disadvan-
tages in competition with the "Blues." ' 149  Their competitive
disadvantage and their vulnerability to boycotts appear to have caused
the commercial insurers to accept the Blues' leadership on matters
about which providers feel strongly and to direct their competitive ef-
forts elsewhere. Thus, the commercial companies' most successful com-
petitive challenges to the Blues have resulted from their greater ability
to service national accounts and their greater willingness to use experi-
ence-rating for employment groups and cost sharing, comparative ad-
vantages whose implementation has not threatened providers' vital
interests.' 0 Contracting only with insureds and not with providers, the
commercial plans have lacked direct means of controlling providers'
charges and behavior. Although adoption of certain panel-medicine
models might be legally possible,' 5' steps in that direction have not
been taken. Nor have other mechanisms for utilization control been
developed.152 The only appreciable control efforts have focused on fees
and on hospital charges to be paid."5 3 For a long time, the insurers
made a positive virtue of noninterference in professional decisions, 154
149. See S. LAW, supra note 121, at 11-13; Frech & Ginsburg, Competition Among Health
Insurers, in FTC 210.
150. The commercial companies' advantages in these three respects flow from the localized
nature of the Blue plans (reflecting their organization by local provider interests), the Blues' pref-
erence for community rating (reflecting the original conception of the plan as a controlled, quasi-
public taxing authority not facing competition), and the Blues' focus on shallow rather than cata-
strophic coverage (reflecting their origin as a means of assuring payment to providers). See H.
SOMERtS & A. SOMERS, supra note 141, at 309-16. See generall, J. KRIZAY & A. WILSON, THE
PATIENT AS CONSUMER: HEALTH CARE FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 37-50 (1974).
151. See Note, supra note 134, at 750.
152. See note 158 infra for a discussion of practical difficulties confronting insurers. Insurers
have cooperated with peer review mechanisms established by organized medicine, however. See,
e.g., Steinwald, supra note 58, at 28; Edgahl, supra note 58, at 493.
153. See, e.g., Kallstrom 649-52. Obviously, insurers could not commit themselves to pay
whatever the doctor charged, yet they were forced by competitive pressures from Blue Shield,
which has some control over fees, to provide indemnification of incurred costs rather than a fixed
cash indemnity.
154. It is the virture [sic] of the approach inherent in this insurance company concept
that there is no interference in the provision of care. Naturally, there are controls, the
purpose of which is to define what is intended by the terms of the contract and to deter
misuse of this intent. But the concept of insurance companies is that essentially any de-
termination of the quality of care must rest with those professionally competent by train-
ing, tradition, and experience to arrive at such determinations-and with the patient.
Follman, CommercialInsurance Views Financing ofHospltal andMedical Care, J. MICH. ST. MED.
Soc'y, June, 1959, at 973, quotedin H. SOMERS & A. SOMERS, supra note 141, at 415. For a full
examination of insurer attitudes, their origins and their impact, see C. MoRRow, HEALTH CARE
GUIDANCE: COMMERCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE AND NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY (1976).
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going along with physicians in interpreting as "interference" any ag-
gressive attempt to impose insurance limits that cramped the doctors'
style.
As discussed below,"'5 the commercial insurers' customers, prima-
rily employers and labor unions, have not until recently demanded
much cost containment, being largely content with traditional insurer
practices. Because any attempt to sell cost containment aggressively
would have required a large effort to educate both consumers and
providers to a different view of the insurer's function, such competitive
moves would have involved considerable investment and risks for the
innovating insurer above and beyond the risk of probable professional
retaliation. Moreover, any innovative success could have been quickly
imitated by other insurers, touching off a competitive reaction which,
insofar as it produced greater selectivity in benefit packages and re-
duced premiums, would reduce overall industry revenues. Given these
risks, insurers are understandably hesitant to challenge the provid-
ers. 156 It therefore seems likely that health insurers' lack of inventive-
ness in developing and promoting cost containment has rested in part
upon a fear of the consequences of competition.' 57 In some respects, the
medical profession appears to have done the health insurers a service
by discouraging forms of competition that, while potentially beneficial
to individual innovators and consumers, would have adversely affected
the insurance industry as a whole.
Today health insurers strongly support cost containment, but they
favor having government do much of the cost-containment job and dis-
claim the ability to do it themselves in a competitive environment.
Maintaining that, as a highly fragmented industry, they lack the market
power necessary to control costs and negotiate with providers,15 8 the
155. See text accompanying notes 164-69 infra.
156. Reflecting on the statement in note 154 supra, Herman and Anne Somers wrote: "Practi-
cal convenience often gets elevated to ideological status." H. SOMERS & A. SOMERS, supra note
141, at 415 See also C. MoRRow, supra note 154, at 75-94.
157. Antitrust lawyers and economists will recognize the operation of "oligopolistic inter-
dependence." See F. ScHERER, supra note 55, at 135-36; Posner, Oligopoly and theAntitrust Laws:
A Suggested.4pproach, 21 STAN. L. RPv.1562 (1969); Turner, The Defnition of.4greement Under
the Sherman .4At: Conscious Parallelism andRefusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. Rv. 655 (1962). When
Dr. Paul Ellwood recently proposed the idea of "health care alliances," see text accompanying
note 115 supra, the Health Insurance Association of America appointed a committee to consider
it. One is inclined to wonder about the state of competition in an industry which responds to new
ideas in this way.
158. One interpretation of this argument is that the individual insurer usually lacks bargain-
ing power of the monopsonistic proportions needed to confront the physician monopoly. As ar-
gued in the text and in note 121 supra, however, it is not clear that permitting such monopsony
power would be appropriate. Another more tenable interpretation of the insurers' "position is that
individual insurers frequently possess such a small share of the business in local markets that the
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commercial insurers have suggested expanding the insurance industry's
antitrust exemption to permit them to bargain collectively with the
medical profession.' 5 9  Whether congressional acceptance of this
monopsonistic "solution" to the cost problem is appropriate depends,
at least in part, on whether competitive innovation, along lines sug-
gested herein, is feasible or not. It would seem that the principle of
"countervailing power" should not be invoked unless it is clear that the
provider monopoly cannot be broken down and reasonably competi-
tive conditions restored.1
60
administrative costs of organizing provider panels and otherwise controlling costs would be pro-
hibitive. An insurer whose market share was too small to permit operation on an efficient scale
normally would either have to grow or to leave the business to others. The particular phenomenon
here, however, may sometimes be the result of national contracts with large employers whose
employees are scattered in pockets about the country. Present methods of providing coverage for
such employers are not immutable, of course, and insurers should be expected to devise new ways
of serving their national accounts, thereby solving the cost problem through innovation rather
than adhering to traditional patterns. One possibility that suggests itself is that two or more insur-
ers could combine their efforts in order to achieve the critical mass needed to organize a local
panel; the business purpose of such a combination would probably protect the combination
against antitrust attack if the plan did not try to do too much. See text accompanying notes 121-30
supra. See U.S. DEPVT OF JUSTICE, THE PRICING AND MARKETING OF INSURANCE 119-45 (1977).
On the comparable problem of data exchange among insurers, deemed lawful under similar prin-
ciples, see id 91-119. Once the panel approach was established in a community, see text accompa-
nying notes 114-17 supra, the panels would come to have an identity of their own and would
compete to serve small accounts, relieving the insurers of the need to take the organizational
initiative.
159. The insurers' proposal has not been made public in definitive form, but one statement by
an insurance company executive suggests what they have in mind:
This would not enable us, for example, with the sort of limited legislation that I'm talk-
ing about, to have a group of insurance companies tell a group of doctors it's going to be
this way or not at all. That's not the concept at all. It's rather to a e o sit down with agroup of doctors and together find any reasonable way of having them accept reasonableand customry peer revew and let their peer review be the last determinant whether theywould be willing to accept that as a negotiated basis for payment in the area.
NATIONAL LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON AMERICA'S HALH POLICY, CONFERENCE PROCEED-noS 43 (1976). Although some concerted action can be justified, see note 158 supra, combinations
for collective bargaining with physicians would violate fundamental antitrust principles. It is be-'
lieved that the law allows sufficient flexibility to permit appropriate forms of innovation.
The health insurers apparentiy believe that a naked combination formed for purposes of
collective bargaining with doctors would not be sheltered from antitrust scrutiny under the Mc-
Carran Act. Even if a state insurance commissioner blessed the arrangement, it would probably
not receive McCarran protection unless the commissioner's actios could survive analysis under
the Parker doctrine. See notes 13c1-33 supra.
160. Thus, rational policy would be to alter the tax treatment of health insurance premiums,
see text accompanying notes 164-66 infra, and to enforce the antitrust laws before turning to more
extreme solutions. Starr, supra note 121, appears to underestimate the otential for restoring the
private market to health. European experience with collective bargaining is reported in W.
GI.ASE, HEALTH INSURANCE BARGAINING" FOREIGN LESSONS FOR AMERICANS (forthcoming).The argument here is not that this model is unacceptable but that it is premature to adopt it. See
note 121 s cinpra.
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The health insurance industry's long-range economic interests do
not lie in the direction of strengthened competition in cost containment
or in restoration of their customers' cost-saving incentives, both of
which would result in the elimination of excess insurance coverage and
probably reduced premiums and profits for the industry as a whole.'
61
From the industry's point of view, the ideal outcome would seem to be
the perpetuation of roughly the present system under more extensive
public control mechanisms. The main pressure for cost containment
would devolve on these public mechanisms rather than the insurers. If
the controls were not very effective (as is likely'62), the insurers would
then enjoy the benefits of continued cost escalation without bearing any
responsibility for it. But such an outcome would be politically unstable,
giving rise to the likelihood that the health insurance industry would
have its intermediary role assumed altogether by the federal govern-
ment, promulgating fee schedules and otherwise wielding its monop-
sony power over providers to contain costs. The health insurers'
proposal for a broader antitrust exemption to permit collective bargain-
ing with providers appears to be a political strategy designed in recog-
nition of just this possibility. Such an exemption would allow the
health insurers to act in concert as a monopsonistic purchaser, obviat-
ing the necessity for government to exert its own monopsony power.
In pleading for dispensation from the basic antitrust prohibition
against exploitative combinations of competitors, the insurers are not
making their strongest case for a continued role in the health care sys-
tem. Indeed, in a political gamble, they are playing away from what
appears to be their greatest strength-namely their ability to offer con-
sumers a meaningful range of choices and to accommodate, without
coercion and through wholly consensual arrangements among individ-
uals, the conflicting interests of consumers and providers. Although the
insurers' proposal will be acceptable to those who view the health care
crisis as a power struggle between provider and consumer interests, it
still seems more appropriate to treat the problem as a potentially cor-
rectable failure of public policy and of the private market. In any event,
the insurers' position on these issues must be seen for the self-interested
political stance it is. Despite what they now say, health insurers proba-
bly can be counted on to compete in cost containment if they can be
161. Health insurers would probably not wish to see any change in the tax treatment of insur-
ance premiums, but the introduction of tax credits for the underinsured, see text accompanying
note 166 infra, might offset insurers' losses of premiums resulting from reductions in coverage by
others.
162. See Havighurst, Health Care Cost-Containment Regulation, supra note 1.
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effectively deprived of their current excuses for not doing So.163
2. The Customers: The Weakness of Demand for Cost
Containment. In addition to health insurers' reasonable fear of pro-
fessional resistance, another explanation that can be offered for their
slowness in initiating significant cost-containment measures in the past
has been the lack of consumer demand for such programs. Employers
and employee groups, particularly unions, have long sought increas-
ingly comprehensive insurance protection and have revealed little in-
terest in more selective coverage, high deductibles or cost controls that
might limit patients' options.
The reasons for purchaser disinterest in cost containment are not
difficult to identify. Cost escalation has been and is tolerated beyond
consumers' actual preferences primarily because of the distorted incen-
tives that result from the treatment of health insurance as a tax-free
fringe benefit.'" This tax subsidy inflates the consumer's demand for
health insurance and prevents employers and employees from deriving
the full advantage of cost-containment efforts, the savings from which,
if paid to the employee, would amount to wages subject to both income
and Social Security taxes. More than any other factor, the tax law has
prevented insurer competition from focusing on cost containment and
has created the climate in which the medical profession's strong prefer-
ences concerning the nature of health insurance cannot be overcome.16
The prospects for private cost containment would brighten dra-
matically if insurance purchasers' cost consciousness were strengthened
by a change in the tax law to make insurance purchaseable, beyond a
certain point, only with after-tax dollars. 166 Such use of financial incen-
tives should seem an effective way to stimulate the education of em-
ployees to the frequently limited value of additional health care and to
the desirablility of limited self-insurance over costly exposure to
"moral hazard"--the risk that an insurance fund will be exploited by
163. But see C. MoRRow, supra note 154. Morrow's pessimism about turning commercial
insurers around on cost-containment issues might yield somewhat if she would consider the possi-
ble impact of changes in the competitive environment and in the operative incentives.
164. See Controlling Health Care Costs 475-78. Insurance unavoidably distorts many pur-
chasing decisions, creating a problem that insurers must be induced to solve. The tax incentive to
overinsure thus piles a distortion on a distortion, hopelessly entangling the system.
On the effect of tax considerations in union bargaining, see R. MuNTs, BARGAINING FOR
HEALTH 87-88 (1967).
165. It is perhaps instructive that the greatest experimentation with new models of health care
financing and delivery and the greatest confrontations between organized medicine and innova-
tive health plans occurred before the era in which the tax law began to cushion the impact of
insurance premiums. See note 50 supra.
166. For the proposal that a limited tax credit be substituted for the current form of tax sub-
sidy, see Controlling Health Care Costs 476-77; Enthoven 711-12.
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the insureds (and the providers) if administrative checks are not im-
posed. If employers and unions could arrange for premium savings to
flow through to employees without an additional tax, the latter would
be induced (as they can be in no other way) to learn these important
lessons. 167
Despite the tax-induced weakness in private demand for cost con-
tainment, there is still an opportunity for insurers to respond to the
limited but still significant desire for cost containment which exists at
the new margin-where a dollar saved, though worth less than a dollar
after taxes, may still be worth saving, depending on the value of the
benefit forgone. Indeed, there are clear signs that employers and unions
are awakening to the existence of inappropriate health care spending
and to potential gains from cost containment. 68 Moreover, insurers
have taken many important initiatives which, although inadequate to
meet the need and tentative in their approach to organized medicine,
are indicative of immense promise.' 69 Far from indicating that private
cost containment has no future, current events indicate stirrings that
could become a potent force if the threat of professional restraints on
innovation could be removed.
IV. ANTITRUST REMEDIES FOR PROFESSIONAL RESTRAINTS
Until recently, the antitrust laws have been of only slight value as
a deterrent to restraints of trade by medical organizations. However,
the Supreme Court's decisions in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar170 and
Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital'7' have significantly
increased the likelihood of successful antitrust actions against profes-
sional groups by, respectively, establishing that the "learned profes-
sions" enjoy no special exemption 172 and expanding the conception of
167. Employers and unions are reported to be highly paternalistic toward the rank and file,
perferring liberal claims administration and comprehensive coverage even when the rational em-
ployee would prefer cost sharing, selective coverage, rigorous claims administration, and more
take-home pay. Any problem here lies not with the health care system but in the areas of em-
ployee relations and internal union politics. See generally R. Munts, supra note 164. It seems clear
that the public should not, through the tax system, underwrite the marginal costs of such paternal-
ism. A tax law change would apparently contribute usefully to educating not only employees but
also those who act as their proxies in decision making on health insurance. Also on consumer
attitudes, see C. MoRRow, supra note 154, at 87-93.
168. See COUNCIL ON WAGE & PRICE STaBILIT 99-177.
169. See references cited in note 80 supra.
170. 421 U.S. 733 (1975) (bar association mandatory fee schedule is unlawful price fixing).
171. 425 U.S. 738 (1976) (restraining expansion of 49-bed hospital would "substantially af-
fect" interstate commerce and Sherman Act suit may be brought).
172. But see note 197 infra and accompanying text.
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interstate commerce to encompass more medical activities. 73 Never-
theless, there remain a number of doctrinal and practical obstacles to
making the antitrust laws an effective defender of innovation in the
health services industry. The main focus of this legal analysis is on cost-
containment innovations by third-party payers, but much of the discus-
sion applies as well to HMOs and to competitive developments of other
kinds in health care delivery.
A. Professional Boycotts.
The medical profession is ideally situated to employ boycotts to
good advantage. By virtue of certain conditions in the medical market-
place, each fee-for-service physician already possesses a substantial
measure of monopoly power over his or her individual patients,
74
making it unnecessary for doctors to combine to forge new market
power through price-fixing or market-division agreements. Instead, co-
ercive refusals to deal and other techniques 175 have been used to per-
petuate those market conditions that underlie the individual doctor's
market power and to frustrate both the efforts of consumers to combine
for increased bargaining effectiveness and attempts by financing in-
termediaries to help consumers overcome their purchasing disadvan-
tages. When used as a disciplinary technique, the boycott is effective in
maintaining the status quo.
Unlike price fixing, professional restraints directed against con-
sumer-oriented organizational innovations do not necessarily require
unanimity or near-unanimity of action to be effective. Sporadic and
incomplete boycotts can be quite successful in warding off periodic
challenges. Moreover, the mere threat of harassment stemming from
organized professional disapproval may prevent desirable initiatives
from occurring at all, thus producing anticompetitive consequences
without any overt action inviting antitrust enforcement. It would be
desirable for antitrust law relating to professional boycotts and related
restraints to be clarified in such a way as to deter both formal and in-
173. See text accompanying notes 256-57 infra.
174. An individual doctor's considerable discretion in both pricing and spending results from
several natural circumstances, including patients' technical ignorance, their difficulty in shopping
for alternative providers or treatments, and their reluctance to economize where health is allegedly
concerned. In addition, the doctor's freedom in both pricing and choice of therapy is greatly en-
hanced by the frequent availability of third-party payment covering (within liberal limits)
whatever fee the provider sets and many possibly nonessential services. See generally Sloan &
Feldman, Competition Among Physicians, in FTC 57.
175. Ethical restrictions on doctors' advertising are an example. See Canby & Gellhorn, Phy-
.vcian Advertising: The First Amendment and the Sherman Act, 1978 DuKE L.J. 543, 546-47.
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formal abuses and to provide assurances of meaningful protection to
would-be innovators.
1. Proving a Conspiracy to Boycott. A major impediment to the
use of the antitrust laws to control professionally imposed restraints is
the problem of proving, in particular cases, the existence of a "contract,
combination . . . , or conspiracy" to boycott.'76 Whether a boy-
cott-that is, agreed-upon refusals to deal-organized by a professional
group would be entitled to any special defenses will be discussed sepa-
rately. For the moment, it may be assumed that a professional associa-
tion's explicit call for its members to boycott an innovative provider or
financing plan (or such a plan's subscribers or cooperating profession-
als) would be unlawful per se under established doctrine. 177 Because it
would be unusual to find documentation of an agreement or explicit
invitation, however, it is important that enforcement mechanisms also
be able to identify and deal with more subtle invocations of profes-
sional power.
The case law indicates that, where no agreement can be shown
directly, an unlawful conspiracy to boycott can sometimes be inferred
from collective actions likely to produce uniform behavior amounting
to a boycott. Thus, the circulation of certain kinds of information likely
to induce parallel action has been held to warrant a finding of a con-
certed refusal to deal.178 Without more, however, an inference of con-
spiracy would not be permissible if the information circulated was
otherwise difficult to obtain and had value to the recipients above and
beyond its utility as a signal for concerted action.1
79
Proof of widespread individual refusals to deal is not itself ade-
quate to establish the requisite conspiracy; although true group boy-
cotts to coerce private behavior are illegal per se, unilateral refusals to
176. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
177. See, e.g., Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
178. In Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914),
some retail lumber dealers' associations published a list of wholesalers who also traded at retail in
competition with the associations' members. The Supreme Court said:
[W]hen in this case by concerted action the names of wholesalers who were reported as
having made sales to consumers were periodically reported to the other members of the
associations, the conspiracy to accomplish that which was the natural consequence of
such action [z. , refusals to deal] may be readily inferred.
Id at 612.
179. Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588, 604 (1925) (circulation
among sellers of information regarding prices and quantities of cement sold under "specific job"
contracts was upheld as a means to prevent buyers from fraudulently procuring more cement at
the contract price than they were entitled to get); McCann v. New York Stock Exch., 107 F.2d 908,
912 (2d Cir. 1939).
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deal are permitted.18 0 Indeed, the freedom to do business with whom-
ever one chooses is part of that same "freedom of traders" that the rule
against coercive boycotts is itself designed to vindicate.",' Arguably,
physicians might have good personal reasons for refusing to cooperate
with a particular cost-containment program. Not only might the
paperwork burden be seen as excessive, but an individual doctor might
be so outraged by an insurer's action that he would be willing to give
up some patients and some income to keep his conscience clear and to
strike a small blow for patients' rights and professional indepen-
dence.18 2 Where such motives are dominant, a conspiracy may not be
inferable.
Although physician refusals to deal could sometimes occur with-
out primary regard for what other doctors are doing, it may also be the
case that, through the use of code words and signals, physician organi-
zations can invite an outpouring of sentiment calculated to harass and
thereby discipline an innovator. Numerous individual refusals to deal
might therefore be decided upon with some expectation that others
would act in parallel fashion, so that many more such refusals would
occur than would have occurred without that expectation. 183 Moreover,
the role of a medical organization or of certain individuals in whipping
up enthusiasm or in publicizing the issue and inviting the response may
be apparent. A court or jury could, on facts suggesting such a scenario
of stimulus and response, infer the existence of a conspiratorial boy-
cott. 1
84
180. See, e.g., United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
181. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951). It is
perhaps noteworthy in this context that physicians appear to place a high value on their own
freedom of choice. See Principles of Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association § 5.
182. Such a defense would be more difficult to justify in the case of a refusal to refer patients
to hospitals or specialists who are doing business with an HMO.
183. An inference of conspiracy from "conscious parallelism" is not compelled where the pu-
tative conspirators might have had reasons of their own for acting as they did, Theatre Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954), but neither would such an
inference be improper. Arguable reasons for independent action should not preclude a factfinder's
inference of conspiracy where an element of interdependence remains. See notes 195-96, 271infra. In the Theatre Enterprises case, the jury had found for the defendants, 346 U.S. at 539, but it
is unlikely that a finding for the plaintiff would have been overturned. See text accompanying
notes 208-11 infra.
184. In the AMA case, the court of appeals sharply differentiated between the explicit boy-
cotts there employed and intraprofessional communications of the sort that the text suggests may
also be troublesome: "[A]ppellants have open to them always the safer and more kindly weapons
of legitimate persuasion and reasoned argument, as a means of preserving professional esprit de
corps, winning public sentiment to their point of view or securing legislation." 130 F.2d at 248
(footnotes omitted). Reference to "professional esprit de corps" might be read to imply that pro-
fessional actions identifying an object of common concern would be acceptable so long as no
retaliatory measures were explicitly advocated. The better reading, however, would permit profes-
[Vol. 1978:303
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Despite this logic, the Oregon State Medical Society case l85 sug-
gests that the courts may not be quick to characterize professional ac-
tivities as a boycott. 86 There, the trial court had accepted the testimony
of local medical society members that there was no society policy of
discrimination against private hospital associations and had discounted
evidence in the form of letters from doctors to hospital associations at-
tributing their personal refusals to deal to "a policy of their local medi-
cal society." ' 7 The Supreme Court felt bound by these findings and
theorized several possible innocent explanations for the letters.1 88 Nev-
ertheless, it certainly seems that messages were received by the medical
society members even though none were demonstrably sent. Though
the Court was unwilling to declare the trial court's refusal to find a
conspiracy "clearly erroneous," its discussion of the evidence strongly
suggests both the efficacy and the subtlety of intraprofessional commu-
sional groups to emphasize positive professional values but would encourage courts to regard with
suspicion collective actions to denigrate alternative approaches or to focus professional disap-
proval on a specific competitor or would-be innovator.
185. See notes 42, 46, 50, 56-57 supra and text accompanying notes 42-57 supra.
186. The Court's full discussion of the evidence on the boycott issue is helpful in dealing with
the problem of proving a concerted refusal to deal in a professional setting:
The record contains a number of letters from doctors to private associations refusing to
accept checks directly from them. Some base refusal on a policy of their local medical
society, others are silent as to reasons. Some may be attributed to the writers' personal
resistance to dealing directly with the private health associations, for it is clear that many
doctors objected to filling out the company forms and supplying details required by the
associations, and preferred to confine themselves to direct dealing with the patient and
leaving the patient to deal with the associations. Some writers may have mistaken or
misunderstood the policy of local associations. Others may have avoided disclosure of
personal opposition b the hand and impersonal excuse of association "policy." The
letters have some evi en value, but it is not compelling and, weighed against the
other post-1941 evidence, does not satisfy us that the trial court's findings are "clearly
erroneous."
Appellees' evidence to disprove conspiracy is not conclusive, is necessarily largely
negative, but is too persuasive tor us to say it was clear error to accept it. In 1948, 1,210
of the 1,660 licensed physicians in Oregon were members of the Oregon State Medical
Society, and between January 1, 1947, and June 30, 1948, 1085 Oregon doctors billed
and received payment directly from the Industrial Hospital Association, only one of the
several private plans operating in the State. Surely there was no effective boycott, and
ineffectiveness, m view of the power over its members which the Government attributes
to the Society, strongly suggests the lack of an attempt to boycott these private associa-
tions. A parade of local medical society members from all parts of the State, apparently
reputable, credible, and informed professional men, testified that their societies now
have no policy of discrimination against private health associations, and that no attempts
are made to prevent individual doctors from cooperating with them. Members of the
governing councils of the State and Multnomah County Societies testified that since 1940
there have been no suggestions in their meetings of attempts to prevent individual doc-
tors from serving private associations. The manager of Oregon Physicians' Service testi-
fied that at none of the many meetings and conferences of local societies attended by him
did he hear any proposal to prevent doctors from cooperation with private plans.
If the testimony of these many resjponsible witnesses is given credit, no finding of
conspiracy to restrain or monopolize this business could be sustained. Certainly we can-
not say that the trial court's refusal to find such a conspiracy was clearly erroneous.
343 U.S. at 335-37. See also notes 199-200 infra and text accompanying notes 198-200 infra.
187. 343 U.S. at 335-36. See Goldberg & Greenberg 61, for examples of such letters.
188. 343 U.S. at 335. See note 186 supra.
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nication as well as the difficulty of curbing the profession's tendency to
act in concert when its collective interests are threatened. 8 9
The Oregon State Medical Society case, revealing a judicial reluc-
tance to discover a physician boycott, is important authority, to be sure,
but it is possible that in the years since 1952 we have become more
sophisticated about the issues it addressed.190 Certainly the crisis in
health care costs has highlighted the cost-escalating effects of third-
party payment plans, providing one insight essential for an apprecia-
tion of the value of private cost-containment activity and of the hazards
of excessive doctor influence over the mechanisms of health care
financing and delivery. 91 More specifically, the work of Goldberg and
Greenberg which reinterpreted the Oregon experience' 92 revealed how
doctors' refusals to deal, stimulated at least in part by professional ac-
tions taken in concert, can suppress independent efforts to curb physi-
cians' power. Moreover, despite the Supreme Court's dicta in the
Oregon and Goldfarb cases indicating that professionals' activities
would be viewed charitably,9 3 the antitrust and other scrutiny to which
various professional actions are currently being subjected' 94 may dispel
some of the illusions about professionals that have prompted the Court
to hedge its opinions in the past. In particular, enough evidence may be
accumulating on physicians' conduct to confirm the impression that, far
from being entitled to judicial deference, the medical profession has a
sufficient propensity for concerted action in defense of its economic in-
189. See note 186 supra. The Court concluded from evidence that two-thirds of the Oregon
physicians had accepted payments directly from one of the hospital associations in one 18-month
period that the boycott, if indeed one had been attempted, was ineffective. 343 U.S. at 336. By
another measure of effectiveness, however, the medical societies' actions were highly successful,
since the hospital associations terminated their objectionable methods of cost containment. See
Goldberg & Greenberg 61.
190. As a sign of the difference in the times, it is notable that the trial judge's findings of fact,
by which the Supreme Court felt bound, contained, as the Court observed, "irrelevant soliloquies
on socialized medicine, socialized law, and the like, which. . . do not add strength or persuasive-
ness to his opinion." 343 U.S. at 331.
191. In retrospect, it seems that the target in Oregon State Medical Society should have been
not the unprovable conspiracy to boycott but the concerted actions involved in creating the profes-
sion's own prepayment plan. It was this initiative that facilitated more uniform resistance to the
hospital associations. Subsequent discussion, at text accompanying notes 279-98 infra, examines
more fully the case for using the antitrust laws to prevent profession-dominated "reforms" from
foreclosing private innovation.
192. Goldberg & Greenberg.
193. See note 197 infra and text accompanying notes 197-98 infra.
194. See, eg., National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 98 S.Ct. 1355 (1978)
(ethical restraint on competitive bidding held a per se violation); Bates v. Arizona State Bar, 433
U.S. 350 (1977) (disciplinary restraint on attorney advertising held unconstitutional). Goldfarb
and Bates strongly reflect an increased awareness by the Court of the interests of consumers in a
properly functioning competitive market.
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terests that special vigilance is required. 95 In cases where doctors' in-
terests have been challenged, courts should not make themselves hard
to persuade that there has been a meeting of professional minds.19 6
2. Professionalism as a Defense for Boycotts. Even though
Goldfarb held that the so-called "learned professions" are subject to the
antitrust laws, that case also suggested that the concept of professional-
ism may legitimize certain collective activities by professional societies
that would not be permitted if undertaken by industrial trade associa-
tions. 197 An even broader indication of this possibility appeared in Ore-
gon State Medical Society:
Since no concerted refusal to deal with private health associa-
tions has been proved, we need not decide whether it would violate
the antitrust laws. We might observe in passing, however, that there
are ethical considerations where the historic direct relationship be-
tween patient and physician is involved which are quite different
than the usual considerations prevailing in ordinary commercial
matters. This Court has recognized that forms of competition usual
195. Though comprising a large number of seemingly independent competitors, many of
them in solo practice, the medical profession possesses remarkable solidarity. Not only is there
considerable interdependence as a result of referral patterns, hospital practice and professional
organizations, but also the training of physicians, long dominated by organized medicine through
its accreditation powers, see generally Kessel, Higher Education and the Nation's Healtlh-A Review
of the Carnegie Commission Report on Medical Education, 15 J. L. & EcON. 115 (1972); see note
240 infra, has instilled many common values and perceptions that make it relatively easy to stimu-
late a collective response to a perceived threat, once identified. For a discussion of the ideological
cohesiveness of the medical profession, see note 214 infra. Moreover, informal professional and
social interactions among physicians in many communities facilitate the enforcement of consen-
sual expectations, once arrived at, against all but the profession's fringe. See Brief for Appellants
at 3-28, Feminist Women's Health Center v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Fla. 1976); see
notes 39-40 supra.
196. In other industry settings involving large numbers of competitors, the Supreme Court
has been willing to discover conspiracies without precise proof of the mechanisms by which they
were controlled. Thus the Court has observed that, among a cartel's sanctions, "experience has
shown [business honor and social penalties] to be the more potent and dependable restraints."
American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 411 (1921). In another case,
involving a price-fixing plan by real estate brokers that lacked visible enforcement mechanisms,
the Court observed: "Subtle influences may be just as effective as the threat or use of formal
sanctions to hold people in line." United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S.
485, 489 (1950). On the significance of exchanges of assurances among professionals with a strong
awareness of their collective welfare, see note 271 infra and accompanying text. See also note 214
infra and text accompanying notes 217-33 infra.
197. 421 U.S. at 788 n.17:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business is, of
course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates the Sherman
Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with
other business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust concepts
which originated in other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of the
professions, may require that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a
violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently. We intimate no
view on any other situation than the one with which we are confronted today.
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in the business world may be demoralizing to the ethical standards of
a profession.'
98
While this dictum stands as a general expression that the medical pro-
fession may enjoy certain prerogatives, the case law has yet to establish
what those prerogatives might be.
19 9
There is no question that the foregoing quotation from the Oregon
case, when read in the context of the Supreme Court's discussion of the
boycott issue,2° strongly implies that the medical profession might be
allowed to engage in coercive boycotts, enforcing professional "ethics"
against third-party insurance carriers and others. One cannot know for
certain, of course, whether the Court would in fact tolerate such action,
but, given its strongly expressed opposition in other contexts to "agree-
ments. . .[which] cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain
their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment,"20 ' it would
be surprising if the medical profession were allowed to enforce its pref-
erences by such coercive means. Moreover, such a result would depart
widely from the holding in the AMA case, in which the court of appeals
held that the doctor conspiracy to boycott Group Health and its partici-
pating doctors could not be defended on the basis that it was "intended
to promote the public welfare" or "designed to eliminate unfair, fraud-
ulent and unlawful practices. 20 2 Underscoring its view concerning the
limits of professional power, the court of appeals observed that
"[A]ppellants are not law enforcement agencies. . . and although per-
sons who reason superficially concerning such matters may find justifi-
cation for extra-legal action to secure what seems to them desirable
ends; this is not the American way of life."20 3 This language seems
more in keeping with established antitrust doctrine and more managea-
ble as a principle than the dictum in the Oregon case. Moreover, the
Supreme Court's recent refusal to listen to any worthy-purposes de-
198. 343 U.S. at 336.
199. The most recent decision of the Supreme Court suggests that professionalism may not
make an appreciable difference. In National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 98 S.Ct.
1355 (1978),, a majority of the Court stated that "professional services may differ significantly
from other business services, and, accordingly, the nature of the competition in such services may
vary. Ethical norms may serve to regulate and promote this competition, and thus fall within the
Rule of Reason." Id at 1367. Justice Blackmun, joined. by Justice Rehnquist, expressed the fear
that the majority's emphasis on competition as the touchstone, which it drew from a historical
review of the rule of reason, left too little "elbow room for realistic application of the Sherman Act
to professional services." Id at 1370. The Professional Engineers case significantly narrows the
implication of the Goldfarb footnote quoted in note 197 supra.
200. The quoted language appears precisely at the ellipsis in the lengthy quotation set forth in
note 186 supra.
201. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951).




fense for a professional ethic barring competitive bidding by consulting
engineers goes very far toward subjecting professional groups to the
usual rules of per se illegality.2 '
Other cases that have grappled with the professionalism defense
for boycotts have not departed from the usual stringent standards. One
recent case upheld 'a complaint alleging that a dentists' organization
induced certified orthodontists not to teach in the plaintiffs innovative
training program in orthodontics.2 0 5 The court stressed that the defend-
ant not only refused to accredit the plaintiff's training program but also
enforced its disapproval by an ethical rule binding on its members.
Thus, a classic concerted refusal to deal was alleged, and, although it
was not characterized as a boycott by the court, it was condemned
without any apparent hope of redemption by proof of worthy goals.
20 6
Another court, in dealing with an alleged conspiracy among hospitals
and a certifying organization for respiratory therapists, stressed the ne-
cessity for distinguishing between "commercial" and "noncommercial"
boycotts, indicating a willingness to treat the former as per se illegal
and to condemn the latter only if they were "unreasonable (in the anti-
trust sense) in their impact. ' 2°7 Since both of the foregoing cases indi-
cated a willingness to consider the probable anticompetitive impact of
the restraint rather than its allegedly high-minded objectives as the key
factor, they seem to leave the law of professional boycotts in very much
the same posture as the law of boycotts by other competitor groups.
Though hardly authoritative, perhaps the most interesting decision
on the value of professionalism to insulate a classic boycott was
reached by a divided FTC in a 1966 case in which medical and hospital
interests were found to have unlawfully boycotted two commercial
blood banks.2°s As the two dissenting commissioners noted, no com-
mercial motive appeared,2° only an ideological objection to "traffick-
204. National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1355 (1978).
205. United States Dental Inst. v. American Ass'n of Orthodontists, 396 F. Supp. 565 (N.D.
Ill. 1975). Compare Majorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Sec-
ondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970) (no boycott in-
volved in educational association's choice to adopt non-profit status as a requirement for
accreditation).
206. 396 F. Supp. at 581. The court's recognition of the anticompetitive consequence of the
alleged practice-denial to general practitioners of training in orthodontics that would enable
them to compete with members of the defendant specialty society-was undoubtedly a factor in
the holding.
207. Veizaga v. National Bd. for Respiratory Therapy, 1977-1 Trade Cases T 61,274 (N.D. Ill.
1977).
208. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 70 F.T.C. 728 (1966), rey'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d
1011 (8th Cir. 1969).
209. Id at 955-58 (Comm'r Elman, dissenting); id at 962 (Comm'r Reilly, dissenting).
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ing in human blood" and a professional concern (seemingly sincere,
though undocumented) about the quality of blood supplied.210 Despite
these reasons why individuals might have independently eschewed
dealings with the commercial suppliers, the majority was willing to in-
fer a conspiracy by emphasizing this shared belief together with evi-
dence of regular meetings, discussions of the commercial banks as a
problem to be solved, several affirmative acts in furtherance of the
common purpose, and consistently parallel behavior. Significantly, the
majority, unlike the minority, was unwilling to allow a boycott, even
one inspired by seemingly legitimate professional values, to victimize
an innovative provider.211
Aside from the dictum in the Oregon case, there seems to be no
authority allowing professional groups greater freedom than other
competitor combinations to employ boycotts to coerce the actions of
independent participants in the market for health or other professional
services. As in other fields, per se illegality is most appropriate where
the boycott's impact is felt by a competitor or competing group.212 Al-
though a different approach might be taken where agreed-upon refus-
als to deal are directed at some perceived abuse not involving the
commercial interests of the boycott organizers, a physician boycott di-
rected at a third-party insurer should fall into the forbidden category as
a "commercial" restraint even though the insurer is not, strictly speak-
ing, a competitor of the doctors. No meaningful distinction exists be-
tween attempted destruction of a competitor, such as Group Health in
the AMA case, and destruction of the benefits of competition by dictat-
ing the terms on which dealing will occur.2 13 Indeed, the restraint al-
leged in the Oregon case was serious not because the insured hospital
210. On appeal, the lack of a demonstrated commercial purpose was held effectively to de-
prive the FTC of jurisdiction over the nonprofit corporations involved since they had not been
shown to be organized for the profit of their members as required by 15 U.S.C. § 44 (1976). 405
F.2d at 1019. This technical issue aside, however, such ideological purposes should not be ac-
cepted as a justification for a boycott where their effect is to stifle a competing enterprise or other-
wise further the parochial interests of the profession. See note 214 infra. While first amendment
considerations may be invoked to protect intraprofessional communications and the propagation
of professional ideology, first amendment values may also advanced in defense of pluralism and
against private repression of competing ideologies. See text accompanying notes 224-31 infra.
211. An important feature of the case was that the Community Blood Bank, though long the
subject of discussion, was organized only upon the appearance of the commercial bank. 70 F.T.C.
at 777-78. Clearly, if established providers can employ the boycott weapon, the competitive stimu-
lus to change, such as was needed to improve blood banking in Kansas City, would be repressed.
212. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTrrRUST 238-41 (1977). See Note, Boycott:
A Specqfc Defnition Limits the Apphcability of a Per Se Rule, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 818 (1977).
213. For cases in which boycotts were employed to dictate the terms of dealing, see Para-
mount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930); United States v. First Nat'l
Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S. 44 (1930).
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associations were competitors of Oregon Physicians Service but be-
cause they were vehicles for improving the consumer's bargaining posi-
tion vis-a-vis the doctors and for containing the artificial demand for
doctors' services generated by insurance. Probably the key to finding a
per se violation should be the presence of a possible conflict of interests
on the part of the boycott organizers, who should not be entrusted in
such circumstances, even as professionals, with the economic power in-
herent in the boycott sanction.
214
214. Under this test, the Community Blood Bank case, discussed in notes 210-11 supra and
text accompanying notes 208-11 supra, was correctly decided by the FTC. Though the majority
did not find a commercial purpose, a conflict of interests might nevertheless have been identified
in view of the pathologists' interest in running their own departments and in sharing authority
over the community bank.
To illustrate the difficulty of disentangling commercial and noncommercial purposes, im-
agine a medical society resolution declaring it unethical for any member to prescribe Laetrile
(assumed for present purposes to be a medically useless but hope-inspiring drug) for cancer pa-
tients. This would amount to a boycott of Laetrile suppliers, who are in a significant sense compet-
itors of physicians because adopting Laetrile therapy implies foregoing the more expensive cancer
therapies that physicians offer. On the other hand, because Laetrile therapy is offensive to impor-
tant professional values and because the suppliers of Laetrile are apt to be regarded by physicians
as unethical profiteers, any commercial motive is clearly dominated by other concerns. Neverthe-
less, these concerns may be strengthened by the competitive threat posed, and one could question
whether, given the conflict of interests, the medical profession's positions on such issues could ever
be wholly objective. More importantly, there is an ideological issue as well on which professional
views appear to differ from the views of many others. An alternative conception of the ethical
responsibility of the physician might be that a patient can have Laetrile prescribed if that is his
choice following an exposition by the physician of the alternatives available and the risks of the
treatment. Under this formulation, some individual professionals might refuse ever to prescribe
Laetrile, while others might do so in good conscience when the patient's choice was an informed
one; professional organizations would be justified in disciplining individual physicians who failed
adequately to inform patients of the risks to which they were exposing themselves. This latter
conception of professional responsibility is perhaps more in keeping with the principle of con-
sumer sovereignty reflected in the antitrust laws than is the impulse of many physicians to pre-
scribe a rule for all physicians, effectively cutting off certain options that patients might wish to
adopt.
The foregoing illustration presents sharply the ideological dimension that frequently exists
in professional self-regulation, see also note 195 supra, and suggests the appropriateness of not
respecting ideological boycotts where a conflict of economic interests is also present. It should not
be necessary to impugn the medical profession's actual motives since the principle that a conflict
of interests automatically disqualifies a decision maker is an objective one, as is the principle that
consumer choice rather than professional choice should ultimately govern medical practice. See
note 225 ifra; Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972)
(informed consent); Note, Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal Therapy for the Doctor-Patient
Relationship, 79 YALE L.J. 1533 (1970). On other ideological issues in medical practice that are
subject to foreclosure by the physician monopoly, see note 210 supra and accompanying text; A.
Dolan, Antitrust Law and Physician Imposed Restraints on Patient Choice of Practitioners (Dec.
19, 1977) (presented at the Antitrust Laws and the Health Services Industry, a conference spon-
sored by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, and Duke Law Journal)
(discussing "therapeutic ideology"); Havighurst & Bovbjerg, supra note 1, at 401-11; Havighurst
& Blumstein; Comment, Restrictions on Unorthodox Health Treatment in Calforni.'A Legal and
EconomicAnalysis, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 647 (1977).
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B. Practices Conducive to Boycotts.
1. Applying the Boycott Label. Although coercive boycotts used
to advance professional groups' commercial interests appear to be ille-
gal per se, confusion can exist concerning whether a true boycott exists.
It is tempting, for example, to attach the boycott label to any exertion
of a competitor group's power which seems unreasonable even though,
on close inspection, there have been no agreed-upon refusals by com-
peting buyers or sellers to deal with particular third parties.2 ' s To avoid
confusion in the field of professional restraints, however, it seems desir-
able to reserve the boycott label for true concerted refusals to deal and
not to extend this particular category of per se offenses beyond its lit-
eral limits. Although such a precise definition of the per se offense
would leave the legal status of many other coercive and potentially de-
structive practices unresolved, many of these practices might be con-
demned by a different and only slightly more extended analysis. Thus,
concerted action conducive to, or closely analogous to, a true boycott
might be readily condemned in an appropriate case by consulting pre-
cedent, quickly applying the "rule of reason," and finding the practice
to be anticompetitive and, while not technically a boycott, equally de-
structive and equally unredeemable by any possible showing of worthy
purpose or minimal impact.216
An example of a practice that falls near the borderline between a
true boycott and a restraint requiring a somewhat fuller evaluation
would be a medical society resolution condemning a health insurer's
adoption of a particular cost-containment practice. If the resolution in-
cluded a call for members to cease or alter their dealings with the in-
surer in question, it would be illegal per se.2 17 Even without such an
explicit invitation, however, a conspiracy to boycott might still be in-
ferred simply from the circulation of the profession's official opinion,
which serves no useful purpose other than to educate members as to
their collective self-interest, increasing the likelihood of refusals to deal
or other harassment.2 18 Alternatively, the resolution could be found,
215. The Supreme Court has always been clear on the distinction between a true concerted
refusal to deal, or boycott, and other practices that are similar but nevertheless do not amount to a
boycott. Some confusion exists, however, among commentators. See note 235 infra.
216. As Areeda observes, "[there are cases where one can weigh harms, benefits, and alterna-
tives and conclude almost instantaneously that conduct is unlawful; one decides the particular
case so rapidly that he may express his result in 'per se' language." P. AREEDA, supra note 128, at
409.
217. For an example of such a resolution, see note 68 supra and accompanying text.
218. The matter could be seen as falling under the principle of the Eastern States case. See
note 178 supra and accompanying text. See also Vandervelde v. Put and Call Brokers and Dealers
Ass'n, 344 F. Supp. 118, 139-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). That the medical profession relies on educating
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whether or not indicative of an actual conspiracy to boycott, to restrain
unduly the insurer's freedom to act in accordance with its own business
judgment concerning consumers' desires for cost-containment services.
The hazard that doctors would be stimulated to refuse to deal in greater
numbers could easily outweigh any public benefit that might flow from
the declaration of a professional consensus.2 19
2. Confronting the "Tree Speech"Argument. The Noerr-Penning-
ton Doctrine. The suggestion that professional organizations become
exposed to antitrust liability by formulating and announcing an opin-
ion on business developments affecting their members' welfare will nat-
urally be threatening and potentially frustrating to medical society
activists. They can be expected to contest the reach of antitrust into
their organizational affairs by asserting rights of free speech and associ-
ation as embodied in what has become known as the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine.220 This doctrine sets limits derived from values implicit in the
first amendment on the use of antitrust rules to control concerted action
by competitors when political rights would be infringed.
its members to their common interests is implied by the motto of the AMA's newspaper, American
Medical News: "An Informed Membership Is Our Greatest Strength." It must be observed, how-
ever, that certain recent AMA resolutions critical of third-party initiatives have not been widely
circulated or announced in such a way as to encourage doctors to retaliate. See, e.g., Blues'Policies
Opposed, Am. Med. News, Dec. 12, 1977, at 7, col. 1. Nevertheless, since such issues arise locally,
and not nationally, local medical societies might use the AMA resolution in formulating their
strategies in local skirmishes with insurers.
219. Arguably, it would not matter whether such refusals were for personal reasons or in
defense of collective interests. In United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969), the casual
exchange of price information by leading producers in a somewhat concentrated market was held
unlawful without evidence of purpose and without significant inquiry into actual effects. Con-
certed action having dangerous tendencies and little redeeming value can be condemned under
standard principles without demonstrating actual effects or wrongful intent in specific cases.
220. See generally Fischel, Antitrust Liabili for Attempts to Influence Government Action: The
Basis andLimits ofthe Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CH. L. REv. 80 (1977); Note, Physician
influence: Applying Noerr-Pennington to the MedicalProfession, 1978 DUKE L.J. 701. In the lead-
ing case, Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961),
the Supreme Court refused to allow the antitrust laws to be used to restrict the railroads' deceptive
use of the media to procure legislation adverse to trucking interests, arguing, in effect, that the
"marketplace of ideas" could take care of itself. Similarly, it was held in UMW v. Pennington, 381
U.S. 657 (1965), that the petitioning of government officials--the Secretary of Labor in that
case--to adopt policies harmful to competitors was privileged against antitrust action. A later
decision, however, upheld an antitrust complaint that charged a truckers' association with abusing
the fundamental right of access to the administrative and judicial arms of government by system-
atically opposing before a state regulatory commission and the courts, without regard to the mer-
its, all applications for new entry into the trucking business. California Motor Transp. Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972). Despite the argument that the established truckers were
simply petitioning their government, the case was held to fall within the "sham" exception, see
text accompanying note 224 infra, to the general principle that antitrust should not frustrate the
exercise of political rights.
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The Noerr-Pennington line of cases protects a trade association
and its members when they are in some sense petitioning government
in good faith. However, when a medical society or hospital staff in-
volves itself in activities where it is not petitioning government and
where it has no quasi-governmental function of its own, 221 it would
appear to be subject to antitrust controls and to all the rigors of the
antiboycott rule. Thus, where medical society discussion arouses an-
tagonisms leading to a boycott of an insurer or an innovative provider,
it is private, not governmental, behavior that the medical society seeks
to change, and an antitrust prohibition against such coercion is quite in
keeping with a constitutional order which distinguishes between public
and private spheres. Under antitrust doctrine, the basic objection to the
use of the boycott sanction is precisely that it represents an assumption
of governmental power by a private group and "trenches upon the
power of the .. .legislature. '2 22 Professional groups lacking a clear
delegation of governmental power'13 must not be allowed to assume
such authority.
Of course, a medical society might cast all of its anticompetitive
moves in political terms, sending its signals to the membership in the
form of a complaint that "there ought to be a law" against whatever
some third party was doing. But such an attempt to disguise a call for
boycott as political speech would face a severe test under the "sham"
exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which the Supreme Court
stated as follows:
221. In Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, No. 75-186 (N.D. Fla., Dec. 3,
1976), the district court refused to give practically any weight to antitrust considerations in grant-
ing summary judgment to hospital physicians who had acted to stifle a competing abortion clinic.
Reversing its own earlier position, 415 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Fla. 1976), the court ruled that, by
virtue of a vague statutory mandate to engage in professional self-regulation, hospital staffs are
always engaged in quasi-governmental activity, so that intraprofessional communications are
privileged. The court then concluded that even proven anticompetitive motives could not taint the
activities of the hospital staff taken in the name of professional standards unless "a pattern of
baseless, repetitive claims exists, so pervasive that from its very magnitude the inference of abuse
of the governmental process emerges." No. 75-186, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Fla., Dec. 3, 1976). By that
standard, almost any intraprofessional communication could not be evidence of conspiracy as
long as ethics, the quality of care, or some other professional value was invoked. In addition to the
inadequate weight given to antitrust considerations, a further difficulty with the case is that the
allegedly quasi-governmental actions of the medical staff were taken without investigation and
without any procedural formalities whatsoever, thereby seemingly violating the doctrine of Silver
v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963). See text accompanying notes 246-47 infra.
222. Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465 (1941) (quoting Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 242 (1899)).
223. In keeping with the usual principle that antitrust prohibitions should not be deemed set
aside without a clear indication of legislative intent, see, eg., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373
U.S. 341, 357 (1963), the delegation to a professional group should be clear and specific, as it was
not in the Feminist Women's Health Center case, discussed in note 221 supra.
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There may be situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensi-
bly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham
to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere
directly with the business relationships of a competitor [in which
case] the application of the Sherman Act would be justified.2 24
Professional groups might claim a first amendment right to pursue
"noncommercial" objectives and could cast their objections to many
third-party activities and new forms of competition in terms that defy
both characterization as commercially inspired and attribution of an
anticompetitive motive. 225  Nevertheless, where the speech does not
take the form of an appeal for political action, such as appeared in the
Noerr and Pennington cases, first amendment imperatives are weaker,
and countervailing interests must be given their appropriate weight. 26
224. 365 U.S. at 144. For cases in which the exception has been applied, see note 179 supra
and United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 360 F. Supp. 451 (D. Minn. 1973), at'd, 417 U.S. 901
(1974). In such cases, there is apparently no avoiding an inquiry into subjective intent. See note
225 infra. Somewhat comparable issues have arisen in labor cases which involve such questions as
whether the purpose of picketing is to convey information to the public or to signal other unions to
exert pressure, and whether employer speech is intended to intimidate the workers. American
Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215 (1974) (signal picketing); NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co., 395 U.S. 575, 619 (1969) (employer intended to threaten workers).
225. Where noncommercial purposes do indeed motivate the exchange of views and the re-
sulting parallel behavior, a difficult problem of balancing the strong interest in free discussion
against interests in freedom from economic coercion is presented. See Note, Political Boycott Ac-
tivity and the First Amendment, 91 HARV. L. Rav. 659 (1978). However, where a commercial
motive underlies the discussion, the balance would seem to shift in a fundamental way, with the
public's interest in free economic activity becoming paramount. See generally Bird, Sherman Act
Limitations on Noncommercial ConcertedRefusals to Deal, 1972 DuKE L.J. 247; Coons, Non-Com-
mercialPurpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 705 (1962). An objective test based
on conflict-of-interests principles would be preferable to a subjective test focusing on the content
of the speech in question or the actual intent of the speakers. See note 214 supra. This is, roughly
speaking, the rule that has evolved for businessmen, and it has proved salutary in avoiding com-
plexities, in facilitating enforcement and in removing the temptation to hide a restraint behind a
claim of worthy purpose. Any different rule for professionals, such as is suggested by a taxonomy
which attributes commercial purposes only to "businessmen," see Bird, supra, at 249-50; Coons,
supra, at 712, 726-29 & 727 n.64; Note, supra, at 660 n.ll, would sacrifice these advantages. More-
over, despite dicta seeming to concede that professionals' concerns rise above the commercial
level, see note 197 supra and text accompanying notes 197-98 supra, the courts have seen many
cases where they have not done so. See notes 206, 210-11 supra and text accompanying notes 16-
17, 205-11 supra, suggesting that no dispensation is appropriate. See Bird, supra, at 268-70.
For a case sometimes cited as adopting noncommercial purpose as a Sherman Act defense,
see Marjorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools,
Inc., 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970). That case did not involve a
boycott, however, or any danger thereof.
226. Recent cases holding for the first time that so-called "commercial" speech is entitled to
first amendment protection make it clear that some regulation is still permissible and suggest that
a simple balancing test is to be employed. Bates v. Arizona State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976);
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). These cases all involved advertising of professional serv-
ices, and a dominant consideration in extending constitutional protection to such speech was the
interest of consumers in receiving the information sought to be conveyed. Cf. Red Lion Broad-
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Thus, the rights of private actors to take lawful commercial initiatives
and of the public to enjoy the benefits of an unrestricted market must
be accommodated with professionals' right to assert professional val-
ues. Underlying both the rule of per se illegality for naked restraints of
trade and the reasonableness requirement applicable to other actions
taken by competitors in concert is a concern to identify and prevent
hazards that, although perhaps not such "clear and present dangers" as
would justify restraints on political speech, are nonetheless real and
significant. 27 While professionals should certainly be allowed to meet
together as other groups are, they are no freer to engage in speech con-
ducive to concerted action that subverts the public interest in competi-
tion and the "freedom of traders."22 8 In an early trade association case,
the Supreme Court found unlawful an exchange of information and
opinion where such information and opinion was employed to knit a
multitude of competitors into a conspiracy.229 The somewhat compara-
casting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (declaring that first amendment values permit regulation
of broadcasters that improves the flow of information and weakens monopoly in the "marketplace
of ideas"). In the circumstances under discussion here, consumers' interests are not obviously
served by intraprofessional communications concerning competitive developments. Indeed, the
argument is that not only are consumers' economic interests disserved but the medical profession's
ideological monopoly is perpetuated. See note 214 supra.
227. The Supreme Court's recognition of the "sham exception" to the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine, see text accompanying note 224 supra, indicates a willingness to recognize an anticompeti-
tive hazard even where political speech is ostensibly involved. Where the "political" aspect-the
invocation of or appeal to governmental processes-is missing or remote and the likelihood of a
commercial purpose is strong due to the professionals' conflict of interests on the issues being
discussed, a straight balancing test of the sort familiar in antitrust analysis would seem appropri-
ate. See P. ARBEDA, supra note 128, at 269-75, 409-10. In general, the "clear and present danger"
test has not prevented a great deal of regulation affecting speech in substantial ways. See, e.g.,
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (demonstration near school); United States
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (draft card burning); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966);
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) (labor picketing). Compare United
States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969) (antitrust prohibition on exchange of price informa-
tion) with Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 215-16 (1919) (focusing on the "material and
intended effect" and the "probable effect" of the speech at issue). See also National Soc'y of
Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1355 (1978) (upholding an injunction barring pro-
fessional speech). Although a civil liberties lawyer approaching the problem without a sense of
antitrust's own libertarian premise might reach a different conclusion, the development of a per se
antitrust rule operating as a prior restraint on certain professional speech in certain contexts, see
text accompanying notes 264-73 infra, should be quite defensible.
For the argument that concern about "chilling effects" and prior restraints may not be
warranted with respect to purely commercial speech, see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976).
228. Indeed, concerns about the ideological domination of health services delivery by physi-
cians, see note 214 supra, and about the medical profession's solidarity in defending its interests,
see notes 195-96 supra & 271 infra, suggest that professional groups should be closely circum-
scribed in their communications in order to vindicate the freedom of vonsumers and their interest
in innovation.
229. American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921). This case drew
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ble activities of professional organizations should be subject to similar
scrutiny, and, if a profession's propensity for concerted action appears
particularly great, a commensurately strict limitation on intraprofes-
sional communications would be justified.
The overriding object of the antitrust law's confrontation with the
medical profession on these matters should be to change professional
organizations from virtual arbiters of the features of the private financ-
ing and delivery system into mere advocates whose point of view must
compete with others in the economic marketplace, the marketplace of
ideas, and the political process. In response to this suggestion, many
physicians will understandably decry the potential abuses they see in
freer private-sector developments, and reduction of their powers could
indeed facilitate some truly objectionable practices that might have
been prevented. Nevertheless, medical organizations "are not law en-
forcement agencies,"230 except perhaps in some narrowly defined areas
of professional self-government, nor are they suitable spokesmen for
consumer interests on medical care issues having an economic aspect.
Moreover, other protections against possible third-party abuses are
available and probably adequate. For these reasons, organized
medicine should be confined to the use of persuasion directed either
toward consumers or toward political bodies.231
Although doctors' use of their power over private actors to dictate
their economic environment must be curbed, medical groups certainly
must be left free to pursue their legitimate political rights. Thus, a med-
ical society should be free to protest a Medicare or other governmental
policy that it finds objectionable, even to the extent of prompting many
doctors to refuse to accept Medicare patients or to participate in an-
other government health program.232 Indeed, it is not at all clear that
sharply the issue of free speech versus the Sherman Act's prohibition of vonspiracy. Justice
Holmes, dissenting, said that he "should have supposed that the Sherman Act did not set itself
against knowledge" and that the "decree as it stands seems to me surprising in a country of free
speech that affects to regard education and knowledge as desirable." Id at 412-13. Justice Bran-
deis, also in dissent, said, "Tlhere is nothing in the Sherman Law which should limit freedom of
discussion, even among traders." Id at 416. Despite the illustriousness of the dissenters, the ma-
jority opinion has stood the test of time. See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333
(1969).
230. American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233, 249 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aif'd, 317
U.S. 519 (1943).
231. In particular, the emerging health systems agencies (HSAs) would seem to provide an
appropriate local forum for medical organizations to advocate their views without simultaneously
stirring up the profession to vigilante action. See the National Health Planning and Resources
Development Act of 1974,42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300t (Supp. V 1975). The HSAs would seem clearly
to perform a quasi-governmental function entitling competitor groups to Noerr-Pennington pro-
tection in advocating their interests.
232. See, e.g., MDs Fight New York Fee Policy, Am. Med. News, Jan. 16, 1978, at 1, col. 1
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the antitrust laws would prohibit an organized doctors' strike to obtain
a change in, say, the state Medicaid program; although the injury to
innocent parties-the Medicaid beneficiaries-would sorely tempt the
courts to find a remedy, it would be improper to ignore a well-founded
claim that the strike was political action undertaken to protect profes-
sionals from the exercise of government's monopsony power.233 How-
ever these issues are resolved, developments in private financing and
delivery mechanisms are, by definition, neither political nor govern-
mental, and the rigorous antitrust rules against private policing of pri-
vate economic behavior would apply. Indeed, the fundamental legal
distinction between concerted action taken against governmental poli-
cies and that directed at private actors is one reason why initiatives in
the private sector may offer a significantly better opportunity than
stronger government controls for ultimately breaking the medical pro-
fession's grip on the financing and delivery system.
3. The "Seal-of-Approval" Analogy. A medical organization's
assertion of a right to approve or disapprove the structuring and ad-
ministration of private third-party payment plans and other develop-
ments in the private financing and delivery of care may best be
analyzed by drawing an analogy to "seal-of-approval" and other stan-
dard-setting programs. Such programs have been tolerated, within lim-
its, by the antitrust authorities in many industrial settings234 because
they are perceived as conveying information useful to consumers and
others. This advantage is deemed to outweigh the hazard of anticompe-
(reporting professional reaction to a fee schedule for services under the state workmen's compen-
sation program).
233. For the view that such boycotts are illegal and a review of the litigation (so far inconclu-
sive), see Weller, Medicaid Boycotts and Other Maladiesfrom Medical Monopolists: An Introduc-
tion to Antitrust Litigation and the Health Care Industry, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE Rnv. 99, 102-04
(1977). See also DeGregorio v. Segal, 443 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (not raising the Noerr-
Pennington defense). A question exists whether boycotts directed at government policy, particu-
larly an exploitative one, see notes 132-33 supra, would have a stronger claim to constitutional
protection than "political" boycotts aimed at private parties. For a discussion of the limits of legal
control on the latter type of coercive behavior, see Note, supra note 220. Although George R.
Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (lst Cir. 1970), suggests that the
Noerr defense is not available to shield dealings with government as a purchaser of goods and
services, see also Fischel, supra note 220, at 115-18, that case did not involve a true political issue
such as a complaint that government was exerting its monopsony power unfairly. While a conspir-
acy to rig competitive bids would be clearly unlawful, when government proceeds by fiat or fee
schedule it can be said to have set the private market aside and arguably to have a constitutional
duty to permit collective bargaining. Whether or not the state could pass a law expressly prohibit-
ing boycotts in such circumstances, the antitrust laws should not apply to such a political dispute.
234. See, e.g., Structural Laminates, Inc. v. Douglas Fir Plywood Ass'n, 261 F. Supp. 154 (D.
Ore. 1966), af'dper curiam, 399 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1024 (1969);
Roofire Alarm Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 202 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), af'd, 313 F.2d 635
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963).
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titive abuse sufficiently to warrant taking the trouble to evaluate the
program's reasonableness in each case. Many legitimate self-regulatory
programs in the health care system involve granting the equivalent of a
seal of approval showing that certain standards have been met.
The typical industrial "seal-of-approval" program does not pres-
ent the hazard of stimulating a true boycott by members of the accred-
iting association, because such members are usually not customers or
suppliers of applicants for approval (or in a position to prescribe their
products or services). Although frequently the accrediting body is com-
prised of competitors of the applicant, this circumstance is tolerated
because, although an anticompetitive animus is possible, the decision to
honor the seal is made by others, who can judge for themselves what it
is worth. In one case, certain utilities allegedly refused to supply natu-
ral gas for use in a burner unapproved by an association of which they,
together with other appliance manufacturers, were members. 3 Al-
though an actual conspiracy to boycott was not clearly alleged in the
complaint, the Supreme Court reacted to the boycott hazard that it per-
ceived and held that a Sherman Act violation had been pleaded even
though a utility might have had good reasons of its own for unilaterally
honoring the seal-of-approval program. The case indicates that the
Court is acutely alert to the risk of anticompetitive abuse wherever a
boycott may be employed as a sanction, even in the name of product
safety. Thus, the inherent danger that physicians in significant numbers
would honor a professional "seal of approval' and penalize its absence
should expose professional evaluations of innovative financing and de-
livery arrangements to the closest antitrust scrutiny.
236
Though administering a "seal-of-approval" program in an open
and seemingly reasonable way, a medical society could easily set condi-
tions for approval that, while ostensibly ensuring ethics, the quality of
235. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) (per
curiarn). This case is sometimes misinterpreted as treating the defendants' refusal to grant the seal
of approval as a boycott condemned under the per se rule. See, e.g., L. SULLIVAN, supra note 212,
at 243. In fact, the alleged conspiratorial refusal "to provide gas for use in the plaintiffs Radiant
Burners" was clearly the offense found. 364 U.S. at 660. In another case sometimes incorrectly
regarded as involving a boycott, an educational accreditation program was upheld despite some-
what arbitrary practices. Marjorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges &
Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), revpg 302 F. Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970). But the evidence established that the schools constituting the accred-
iting organization freely adopted their own policies toward graduates of the unaccredited school,
accepting many transfer students. 302 F. Supp. at 468.
236. For a case involving a true boycott, the equivalent of a seal of approval, and the medical
profession, see Community Blood Bank of Kansas City Area, Inc., 70 F.T.C. 728 (1966), rev'don
othergrounds, 405 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1969), discussed in notes 210-11, 214 supra and text accom-
panying notes 208-11, 214 supra.
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care and the doctor-patient relationship, primarily serve to protect the
profession's economic interests and to frustrate cost-containment ef-
forts. Indeed, the AMA appears to have achieved its objectives in the
past by just such methods-for instance, by promulgating standards for
ethical prepayment plans.237 Of course, there would be no substantial
problem if it were possible to arrange that the society's views were con-
veyed only to consumers, who could make up their own minds, or were
given only limited publicity in the professional community. But, once
the word is given to the profession as a whole, many members might
take it as a signal to cooperate only with approved plans or providers,
with possibly decisive effects on the prospects for innovation.238
The social utility of "seal-of-approval" mechanisms is greatest in
areas of particular technical complexity where consumers require spe-
cial assistance and protection. It is not at all clear that third-party cost-
containment initiatives present issues requiring scientific or technical
expertise or that consumers and individual providers cannot protect
themselves adequately against third-party abuses and make competent
decisions without medical society assistance. The tenuousness of a
medical organization's claim to a role in approving financing arrange-
ments is revealed by a comparison with certification of specialists by
medical specialty boards and with other self-disciplinary activities of
the profession.239 Some discussion of these self-disciplinary activities
will be helpful in putting the coercive boycott in its true light and in
showing how the antitrust laws may be used to curb abuses of the pro-
fession's power over its own members without sacrifice of the poten-
tially substantial benefits of self-regulation.
C. Professional Self-Discpline.
1. Appiing the Rule ofReason. The self-disciplinary powers ex-
ercised by the medical profession over its own members present signifi-
cant antitrust issues, but the particular mechanisms
employed-medical society memberships, hospital staff privileges, spe-
cialty certification, educational accreditation 24° and other "seal-of-ap-
237. See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra.
238. The concern is that, as in the Oregon State Medical Society case, see text accompanying
notes 42-57 supra, the profession could use any power to approve or disapprove financing plans
and their practices to select a "chosen instrument" behind which to rally in resisting innovation.
See text accompanying notes 279-98 infra.
239. See text accompanying notes 251-52 infra.
240. The FTC has challenged the role of the AMA in the Liaison Committee on Medical
Education (LCME) in an administrative proceeding in the U.S. Office of Education. See Ruhe,
Recent Events of Special Interest to Medical Education, 238 J.A.M.A. 2761, 2763 (1977). One state-
ment submitted in that proceeding argued that the issue was
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proval" programs-do not normally involve true boycotts and
therefore require more extensive evaluation. Under the standard "rule-
of-reason" analysis, these self-regulatory mechanisms are to be judged
in terms of their possible benefits, their possible harms and the likeli-
hood of each, with attention as well to the usefulness of attempting to
establish the preponderance of benefit or harm in each case through
litigation. 4 ' By the same token, consideration should be given to the
possible value of a clear rule as a guide to professional conduct. Even if
the rule were somewhat arbitrary, it might be preferable to a rule
whose flexibility could easily be taken advantage of by professionals
invoking plausible quality arguments, professional values or subjective
judgments against physicians whose real offense was advertising, price
cutting or cooperating with innovative providers or financing plans. Fi-
nally, a legal assessment should encompass the possibility of striking
the right balance by assigning the burden of proof to one side or the
other in such a way as to accommodate the traditional functions of
professional groups with antitrust policy's sometimes powerful distrust
of concerted action by competitors.242 Thus, discipline of a competitor
the openness and responsiveness of the educational process itself, in particular its free-
dom from or domination by a professional orthodoxy which may not be wholly congru-
ent with the public's needs....
The power to define how a doctor is educated is the power to define what a doctor
is, and this is more than a straightforward, technical undertaking which can be safely
entrusted to organized professional interests. We attempt to demonstrate in this state-
ment the existence of a substantial danger that the LCME, by reason of its control by
organized medicine and the medical education establishment, imposes on medical edu-
cation a particular professional ideology, deeply rooted in a particular perception of the
physician's role in society and antagonistic to educational endeavors premised on differ-
ent perceptions.
Letter to Dr. Ernest L. Boyer, U.S. Commissioner of Education (Designate), from Clark C. Havig-
hurst and Gaylord Cummins 2-3 (Mar. 9, 1977) (copy on file with Duke Law Journal). Issues also
exist with respect to the AMA's role in accrediting allied health education programs. See Ruhe,
supra, at 2764.
241. It is important to recognize that application of the rule of reason to a particular practice
may result in the establishment of a new category of per se offenses as soon as the courts have
accumulated experience enough to establish a conclusive presumption of unreasonableness. See,
e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 253, 261-64 (1963). Because the courts are just
embarking on the task of applying antitrust principles to professional conduct, per se rules may
well emerge. This could occur either by refusing to distinguish certain professional conduct from
analogous conduct in industrial settings, see National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United
States, 98 S. Ct. 1355 (1978); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), or by framing
special rules for professional self-regulatory activities. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch.,
373 U.S. 341 (1963). Among the factors affecting the outcome under the needed rule of reason
inquiry will be the courts' awareness of the limitations ofjudicial processes in identifying underly-
ing purposes and actual economic effects in particular circumstances. See Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Where a per se rule is not applied, a rule of reason inquiry still
does not permit justification of a naked restraint on competition by showing some ostensible wor-
thy purpose. National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1355, 1363-65 (1978).
242. See generally Note, 4 Suggested Rolefor Rebuttable Presumptions in Antitrust Restraint
of Trade Litigation, 1972 DuKE L.J. 595.
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by his peers might sometimes be permitted only on the condition that
the professional organization is prepared, under the reasonableness re-
quirement, to justify-in terms of their validity, objectivity and bene-
fit/cost ratios-the quality or other standards being implemented and
to demonstrate the fairness and evenhandedness of their enforcement.
Professional self-discipline is directed at physicians themselves
and not at third parties. As the court of appeals stated in the AMA case,
medical associations are
permitted to organize, to establish standards of professional conduct,
to effect agreements for sef-discipline and control. There is a very
real difference [,however,] between the use of such self-disciplines
and an effort upon the part of such associations to destroy competing
professional or business groups or organizations.2 43
This language, simply reflecting the court's recognition that it was
Group Health rather than individual doctors that was the real target of
the restraints in that case, does not imply that professional groups have
a free hand in policing their own members. Although the AMA case is
sometimes interpreted as curbing the medical profession's self-discipli-
nary powers only where the brunt of the restraint is borne by someone
or some entity other than an individual professional, 244 antitrust con-
cerns would also arise where restraints were directed at professionals
engaged in aggressive fee-for-service competition-by advertising or
fee-cutting, for example. Nevertheless, the ratio of benefit to risk is
probably greater where there are no third-party effects, and the law's
stance should reflect this probability. This could be done by requiring
an aggrieved professional to prove the unreasonableness of the self-
regulatory scheme as applied to him unless he could show either an
anticompetitive pattern or a third-party effect, in which case the profes-
sional group would then have the burden of justifying the restraint. But
strictly intraprofessional restraints must not be passed over lightly, for,
as the Goldfarb case recognized, the consumer has a stake in competi-
tion among professionals themselves245 as well as in the fate of compet-
itors of other kinds. Indeed, to limit the role of the antitrust laws to
policing only restraints on substitutes for doctors' services or for fee-
for-service medicine, such as Group Health, would be to endorse con-
tinued monopolization of these relevant markets.
The courts have still before them the considerable task of recon-
ciling antitrust principles with the recognized self-regulatory responsi-
243. 130 F.2d at 248 (emphasis in original).
244. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 14-15 nn. 36 & 42 (4th Cir. 1974),
rev'd, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
245. See 421 U.S. at 786-88.
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bilities of the organized professions. To guide them, the antitrust
enforcement agencies and the courts have their earlier experience in
using antitrust policy to structure and direct industrial self-regulatory
activities so as to curtail the potential for abuse while retaining the pub-
lic benefits which flow from such activities. Perhaps the leading case is
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,246 in which the Supreme Court
used antitrust principles to impose upon the stock exchange an obliga-
tion to employ certain procedural safeguards to minimize the risk that
its self-regulatory powers would be used to injure competitors of ex-
change members. It would be surprising if the implied self-regulatory
prerogatives of professional organizations were any broader than the
statutory powers exercised by the New York Stock Exchange or were
entitled to any greater deference in an antitrust court. Moreover, the
apparent ability of professional groups to impose informal sanc-
tions-boycotts as well as social and other pressures-argues strongly
for insisting on adherence to reasonable procedural standards as a pre-
requisite to any concerted action threatening to competition. A duty to
investigate, to inform the subject of any complaint and to deal with
issues openly, rather than covertly through a whispering campaign or
an "old boy network," would seem an important protection of competi-
tive values.247
2. Antitrust's Impact on Specific Mechanisms of Self-
Discipline. To clarify how legitimate self-regulatory activities may
proceed in the face of antitrust's vigilance against restraints on innova-
tion, it is useful to review quickly the various mechanisms of profes-
sional self-discipline. This survey is intended only to identify the
problems, if any, presented under the foregoing principles.
Denial of membership in, or expulsion from, a medical society is
not a boycott in and of itself, but it has sometimes been used as a signal
for society members to cease dealing with the practitioner involved.248
Moreover, if the ground of exclusion is cooperation with a disapproved
plan or provider, it is conclusive evidence of the society members' con-
spiracy to boycott that plan or provider.249 Similarly, the medical soci-
246. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
247. See the discussion of Feminist Women's Health Center in note 221 supra. Another case in
which professional action allegedly taken for noncommercial reasons was so informal as to de-
prive the object of the boycott of any means of self defense is Community Blood Bank, Inc., 70
F.T.C. 728 (1966), rev'don other grounds, 405 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1969), discussed in notes 210-11,
214 supra and text accompanying notes 208-11, 214 supra.
248. See text accompanying notes 9-16 supra.
249. Deprivation of the benefits of society membership is an excellent sanction to induce ac-
tion in the common interest. See note 271 infra.
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ety should not be permitted to take steps to cause others to use medical
society membership as a prerequisite for some privilege, such as admis-
sion to a hospital staff. Where significant privileges are in fact attached
to society membership, both common law and antitrust principles250
would enforce requirements of procedural and substantive fairness. It
should not be difficult to administer such rules so that membership pol-
icies would present no difficulties where there had not in fact been an
abuse.
Specialty certification likewise should not be significantly impaired
by closer antitrust scrutiny. This "seal-of-approval" mechanism sup-
plies useful and otherwise unavailable information to consumers and
others and, in view of this substantial public benefit, would be granted
considerable freedom under antitrust principles and subjected to no
unfavorable presumption. Nevertheless, specialty boards may not
sponsor boycotts251 and will be obligated to deal fairly with their mem-
bers and aspirants for certification or membership.252 Though the bur-
den of proof as to the reasonableness of standards and procedures
would ordinarily fall on one challenging them, the well-advised spe-
cialty society would be prepared to defend its policies and their appli-
cation. Attempted interference with innovative plans or providers
would of course trigger an antitrust response.
Denial or withdrawal of hospital staff privileges does not involve a
technical boycott but only the hospital's unilateral refusal to deal.25 3
However, because staff privileges are administered primarily by physi-
cians who are competitors of the applicant, antitrust principles apply,
and their application must reflect recognition that this substantial
power is probably more hazardous to competition and innovation than
any other entrusted to the medical profession. Under the doctrine of
Associated Press v. United States,254 control by one group of competi-
tors of a resource vital to other competitors invites close antitrust scru-
tiny.
255
250. See notes 13-14, 247 supra and text accompanying notes 13-15, 246-47 supra. See also
text accompanying note 254 infra.
251. United States Dental Inst. v. American Ass'n of Orthodontists, 396 F. Supp. 565, 580- 81
(N.D. Ill. 1975); Veizaga v. National Bd. for Respiratory Therapy, 1977-1 Trade Cases [ 61,274
(N.D. Ml1 1977).
252. This obligation arises under antitrust law and common law principles. See Pinsker v.
Pacific Coast Soe'y of Orthodontists, 12 Cal. 3d 541,552, 526 P.2d 253, 261 (1974). See text accom-
panying notes 246-47 supra.
253. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
254. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
255. See id; United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912); Gamco, Inc. v. Provi-
dence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952);
Dalmo Sales Co. v. Tysons Corner Regional Shopping Center, 308 F. Supp. 988 (D.D.C.), aft'd,
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Staff privilege disputes are, of course, legion, and most do not raise
true antitrust issues. Although more such cases are being heard in the
federal courts after the Rex Hospital case,256 cases involving no more
than an allegation of anticompetitive action toward a single physician
should probably be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds for inadequate
impact on interstate commerce.2 57 This would leave before the antitrust
courts all staff-privilege cases involving either a pattern of anticompeti-
tive conduct or an attempt to injure a third-party competitor or the
initiator of unpopular cost-containment measures. Under some such
delineation of the federal court's role, the antitrust laws would be in a
position to exert some influence over hospital staffs in those areas
where innovation is most in jeopardy. The problem of reconciling the
recognized self-regulatory responsibilities of the hospital staff with anti-
trust concerns would then have to be faced.
In line with the Silver case, as well as emerging constitutional and
common law principles,5" certain procedural obligations can be im-
posed on hospital staffs and, presumably, on other legitimate self-regu-
latory bodies such as PSROs. Among the principles of procedural due
process that might appropriately be carried over from constitutional to
antitrust law governing hospital staffs is protection against conflicts of
interest on the part of those exercising self-regulatory powers. In the
1973 case of Gibson v. Berryhill, 59 the Supreme Court found a viola-
tion of due process in a state regulatory scheme that empowered fee-
for-service optometrists to discipline salaried optometrists in such a
way as to threaten their corporate employers' survival as competitors of
the private practitioners. 260 The antitrust laws provide a particular war-
rant for stressing the importance of such conflicts of interests and for
insisting that they be minimized in any self-regulatory scheme.261 In
the hospital setting, issues should be resolved by staff committees (or
even outside consultants) not immediately interested in the outcome,
429 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The actual availability of another hospital might be a defense, but
where a physician has been excluded from all of the hospitals in the community it should not be
necessary for him to prove a broader conspiracy.
256. See text accompanying note 173 supra.
257. But see Zamiri v. William Beaumont Hosp., 430 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (juris-
diction upheld solely on the basis of flow of Medicare payments to the defendant hospital).
258. See notes 21, 24-25 supra and text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
259. 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
260. The Court found that the state licensing board was so dominated by fee-for-service op-
tometrists that no salaried practitioner could get a fair hearing. Id at 578-79. Cf. Sams v. Ohio
Valley General Hosp. Ass'n, 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969) (denial of equal protection to HMO-
affiliated physicians).
261. See Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260, 1265 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
See also note 214 supra and accompanying text.
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and the hospital board's involvement should be more than per-
functory.
262
From the foregoing survey of legal doctrines as adapted to the
field of professional self-regulation, it appears that the medical profes-
sion's legitimate disciplinary activities may proceed without antitrust
jeopardy. 63 On the other hand, legal doctrine can be attuned to pick
up anticompetitive signals and adjust the analytical framework so as to
eliminate special deference to professionalism where necessary to re-
spond to a danger of abuse. Where third parties such as HMOs, health
insurers, union- or employer-sponsored health plans, or innovative de-
livery organizations are affected, antitrust doctrine can be mobilized to
protect them-not for their own sake but as vehicles of change in the
public's interest.
D. The Efficacy of Antitrust for Combatting Subtle Restraints.
Much emphasis has been placed in this Article on the medical pro-
fession's surprising ability to control its economic environment by vir-
tue of its solidarity on issues of commercial self-interest and its tight
control over the resources that would-be innovators require. But to rec-
ognize the perniciousness of a local medical community's ability to
orchestrate effective professional resistance to private cost containment
and other initiatives is only to identify the problem, not to solve it. It is
manifestly impossible to prevent altogether, or even to deny the legiti-
macy of, practitioners' interchange concerning business developments
affecting them. Moreover, intraprofessional communications frequently
occur in code, with commonly accepted "buzz words" triggering the
desired responses but defying the easy application of legal sanctions.
Further, informal professional pressures which can be used to govern
262. In particular, consumer members of the hospital board should be careful to scrutinize
staff decisions. Of course, the hospitals themselves are subject to a conflict of interests in some
instances, such as where an HMO threatens to utilize the hospital less intensively than fee-for-
service physicians. Conspiracies among hospitals would be equally subject to antitrust restraint.
263. In the Silver case, the Supreme Court recognized the possibility that an overhanging
threat of antitrust liability might discourage aggressive self-regulation but stated that "under the
aegis of the rule of reason, traditional antitrust concepts are flexible enough to permit the Ex-
change sufficient breathing space within which to carry out the mandate of the Securities and
Exchange Act." 373 U.S. at 360 (emphasis added). It also suggested that liability would attach
only "for anti-competitive acts of self-regulation which fall too far outside the scope of the Ex-
change Act." Id at 362 (emphasis added). It declined, however, to declare whether "a particular
enforcement of the rules on its merits is to be governed by a standard of arbitrariness, good faith,
reasonableness, or some other measure." Id at 366. In requiring the observance of procedural
protections, the Court said that it had "provided not a brake upon the private partner executing
the public policy of self-regulation but a balance wheel to insure that it can perform this necessary
activity in a setting compatible with the objectives of both the antitrust laws and the Securities
Exchange Act." Id at 367.
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individual practitioners' behavior cannot be easily identified or mea-
sured, and any attempt to reconstruct in an antitrust case how a com-
petitive threat was perceived and dealt with in a medical community is
bound to be a major undertaking. Though today discovery proceedings
would frequently reveal a "smoking gun," increased sophistication on
the part of the profession could soon result either in nonpreservation of
evidence or in such linguistic smoke-screens as ethical discourse, ap-
peals to individual conscience, or ostensible mobilization for political
action. Some attention must be given to the problem of devising a rem-
edy imposing on professional associations a requirement of neutrality
toward cost-containment measures taken by private third parties.
1. Clarifying the Law. Even if effective enforcement of antitrust
principles in professional contexts would be difficult, one should not
discount too much the value of a prompt clarification of medical orga-
nizations' responsibilities under the antitrust laws. At the present time,
physicians operate without recognition of their legal obligations.
Though long accustomed to acting as a law unto themselves, they
might change their behavior in material ways if educated to the reasons
why the law demands that they respect the freedom of others to inno-
vate in the interest of consumers and that they accord consumers and
individual physicians the right to make the ultimate choices. If appeals
to physicians' sense of justice and social responsibility are unavailing,
clarifying the threat of antitrust sanctions may still accomplish the de-
sired result. Physicians' self-interest might also respond to the argu-
ment that permitting the market to become more competitive can
forestall moves to install the government as the chief decisionmaker or
sole purchaser of medical services. Moreover, would-be innovators
might be substantially encouraged in their efforts by a clarification of
legal principles and by an indication that the antitrust enforcers and the
courts would run interference for them against the doctors.
In order to achieve the desired clarification of the law without
drawn out proceedings and the uncertainty attending case-by-case de-
velopment, the FTC might consider the possibility of initiating a rule-
making proceeding to clarify in a "trade regulation rule" what is and
what is not permissible in the way of medical organizations' responses
to private cost-containment initiatives.2" Though it is premature to
propose finally the content of such a rule, it might go so far as to pro-
hibit voluntary associations of competing physicians265 from officially
264. See 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (1976); National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672,
698 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
265. The FTC's jurisdiction over nonprofit associations, such as medical societies, is unfor-
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expressing (by way of resolution, official statement, editorial or other-
wise) either approval or disapproval of a particular third-party initia-
tive or of a general method of cost containment.266 The rule would
have to specify a number of things with particularity and might include
some examples, perhaps drawn from the FTC's investigations, of the
kinds of things prohibited or regarded as permissible. One advantage
of using the rule-making approach here would be that it would involve
accusing no one directly of wrongdoing but would simply enunciate a
clear rule to govern future conduct.2 67 There would seem to be no less
painful way to effectuate the revolution in the status and governance of
the professions that is implicit in the Goldfarb case.
Simply declaring that the medical society must remain neutral on
private cost-containment ventures initiated without its advice would
most likely not be sufficient to create an environment conducive to ef-
fective private initiatives. It would probably be necessary to prohibit as
well the approval (or disapproval) or endorsement even of programs
that were voluntarily brought to the society by their proponents. Other-
wise, a de facto "seal-of-approval" scheme would emerge, with the pos-
sible result that all plans lacking the society's imprimatur would be
discriminated against by physicians acting in part in defense of the pro-
fession's collective welfare. The experience revealed in the record of the
Oregon State Medical Society case demonstrates that, if the profession
is allowed a chosen instrument as a financing vehicle, it is in a strong
position to set rules for all insurers without explicitly calling for a boy-
cott.268 Because application of the antitrust "rule of reason" in such
situations allows a balancing of expected public benefits against ex-
pected harms, there is ample authority for the courts (or for the FTC in
developing a trade regulation rule) to assess the probabilities and con-
clude that the public interest requires the more extensive prohibition.
tunately in some doubt. See Community Blood Bank v. FTC, 405 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1969). The
FTC has not been deterred, however, and has undertaken to prove that the AMA is operated for
the "profit.. .of its members," as required by § 4 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 44 (1976). Ameri-
can Medical Ass'n, F.T.C. Dkt. No. 9064, TRADE REo. REP. (CCH) 21,302 (Apr. 26, 1977). The
conflict-of-interests analysis in the text accompanying note 214 supra might help the Commission
overcome this obstacle, permitting jurisdiction to be asserted on an objective rather than a subjec-
tive basis. See note 224 supra. Indeed, the suggested rule might take the form of a specification of
activities triggering the Commission's jurisdiction.
266. The "free speech" arguments against such a radical remedy are evaluated in the text
accompanying notes 220-23 supra.
267. By proceeding under the FTC Act rather than the Sherman Act, the FTC would avoid
exposing physicians to criminal and treble damage liability.
268. See Goldberg & Greenberg 58-62. See also text accompanying notes 279-98 infra, argu-
ing that financing and cost-containment measures dominated by organized medicine should be
prohibited under antitrust principles for the same reasons.
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In developing rules for medical societies, particular problems
could be anticipated in the presentation of "news" to the members
through society-sponsored publications. Consideration should perhaps
be given to prohibiting society-sponsored publicity tending to induce a
boycott, such as reporting of explicit proposals for boycotts or of in-
flammatory opinion unbalanced by opposing views. Although it is not
obvious just how a rule could effectively prevent a medical society from
allowing its meetings to become forums for conspiracy-making, the en-
forcement agencies and the antitrust courts have had experience with
trade association meetings in other industries269 and should be able to
define potential abuses. Total repression of discussion would not be ap-
propriate, of course, 270 and is not required. All that is needed is an
effective impairment of physician organizations' ability to inspire a crit-
ical mass of physicians to act with primary regard for their collective
rather than their individual self-interest.271 Finally, it is elementary
that the medical society should avoid actions designed to penalize indi-
vidual physicians who elect to cooperate with cost-containment efforts,
including identification of such individuals by name so as to invite their
colleagues to exert pressure upon them.
Such restrictions on a medical society, its officers and its newslet-
ter, if they should be adopted, would undoubtedly be perceived as ex-
treme measures, but anything less might be inadequate to break the
organized profession's de facto grip on developments not legitimately
subject to its control. It is arguable, of course, that such a remedy is
more appropriately imposed as a remedial measure following a finding
of a specific violation than in a trade regulation rule designed to clarify
269. See, e.g., American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
270. See text accompanying notes 220-33 supra.
271. The logic of collective action requires that each individual actor have some assurance of
solidarity within the group. Without such assurance, an individual would perceive no benefit to
himself in acting against his immediate self-interest. See M. OLsoN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION 9-16 (1971). Professional organizations are able to minimie the "free-rider" prob-
lem--the tendency of individuals to let others bear the cost of taking action that would benefit the
entire group-in a variety of ways: First, membership in the organization itself may carry certain
benefits unrelated to the benefits of parallel behavior, making loss or denial of membership a
sanction to be feared. Id 137-41. See text accompanying notes 12-25 supra on the use of medical
society membership and hospital staff privileges to achieve professional solidarity. Second, explicit
regulatory powers possessed by the organization will typically feature a degree of prosecutorial
discretion, making a professional naturally fearful of violating the revealed preferences of his
colleagues. See text accompanying notes 24-25 supra. Third, informal interaction also provides a
means of registering disapproval of independent behavior. Finally, ideological cohesiveness, re-
flecting the nonmonetary returns from and features of professional practice, may also serve to
strengthen the commitment to parallel action. Many of the mechanisms for encouraging interde-
pendent behavior will work best in smaller groups. See M. OLSON, supra, at 22-36, suggesting that




the substantive offense.27 2 Nevertheless, if investigation confirmed the
existence of a real hazard of boycott and harassment due to the medical
profession's receptivity to signals flashed in code from society head-
quarters, the mere sending of such signals could be barred as creating
such a danger to the public, and carrying so little public benefit, that it
could be classed as a restraint of trade or, under the Federal Trade
Commission Act, as an "unfair method of competition."
273
The dependence of physicians on hospital staff privileges and on
the good will of their hospital colleagues creates an enormous problem
for antitrust enforcement, because interactions among staff members
are close, presumptively legitimate, and difficult to reconstruct or eval-
uate after the fact. But, even though it will be impossible to prevent
many subtle pressures from being exerted, clarification of antitrust doc-
trine applicable to hospital medical staffs should still be useful in curb-
ing the worst abuses and thereby improving the prospects for
innovation. Perhaps an FTC trade regulation rule delineating the legit-
imate scope of hospital staff activities would be of value. Among the
things that might be excluded by rule from the staffs agenda, except
where specifically relevant to legitimate staff activities, are such matters
as competitive developments in the community and the cost-contain-
ment initiatives of private third-party payers. Where the staff as an en-
tity does have a legitimate concern with some third party's activities, it
might be required to adhere to appropriate procedures. Even if such
explicit restrictions on hospital staff discussions seem too extreme or
difficult to enforce fairly, the alternative might be even worse from the
medical profession's point of view-either a continuation under uncer-
tain legal rules of harassing lawsuits destructive of effective and desira-
ble peer review or a de facto or de jure shift to open staffs.
While clarifying the law should yield significant benefits, it is not
clear that prospective case-by-case remedies could add much to what
has been suggested here. An injunction issued following a finding of a
violation might not be much more specific or clear than an FTC rule or
recognized legal doctrine, and the effort required to obtain such an or-
272. The judgment in National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1355
(1978), prohibited the Society "from adopting any official opinion, policy statement or guideline
stating or implying that competitive bidding is unethical." Id at 1368. The Court, with Chief
Justice Burger dissenting on the point, found no merit in the claim that this order abridged first
amendment rights. The discussion focused on the remedial context, thus leaving open the possibil-
ity that preventive rulemaking would be regarded differently.
273. Although such a rule would act as a prior restraint on expression by organizations that
had not themselves been shown to be predisposed to conspiracy-making, the inherently commer-
cial aspect of such speech, given the strong economic interests of the professionals engaging in it,
should relax the standard for determining whether it can be restrained. See note 226 supra.
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der against a single county medical society or a single hospital staff
might seem seldom justified by the relief obtained. As a consequence,
attention must be given to policing these peculiarly intractable re-
straints by the encouragement of treble damage suits and by criminal
proceedings against flagrant abusers of professional power. Regrettable
as it would be to impose such sanctions on an honorable profession, its
education to society's new expectations may require it.
2. Assessing the Prospects for Innovation Under an Antitrust
Regime. Even if antitrust principles are clarified and applied to give
appropriate effect to concerns about how physicians' concerted action
can inhibit innovations in health care financing and delivery, it is still
far from certain that would-be innovators would have as free a hand as
one might wish. Although conditions might be more conducive to pri-
vate initiatives than they are at present, it would be naive to think that
the job was complete. As has been seen, physicians have a considerable
capacity to frustrate change at the local level and they could well suc-
ceed in many instances despite the best efforts of antitrust enforcers and
the courts. Moreover, recognition of potential obstacles could deter all
innovations except those acceptable to the profession, thus occasioning
no overt behavior to which antitrust penalties could attach. Finally,
even if an innovative plan were in fact the victim of egregiously preda-
tory practices, it might be reluctant to sue, to threaten suit or to invoke
the public prosecutor for fear of hardening the opposition still further,
with only an uncertain prospect of ultimate relief. The better part of
valor might be for the plan to accommodate itself to the profession's
demands, dropping its more threatening features. The deal struck
would be directly proportionate to the profession's de facto power, per-
haps reduced, but not eliminated, by the antitrust threat.
When litigation did arise, there would be a substantial risk that the
courts would hesitate to doubt professionals' motives, to narrow profes-
sional groups' claims to self-regulatory power, or to place on provider
organizations the burden of proving the legitimacy of their goals and
methods. Indeed, many judges, themselves members of a learned pro-
fession, will regard as undue cynicism the skepticism about physician
organizations which antitrust enforcers bring to this endeavor. Heavy
costs and long delays would result if the courts, taken in by profession-
als' expressed concern for the quality of care and other ostensibly non-
commercial values, prove reluctant to use per se principles in dealing
with professional activities.
For all these reasons, antitrust policing of informal concerted ac-
tion in the medical profession may not, by itself, succeed in adequately
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protecting opportunities for change. There should, however, be no
thought that an enforcement effort to curb professional restraints is not
worth making. Instead, the implication to be drawn may be that some-
thing more is required. Thus, not only must private sector initiatives of
all kinds receive increased governmental encouragement (or reduced
discouragement), 74 but antitrust enforcers must consider going beyond
addressing professionally imposed restraints on would-be innovators
and contemplate challenging some of the other foundations of the med-
ical profession's power."' 5
V. THE ANTITRUST STATUS OF THE PROFESSION'S OWN
"REFORMS"
If antitrust enforcement concentrating on health care providers'
coercive tactics cannot be counted on satisfactorily to open up opportu-
nities for experimentation and change in the market for health care
financing and delivery, what else can be done? The usual answer is that
government regulation and purchasing power must be brought to bear,
but the argument suggested here is that antitrust enforcement must fo-
cus not only on exclusionary practices such as boycotts and abuses of
the medical profession's disciplinary powers but also on the profes-
sion's more sophisticated tactics in the struggle to shape health care
financing and delivery in the doctors' interest.
Earlier discussion has shown how the medical profession's ability
to retain its prerogatives has been greatly strengthened by its periodic
moves to provide or make available on a limited basis what the public
was coming to demand. Thus, Blue Shield plans were a limited answer
to the demand for health insurance,2 76 limited acceptance to HMOs
was a concession to afait accompli,277 and foundations for medical care
(FMCs) were a limited response to the desire for HMO-type care and
274. The present tax laws are a substantial disincentive to cost-containment innovation. See
text accompanying notes 164-65 supra.
275. In addition to the enforcement agenda laid out in the next section of this Article, anti-
trust enforcers have been looking at a number of institutional bulwarks of professional domi-
nance. The FTC has challenged the AMA's role in the accreditation of medical schools, see note
240 supra, and has challenged restrictions on professional advertising, see American Medical
Ass'n, F.T.C. Dkt. No. 9064, TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,302 (Apr. 26, 1977). In addition, the
administration of licensure laws, restrictions on corporate practice in professional areas, and the
functioning of health planning agencies and professional standards review organizations are all on
the FTC agenda.
276. See text accompanying notes 4-44, 139-48 supra.
277. See Note, The Role of Prepaid Group Practice in Relieving the Medical Care Crisis, 84
HARv. L. REv. 887, 955-56 (1971).
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the pressure for cost containment." Even though the profession has
ultimately sponsored things that the public has wanted, the conditions
it has imposed have always denied the public many options and have
served providers' interests at least as much as consumers'. In each case,
the profession's collective concessions have served to define and to le-
gitimize a new line of defense and to restore the profession's united
front just when it was in some danger of crumbling. With its public
positions once again defensible, all of the profession's formidable pow-
ers of self-defense-its public prestige, its esprit de corps, its ethical
codes, its all-embracing self-regulatory machinery and its ability to
maintain internal discipline-could then be brought to bear with ap-
parent legitimacy. The antitrust laws, concerned as they are with eco-
nomic freedom, aggregations of private power and consumer welfare,
should surely have something to say about strategies that physicians
acting in concert devise in defense of their economic interests.
A. Professionally Sponsored Prepayment Plans.
In examining the market prospects for HMOs, this writer once
concluded that professionally controlled Blue Shield plans were proba-
bly not "a very substantial obstacle to emergence of a satisfactorily
competitive health care marketplace."279 This assessment must now be
revised in view of, first, the failure of HMOs to become a substantial
competitive force and, second, the somewhat pessimistic conclusion
reached above about the ability of antitrust rules on boycotts and re-
lated restraints to maintain an environment adequately conducive to
private innovation. The existence of profession-sponsored prepayment
plans seems indeed to be an "obstacle to emergence of a satisfactorily
competitive health care marketplace." Moreover, there would seem to
be some prospect for applying the Sherman Act to remove professional
control of Blue Shield plans where it still exists.2"'
The McCarran-Ferguson Act's exemption from the antitrust laws
of "the business of insurance" '' surely provides no warrant for orga-
nized medicine to enter that business. The implications for competition
and innovation of allowing an industry cartel to dominate the business
of insuring against the need for the industry's services are too great to
be ignored, and the usual policy of construing antitrust exemptions nar-
278. See text accompanying notes 58-61 supra. For an analogous professional move to pre-
empt a market opportunity seized by a would-be innovator, see note 211 and accompanying text.
279. Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 1, at 772.
280. The FTC's possible interest in seeking such a result appears in recent congressional testi-
mony by Chairman Pertschuk. See note 139 supra.
281. See notes 129-30 supra and text accompanying notes 123, 129-30 supra.
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rowly would appropriately apply to this question. A recent district
court decision in Ohio appears to have accepted an argument similar to
that made here, refusing to extend the McCarran exemption to a medi-
cal society alleged to dominate a Blue Shield plan and to have used it
for its own purposes.28 2
A possible defense for some Blue Shield plans is that state law has
given the profession a warrant to offer its own service plan.283 This de-
fense would seem to be greatly narrowed, however, by the Supreme
Court's refusal in Goldfarb to recognize professional activity as exempt
state action unless it is compelled, not simply authorized or
"prompted," by state law.284 A state Blue Shield law merely authoriz-
ing creation of professionally dominated service plans would probably
not now shield such plans from antitrust scrutiny 2 85 If the plan could
not continue lawfully under state law without continued professional
control, it could be liquidated by the antitrust court unless the state
acted to lift the restriction.
Application of the rule of reason to professional sponsorship of
prepayment plans could well yield the following conclusions in view of
the plan's influence over physicians' fees and the record of Blue
Shield's part in consolidating professional domination of private third-
party payers: The potential harms flowing from one plan's special sta-
tus as the medical profession's chosen instrument are substantial; all of
the undeniable benefits of physician-sponsored prepayment plans
could be derived through independent insurance plans or other prepay-
ment mechanisms; policing the profession's conduct toward competing
insurers and other innovative plans and toward physicians inclined to
cooperate in innovative ventures is an inadequate protection of com-
petitive values for all the reasons elaborated in earlier discussion. The
282. Ohio v. Ohio Medical Indem., Inc., 1976-2 Trade Cases 61,128 (S.D. Ohio 1976). The
Blue Shield plan itself was dismissed as a defendant, however, because its practices, even if influ-
enced by the medical society, were held to be part of the "business of insurance" under the Mc-
Carran Act. Id at 70,112. Such reasoning might be deemed unduly formalistic, and the dismissal
might unduly complicate remedial measures. For another line of attack on physician domination
of financing vehicles, see Ballard v. Blue Shield, 543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1976), cer. denied, 430
U.S. 922 (1977).
283. See, e.g., State Medical Soe'y v. Commissioner of Ins., 70 Wis. 2d 144, 233 N.W.2d 470
(1975).
284. 421 U.S. at 791.
285. Although a significant state legislative policy-the belief that service benefit plans were
acceptable if, and perhaps only if, controlled by professional interests--would be overridden by
the antitrust attack on professionally controlled plans, the federal action does not directly chal-
lenge the validity of state law itself but only the private initiative voluntarily taken under it. As the
Supreme Court said in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943), "[A] state does not give immu-
nity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that
their action is lawful."
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ultimate conclusion of such an analysis would be that professional con-
trol of a substantial prepayment plan violates section 1 of the Sherman
Act. For the reasons next discussed, this conclusion would hold even if
professional control appeared to result in greater doctor cooperation
with cost-containment efforts.
B. Professionally Sponsored Cost Containment.
The antitrust status of FMCs has yet to be tested, though some
years ago the thesis was advanced that they could not stand under a
Sherman Act analysis.286 This was and still is a surprising conclusion
because foundations are dedicated to lowering costs and improving
quality and have been shown to have some beneficial effects.287 Never-
theless, it can be argued that FMCs are a device for curbing the ex-
cesses of some physicians as a means of maintaining the monopolies
and profits of the cartel members as a group against new competition
and/or government intervention. Although FMCs may in fact succeed
in lowering health care costs, they cannot be expected to duplicate the
results of maintaining a competitive market, and the entry-limiting
price level they maintain, though responsive in fact to potential compe-
tition from HMOs and other innovators, will be higher than a competi-
tive price. The same argument would apply to any professionally
controlled plan or initiative that asserted its effectiveness in cost con-
tainment as a defense.
Under the procompetitive premise of the antitrust laws, FMCs and
similar initiatives should be recognized as part of a profit-maximizing
strategy of a coalition of monopolists. Case law suggesting that the
fixing of maximum prices is regarded no more favorably than mini-
mum-price fixing would seem appropriately invoked to curb private
price regulation undertaken by a cartel.288 In many market circum-
stances, an FMC could be challenged as an exclusionary tactic of a
monopolist 289 or as the product of a conspiracy to monopolize the pro-
286. Havighurst, HMOs, supra note 1, at 767-77; Havighurst, Speculations, supra note 1, at
257-63. For a brief description of the foundations, see text accompanying notes 58-61 supra.
287. See, e.g., Edgabl, Taft, Friedland & Linde, supra note 59. But their achievements are
considerably less impressive than those of independent HMOs. See, e.g. , Gaus, Cooper & Hirsch-
man, supra note 59.
288. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Sea-
gram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951). Both cases involved so-called vertical restraints whereby a
seller sought to limit the resale prices of his customers. The illegality of a horizontal restraint on
maximum prices would seem to follow a fortiori in view of the anticompetitive, entry-limiting
purpose and effect. The elements of coercion, of assumed extragovernmental power and restriction
on the "freedom of traders," id. at 213, are the same in either case.
289. If HMOs had a substantial market share, a monopolization charge against the physician
organizers of an FMC under § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), might fail unless
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vision of medical care.29 The most likely theory of attack on FMC-
type efforts, however, would be under section 1 of the Sherman Act as a
combination in restraint of trade lacking virtues sufficient to redeem its
several anticompetitive features.291 Although in both the HMO and
PSRO legislation Congress has been highly tolerant of professionally
dominated reforms, no explicit antitrust exemptions appear in those
laws, and it is not difficult, using established rules of statutory construc-
tion, to give effect to these enactments without disturbing overriding
antitrust principles.292 The fundamental premise of the antitrust laws,
which can be contested in a legislative but not in a judicial forum, is
that the competitive solution is always preferable to the cartel's.
While it seems superfluous to elaborate all of the legal arguments
here, it is worth noting several ways in which the analysis in this Article
strengthens the case for curbing organized medicine's endeavors to get
its house in order and thereby to maintain its essential dominance. Pre-
viously, it was arguable that the FMC might have a role as an appro-
priate response by an otherwise disorganized fee-for-service sector to
competition from independent HMOs actually present in the market-
place. Thus, it was noted that "an essential item of proof in establishing
the antitrust defense of the FMC is a showing that insurers are unable
or unwilling to take on the job. '293 This Article has already concluded,
insured fee-for-service medicine were treated as a separate relevant market and HMO care as an
imperfect substitute. Even then, the court's natural tendency would be to look at the FMC's mar-
ket share rather than the share of its sponsors. One could anticipate difficulty in persuading a
court to view a strategy preserving and strengthening the natural monopoly power of a large
number of independent practitioners, see note 174 supra, as monopolizing conduct. See Havig-
hurst, HMOs, supra note 1, at 776-77 & n.181.
290. Market definition appears to be less of a problem in § 2 attempt or conspiracy cases than
in monopolization cases. Turner, Antitrust Policy andthe Cellophane Case, 70 HARV. L. REV. 281,
303-08 (1956).
291. The theory is developed in Havighurst, HMOs, supra note I, at 767-77; Havighurst,
Speculations, supra note 1, at 257-63.
292. First, the HMO Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to 300e-15 (Supp. V 1975), as amended by Pub. L.
No. 94-460, 90 Stat. 1945 (1976), contemplates "individual practice associations" (IPAs), id. §
300e-15, and the expectation was undoubtedly that many of these would be under professional
sponsorship, following the FMC model. The law provides no explicit endorsement of such plans,
however, and IPAs may be established by other interests. There is nothing in the law to prevent
antitrust from supplying the means of keeping the useful IPA vehicle, see text accompanying note
114 supra, out of organized medicine's control. Second, although the PSRO law, 42 U.S.C. §§
1320c etseq., (Supp. V 1975), enfranchises professionally dominated review organizations, it gives
them no mandate outside the realm of federally financed care, which presents special problems.
Construing these laws in the light of the general principle that repeal of the antitrust statutes by
subsequent specific regulatory enactments will not be implied unless necessary to make the regula-
tory statute work, see, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963), leaves antitrust a
major role in structuring the financing system and curbing abuses of professional self-regulatory
powers.
293. Havighurst, Speculations, supra note 1, at 259.
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however, that this is not a matter reliably subject to proof, that insurer
testimony is self-serving, and that the means are readily available for
insurers to compete effectively in cost containment. This availability of
alternative means of solving the problems that FMCs purport to ad-
dress means that the FMCs' alleged benefits are entitled to little weight
in the balancing process.
Another reason for taking an even harder line against profession-
ally sponsored reforms than that previously advocated is that HMOs
seem unable by themselves to supply the competition needed to obviate
concern about the FMC's monopoly of fee-for-service medicine. The
earlier commentary, which strongly praised HMOs, was written before
Congress undertook to regulate HMOs heavily in the name of helping
them and was based on a faith that the HMO movement would be
allowed to flourish, a faith that has been largely unrewarded.294 In only
a handful of local markets have HMOs proven effective enough as
competitors to allow the FMC to be perceived as a competitive re-
sponse rather than as an exclusionary maneuver.295
Finally, the analysis in this Article should heighten the concern
that the availability of an FMC or some other token of the medical
profession's apparent commitment to internal reform makes the profes-
sion's concerted resistance to innovative alternatives substantially more
effective and more difficult to contest under antitrust principles than it
would otherwise be. The antitrust effort to loosen organized medicine's
domination of its economic environment is unlikely to succeed unless it
can frustrate the profession's efforts to implement its own halfway
measures as solutions to the problems that the public comes to per-
294. See, e.g., Kissam, supra note 3, at 492-99.
295. See generally FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STAFF REPORT ON THE HEALTH MAINTE-
NANCE ORGANIZATION AND ITS EFFECTS ON COMPETrrION (1977). The Minneapolis-St. Paul
area, with six substantial independent HMOs actively serving the area and growing rapidly, id.
37-44, is one in which the FMC can perhaps be seen as simply one more competitor. The follow-
ing report indicates the pressure under which the FMC operates:
In order to cut hospital costs, the Minneapolis Physicians Health Plan, an individual
practice association model HMO sponsored by the .Hennepin County Medical Society,
has sent a letter to its 1,000 participating physicians indicati[ng] that overuse ofhospital
facilities is a "major, continuing abuse" that increases the cost of medical care. Accord-
ing to Russell Wilson, executive director, the plan is conducting pre-admission reviews,
concurrent reviews for length of stay, and retrospective reviews to monitor changes and
medication, develop physician profiles and identify problem areas. The new measures
are necessary if the plan is to remain competitive with the six other HMOs operating in
the Twin Cities area, and if the plan is to become self-sustaining. "If we could cut one
day from the average length of stay in hospital, we could make the plan workable,"
according to Wilson.
HMO & Health Services Rep. 9-10 (July 1977). Despite an appearance of dramatic change that
reduces concern about the FMC, prospects might be better for even more substantial changes if
the medical society could not operate its own plan. It is still not clear why, even in Minneapolis,
the fee-for-service practitioners should be allowed a chosen instrument of self-defense.
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Whatever the outcome of the technical antitrust analysis of FMCs
and other professionally dominated reforms, the substantive concerns
raised in this discussion may be reflected in regulatory decisions and
policy planning in the health care system. Thus, certificates of need
might be denied to FMC-type HMOs on the express ground that they
are monopolistic strategems designed to foreclose more substantial
change.2 97 Already, in Massachusetts, an FMC-type HMO has encoun-
tered antitrust-related arguments in seeking needed approval from the
insurance department. 298 Although it may be expecting too much, al-
erting the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, state and lo-
cal health planning bodies, and other health system regulators and
decisionmakers to the anticompetitive hazards of FMCs and similar
professional initiatives may take some of the burden off of the antitrust
296. Needless to say, the argument in this Article directly contradicts the philosophy underly-
ing current proposals to encourage professional and hospital interests to control rising costs. See
note 61 supra. Though the proposal for voluntary cost containment was developed with the anti-
trust laws very much in mind, it should still be held offensive to antitrust policy. The program as
outlined, see Letter, supra note 61, would rely for sanctions not on professional or commercial
boycotts or other coercive measures but on public pressures brought to bear through a certification
or seal-of-approval program. Nevertheless, the proposal would strengthen the medical profession's
and hospitals' solidarity with respect to other cost-containment measures that might be taken. The
objective of reducing the rate of hospital cost increases by two percentage points in each of two
years would be held out as all the public is entitled to, and other attempts at cost containment
would be held in abeyance while the profession and the hospitals seek to demonstrate their good
faith. In addition, it seems unlikely that the mechanisms for effectuating the desired voluntary cost
containment could avoid facilitating the allocation of markets and the discussion of prices and
other elements normally left to competition.
297. See Havighurst, supra note 65.
298. See Controversy SwirlsAround Say State HMO, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Apr. 15, 1978, at
23; IPA Hit With Antitrust Charge, WORLD NEws, Apr. 17, 1978, at 8; "Open" HMOs Await
Massachusetts Licenses, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Feb. 11, 1978, at 1. From press accounts, the IPA
(an FMC-type plan) appeals to doctors as a means of combatting recent cost-containment meas-
ures undertaken by Blue Shield in Massachusetts. See text accompanying note 113 supra. The
antitrust challenge goes primarily to the price-fixing concern raised by the use of a usual and
customary fee schedule, see Kallstrom 654-59, market division by the several IPA plans in the
state, and use by these plans of ajoint selling agent. Nevertheless, concern about the effect on Blue
Shield would also be warranted. The insurance department had raised issues concerning the plan's
ability to meet its commitments for the premium to be charged, suggesting that the case may
involve below-cost disciplinary pricing designed to bully Blue Shield into line just as earlier dis-
cussion suggested may have occurred in the Oregon State Medical Society case. See text accompa-
nying notes 54-57 supra.
The press accounts do not reveal whether the IPAs in Massachusetts are controlled by
professional societies or are independently sponsored or whether they have received the societies'
"seal of approval." It is at least possible that a plan could become the profession's "chosen instru-
ment" without such control or explicit endorsement. But in such cases, the plan's role in carrying
messages and assurances back and forth among practitioners and providing the service of organiz-
ing the cartel might lead to a finding of conspiracy under Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States,
306 U.S. 208 (1939).
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enforcers and widen acceptance of their assumption of a role in health
sector developments.
C. The Medical Societies as Collective Bargainers.
A further implication of the analysis in this Article is that profes-
sional organizations are, or can readily be, prohibited from engaging in
negotiations with health insurers, unions, employers and other con-
sumer groups over the nature and details of financing arrangements.
While overt bargaining over fees has been generally eschewed because
of the antitrust problem,2 99 informal bargaining over other terms of
dealing has occurred without recognition that concerted action on such
matters also raises antitrust issues.300 The prohibition against collective
bargaining over such matters as an insurer's second-opinion require-
ment would appropriately apply to the medical society even if the ne-
gotiations were initiated by the insurer."' Moreover, the insurer
implementing a deal negotiated with the medical establishment may
itself be guilty of at least a technical infraction as a co-conspirator.
The underlying reason why negotiations between insurers and pro-
fessional organizations have occurred (indicating the reason why they
should be foreclosed) is the implicit threat of boycott or related diffi-
culty facing any plan that departed from accepted practice without first
securing professional approval. Although private advice may be avail-
able from the medical society, there should no longer be any necessity
for negotiating the terms of cost-containment initiatives. Removing the
local medical societies from their accustomed role will seem counter-
productive to some in view of certain beneficial changes that have been
introduced as a direct result of insurer-provider negotiations in the
past. But, as in the case of the benefits flowing from FMCs, these im-
provements are probably minor compared to what would be achieved
by independent third parties negotiating with individual providers in
the absence of the boycott threat.
Health care providers' practice of combining for the purpose of
bargaining with third-party payers has a venerable history, giving it an
apparent legitimacy that seems to argue for its continuation. The prac-
299. See Kallstrom 661-62, discussing the distinction between individually negotiated and
collectively negotiated fees in a variety of contexts involving prepayment for professional services.
300. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 212, at 285-89. Sullivan notes that the absence of price-
fixing removes the case from coverage by any per se rule. Nevertheless, utilization is at least as
sensitive an item as price in competitive bargaining in health care, and courts should not hesitate
to extend per se concepts to this case.
301. Kallstrom elucidates this principle in the context of fee-setting by insurers. Kallstrom
661. Although IPAs can be created by private health insurers and other interests, few have been
begun without specific approval of the local medical society.
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tice was obviously inherent in the original status of Blue Cross and
Blue Shield plans as creatures of provider organizations, and bargain-
ing between such plans and providers was inconsequential as long as
the service plan was already charged with serving providers' collective
interests. But, as some Blue plans came to be more independent, facing
competition on the one hand and the demands of consumers and regu-
lators on the other, the bargaining process became more intense. Nev-
ertheless, given the gradualness of the evolution away from strict
provider control, it probably never occurred to anyone that providers
should be negotiated with only individually and not collectively. In any
event, there was usually no explicit agreement on actual prices to be
charged or paid; rather, they varied with costs or circumstances and
were handled either by a cost-related formula (in the case of hospitals)
or by reference to usual and customary fees or charges.30 2 Thus, the
most obvious antitrust concern-price-was not aroused, and it was
possible to see other issues, such as cost-containment measures, merely
as questions of ethics and administrative detail.
Bargaining between the Blues and organized providers has had
more than just historical acceptance behind it. The special relationship
with providers is expressly recognized in many state laws.303 Moreover,
the McCarran-Ferguson Act and state regulation have long pushed an-
titrust issues far into the background. Further, the Blue plans have be-
come very large in many places, giving rise to a need on the part of
providers to organize to protect themselves against potential exploita-
tion once their direct control was weakened. Indeed, insurance com-
missioners in some states have leaned heavily on the Blues in an
attempt to use their monopsony power in just this way, producing con-
frontations that are as much political as economic and therefore seem
to make a collective industry response appropriate. 31 It would be un-
fortunate if the antitrust laws were applied to deny self-help to provid-
302. See Kallstrom.
303. See, e.g., State Medical Soe'y v. Commissioner of Ins., 70 Wisc. 2d 144, 233 N.W.2d 470
(1975).
304. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1973); Frankford Hosp. v.
Blue Cross, 417 F. Supp. 1104 (E.D. Pa. 1976), afl'dper cur/am, 554 F.2d 1253 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 860 (1977); Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 431 F. Supp. 5 (E.D. Pa. 1975), a dper
cur/am, 557 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1976). For the interpretation that the application of the McCarran
exemption in these cases reflected the Insurance Commissioner's active involvement, see Royal
Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 556 F.2d 1375, 1382-83 (5th Cir. 1977), certgranted, 98
S. Ct. 1488 (1978). See also note 131 supra. In all of these cases, the providers engaged in collec-
tive bargaining with Blue Cross, and, in Travelers, the court alluded approvingly to this fact in
answer to the plaintiffs claim that Blue Cross used "coercion" against the hospitals. 481 F.2d at
84.
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ers confronted by a state-created and state-maintained monopsonist. 30 5
The problem faced by the antitrust enforcement agencies and the
courts is to find ways of breaking down providers' united front toward
third-party innovations in financing and delivery wherever collective
bargaining cannot be justified as a legitimate exercise of political or
countervailing economic power. This is a complex undertaking, but one
incisive and effective stroke would be to apply antitrust principles to
sever providers' relationships with the Blues once and for all, con-
verting the Blues into independent third parties"° and perhaps splitting
some of them into smaller units to reduce their market power. An alter-
native would be to recognize the Blues' special status in the community
and their special relationship to providers by allowing collective bar-
gaining with them while at the same time protecting the right of com-
mercial insurers, unions, employers and other consumer-operated plans
to negotiate with providers individually. However appealing this less
radical approach may seem, it runs the risk that the Blues would re-
main (or become) the providers' chosen instruments, with results simi-
lar to those in the Oregon State Medical Society case. While the
political pressures bearing on the Blue plans might prevent this from
occurring, they have apparently not done so yet, since commercial in-
surers seem unable to go much beyond the Blues in their cost-contain-
ment endeavors. Moreover, the Blues' apparent status as models for
insurer behavior flows directly from collective bargaining, which by
conferring legitimacy on mild cost-containment efforts makes any more
aggressive efforts appear illegitimate because not professionally vali-
dated. For these reasons, it seems highly desirable to put the Blues on
the same footing as everybody else, treating them more like private in-
surers and less like political instrumentalities.
Although a Blue plan or a large buying group might wield monop-
sony power in some communities, that problem could be dealt with on
an ad hoc basis wherever specific abuses appeared. Buyer coalitions
should be controlled by antitrust principles, too, but in the present cli-
mate pragmatism suggests some tolerance for consumer self-help meas-
ures taken against a background of past abuses by providers and the
demonstrated stubbornness of the medical monopoly." 7
305. See notes 122, 131-33, 232-33 supra and accompanying text.
306. See Pertschuk Testimony, supra note 139.




This Article has argued that clarification and enforcement of the
responsibilities under the antitrust laws of medical societies, hospital
staffs and other organizations of competing physicians would have the
benefit of significantly increasing opportunities for medical care cost-
containment measures by third-party payers and other would-be inno-
vators in the health care system. The potential magnitude of the bene-
fits that would flow from a stronger antitrust effort remains open to
question, however, for several reasons. Certainly antitrust enforcers
and the courts can never be as single-minded as the academic observer,
and, as has been seen, many practical as well as doctrinal problems
would beset any effort to change the health world dramatically with
antitrust weapons. Moreover, professional restraints alone cannot ac-
count for the deep-seated reluctance of real-world health insurers and
their customers to pursue aggressively many of the cost-containment
strategies that are available. Such interest in cost containment as does
exist among insurance purchasers may not be sufficient under current
circumstances to induce all the private innovation needed to satisfy the
public clamor for cost control. Although health insurers are revealing
increasing cost awareness, they may be responding as much to political
as to market pressures.
The contrast between weak private interest in undertaking major
cost-containment innovation and public dismay over rising costs practi-
cally compels the conclusion that the tax laws' unlimited treatment of
health insurance as a tax-free fringe benefit, weakening private cost-
containment incentives, is a powerful force behind the market failure
for which public remedies are frantically being sought. Yet, despite this
fundamental distortion, there would seem to be enough signs of an
awakening private interest in health care costs to justify using antitrust
tools to give the private sector a chance to show what it can yet do, even
operating at the artificial margin which the tax laws dictate. Even
though private efforts would be very much diluted without a change in
the tax laws, that would seem to be an argument for changing those
laws, not for giving up on the private sector and attempting to solve the
problem by pervasive regulation. If the tax laws could be changed and
antitrust enforcement were reasonably effective, then a strong argu-
ment could be made that any level of cost containment that was
achieved, even if it disappointed expectations, was as close to the social
optimum as we could hope to come. The private market would then
serve as a useful yardstick for public programs, something that it has
heretofore failed to do.
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The movement for some kind of national health insurance pro-
gram will in due course result in a major federal initiative designed to
put the health care system on a firmer track, and certainly, in view of
the inequities in the present system and its poor overall performance,
some federal initiative is required. Although it has long been acknowl-
edged that one option available to the government is to foster a system
controlled to a significant degree by market forces, that option has
never been explored with the same vigor as regulatory alternatives.
Nevertheless, one recent proposal for national health insurance has fo-
cused attention more sharply than ever before on the possibilities for
building on the private sector's strengths by facilitating consumer
choice among a variety of competing health care plans under condi-
tions fostering competition based on price as well as the plans' other
features. The so-called "Consumer-Choice Health Plan," formulated
by Professor Alain Enthoven, °8 depends heavily on changing the tax
laws to strengthen consumer cost consciousness and on the use of
vouchers to give the low-income recipients of extra federal subsidies
the means of shopping in a competitive marketplace. Although the En-
thoven plan contemplates more regulation than may be needed to
achieve the desired objective- particularly in limiting the opportuni-
ties for redesigning insurance benefit packages along the lines sug-
gested in this Article 3 -it convincingly sets forth the rationale for
relying on private rather than public decision makers to restructure the
health care financing and delivery system.
The Enthoven plan or any other market-oriented health policy
would require an effective antitrust enforcement strategy310 to maintain
not just the appearance of choice in a pluralistic environment but the
reality of a marketplace in which private financing and delivery mecha-
nisms of all kinds could compete for consumers' dollars. Competition
308. See Enthoven.
309. Enthoven says only this:
Any plan for national health insurance must include definitions of covered benefits
and eligible persons. The choices are largely political judgments ... . The philosophy
of CCHP [Consumer-Choice Health Plan] suggests that, beyond the essentials that must
be specified by law, what is included in health benefits plans should be determined by
the consumer desires expressed in the marketplace, rather than by provider interests.
Id 714. It is not clear why Enthoven believes that benefit packages are a political question, in
view of the arguments for precision and selectivity in coverage, see text accompanying notes 82-93,
134-35 supra, and evidence that individuals have widely different preferences and needs for
financial protection, see, e.g. , Havighurst, supra note 85. Either he has bowed implicitly to the
political considerations or he believes that the HMO model, using provider incentives, is suffi-
ciently promising in both the short and long run to permit foreclosure of the kinds of innovation
needed to make insured fee-for-service medicine cost-effective.
310. See Enthoven 716, for a brief but thoughtful acknowledgment of antitrust's role. See also
Ehrbar, .4 Radical Prescroiponfor Medical Care, FORTUNE, Feb. 1977, at 164.
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must permit plans to offer a meaningful variety of combinations of the
elements that consumers and providers may regard as important in a
health plan, including its cost, the quality of care and amenities pro-
vided, the character of the doctor-patient relationship fostered, the util-
ization controls employed, and the scope of coverage and financial
protection, particularly the choice between comprehensiveness of bene-
fits and greater self-insurance for noncatastrophic risks. This Article
has sought to demonstrate that the overriding objective of antitrust pol-
icy in the health services sector must be to curb the medical profession's
traditional dictation to third parties on the subjects of financing mecha-
nisms, cost containment and organizational reforms responding to con-
sumers' preferences. On such issues, the organized medical profession,
despite its many honorable achievements and inclinations, cannot es-
cape a severe conflict of interests that makes it an inappropriate spokes-
man for patients' interests and, in particular, an unreliable authority on
the complex trade-offs between cost and the style, intensity, place and
quality of medical care. The antitrust laws embody a long-standing
general policy recognizing consumers as the best decisionmakers on
such issues.
Though only recently recognized as a major factor in health sector
developments, the antitrust laws have in fact played a significant part
in the evolution of the health services industry and the emergence of its
current problems. The practices and power structure through which the
medical profession now controls its economic environment are in large
measure a reflection of antitrust's default during the era when federal
law based on the commerce power could not reach local restraints and
when the "learned professions" were assumed to have a special right to
police their own domains. Moreover, although the Supreme Court has
had only two occasions to address the antitrust laws' application to de-
velopments in health care financing, those two cases--the AMA case,
vindicating HMOs, and the Oregon State Medical Society case, seem-
ingly legitimizing doctor-sponsored health insurance as the profession's
"fighting ship"-shaped much of the framework for subsequent policy
developments. Thus, it is no accident that we have perceived HMOs,
the one innovation that slipped through the medical profession's de-
fenses, as the only alternative to traditional, hands-off prepayment
mechanisms and have neglected the many other approaches to financ-
ing and delivery that lie on the unexplored spectrum between prepaid
group practice on the one hand and traditional insurance and service
plans on the other. This Article has sought to document the belief that
it is not too late, if we could count on a small amount of governmental
leadership, to make up for past failures of antitrust law and policy, to
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expand the range of perceived health policy options and to stimulate
promising private experimentation and change addressed to the cost
problem. As a uniquely American institution, the antitrust laws may be
the distinguishing feature that gives the United States, alone in the
world, the option of relying more on the private sector than on govern-
ment to make its health care system operate in the public interest.

